

P R E S E N C E

# PRESENCE

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*“Being Here”: Wrestling with Resemblance in an  
Antirepresentational Era*

*“Being here”*

“Being here,” shorthand for firsthand art experiences, poses an alternative to the way we frequently grasp information about our world via pictures and language, framed and interpreted by others. Art’s cognitive engagement differs markedly because viewers play an active role in analyzing what lies before them. One of presence’s definitions is “immediate proximity in time or space,” a kind of “being here,” yet presence is too multiplicative a noun to denote direct experience. The polyvalent presence conveys connected concepts such as compassion, focus, disclosure, existence, grounding, interconnectivity, intimacy, now-ness, spiritual awareness, worldliness, and even *Dasein* (German for “being there”). The existential “being there” describes the unease that accompanies consciousness, while “being here” affords incognizance its rightful confusion, since unfamiliar art experiences tend to catch one off guard. An intimate confrontation in a public space like a museum or an art gallery, “being here” facilitates art’s role as the catalyst that triggers cognition, inspiring viewers to remember and imagine in ways previously deemed impossible.

*“Isness”*

“Being here” initially entails “isness,” the persistent state of perplexed sensibility that attends art experiences, until one gleans a work’s “received” meaning, perpetuated by critics and spectators alike. “Isness” thus precedes what American philosopher and art critic Arthur Danto terms “aboutness,” his criteria mandating art’s meaningfulness. Paradoxically, myriad enigmatic works like Marcel Duchamp’s *Large Glass* or Leonardo Da Vinci’s *Mona Lisa* resist “aboutness.” Even though they appear meaningless, none have thought them nonart.



Like Danto, I uphold the view that all works of art are meaningful (eventually) and that meaning must be “embodied,” though not necessarily inferred from the work’s appearance. Meaningfulness is so crucial to our survival that I coined the slogan “content equals contentment” nearly twenty years ago to describe the pleasure aroused when one can finally accord sense to a particular project. Problematically, works that routinely defy the capacity of curators and writers to locate their appropriate context will fail to receive public attention. “Isness” thus characterizes the way art’s meaning is always delayed, since it is never instantaneous or directly readable, as we’re wont to presume.

Danto has astutely proven that the eyes are useless when distinguishing art from non-art. In *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, he noted that it was “striking as a matter of concealed bias on [Nelson] Goodman’s part that he should have assumed that all *aesthetic* differences *are* perceptual differences,” especially since, “this will not help us with the serious ontological question, namely that of deciding which is which between artworks and nonartworks.”<sup>1</sup> To solve this ontological question, Danto proposed that embodied meanings “show” what the work is “about.” Eternally elusive, “aboutness” implies some prior explanatory concept, intended expression, or ideal interpretation. “Aboutness” joins meaning to an artwork, yet spectators construct meaning, rather than glean it from the work. Works of art are acts of discovery, not tools for expression, so spectators’ ascriptions wholly depend on their capacity to access relevant anecdotes.

In contrast to “aboutness,” “isness” stresses the significance of the art experience as occurring prior to judgment, a sequence ordered by Immanuel Kant, who distinguished the aesthetical judgment of taste as reflective since it gives rather than follows a law. “Being here” (with the work) characterizes the spacio-temporal event whereby one encounters ineffable, unspecific, or inscrutable works. Art introduces unfamiliar concepts and unusual experiences, which we mysteriously absorb and contextualize as our own. Similar in effect to what Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein termed the “phenomena of being struck,”<sup>2</sup> “isness” addresses how art experiences charge our neurological system, and trigger related emotions, memories and

concepts (some new, others long forgotten), which contribute sensibility to otherwise sensational, though meaningless, experiences (a kind of “white noise”). Our knowledge of similar events, related concepts, or an artist’s practice justify these tacit connections.

Danto admittedly projects or ascribes interpretations, rather than interpolates, so both “isness” and “aboutness” are antirepresentational practices. However well informed or useful an interpretation, it cannot be said to represent the artist’s intended expression, whose form is pictorial, not linguistic. Alternatively, a work of art cannot be said to represent whatever ideas a writer attributes to it, the way a portrait characterizes its sitter, a landscape captures sunlight, or a work realizes some manifesto. The gist of antirepresentationalism is best summed up by its principle advocate, the American philosopher Richard Rorty, who argues that knowledge is not a matter of getting reality right, but a matter of “acquiring habits of action for coping with reality.”<sup>3</sup> In light of Rorty’s insight, available interpretations enable us to cope with art as bits of reality.

Danto penned one of the first English texts concerning Existentialism, yet he has adamantly disassociated himself from its tendencies. Nonetheless, Danto’s emphasizing “aboutness” recalls the German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s notion of “handiness,” (use, meaning, or reference). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger made a radical move when he reversed phenomenology’s prioritizing an object’s “objective presence” over its “handiness.” By prioritizing meaning over presence, Existentialists and Postmodernists have incidentally privileged the discourse surrounding the work, leading viewers to seek official explanations, rather than mitigate their own responses. While experientialists concur that presence is never “objective,” they engender art experiences that invite viewers to foster personal relationships with the work at hand. Meaning remains fluid when every viewer has a different experience and repeated viewings engender new visual experiences. Artworks are thus catalysts for life-changing events!

Occurring more at the writer's desk than in art's midst, "aboutness" seems distanced, enabling rather pat, implausible aesthetic explanations to gain certitude. One of the most absurd cases concerns Clement Greenberg's championing of paintings by Helen Frankenthaler and Morris Louis, whose apparent flatness exemplified self-criticality. Despite such paintings' noticeably spatial qualities, he considered them "advanced" since "flatness" served as his special criteria for distinguishing painting from other arts. Problematically, his influential theories left two generations of "educated" viewers unable to insinuate optical depth. Odder still, he dismissed Frank Stella's rather flat black stripe paintings! Did his famous theory concern great art or favored artists?

"Isness" explains a work's temporary meaninglessness. As with a poem or a song's lyrics, knowing a particular language grants us access to the words, but the text appears meaningful after further analysis. "Isness" also accounts for the response, "This does nothing for me," the discontentment that accompanies our lacking the wherewithal to furnish meaning. Most of us have experienced the paradoxical event, whereby we come to love originally despised works, as our pool of available references expands over space and time. Is this a neurological process whereby routine exposure forges synaptic connections or does joy spring from its sudden relevance? These are arguably different descriptions of the same event.

Given the last decade's firewall of representational practices like photography, video, and figurative painting, antirepresentationalism, which denies immediate readability, would appear to be in jeopardy since such works resemble particular subjects. However, such works prove antirepresentational whenever one attributes meaning that extends beyond his/her description of what's recognizable. In an essay accompanying a survey of Bill Viola's videos, the American philosopher and psychoanalyst Donald Kuspit noted how presence combines illusion and reality. He cryptically remarked that "once perception is cleansed, the illusoriness of finite presence and the reality of infinite presence are experienced simultaneously."<sup>4</sup> Most useful for our purposes, he concludes that Viola's

work demonstrates how our sense of reality depends on our own state when we perceive it, so its eternal verity is undermined by human presence, which he views as an “unnecessary intrusion on reality.” Given my focus on “subjective presence,” I would counter that human presence is a necessary intrusion for works to flourish.


For the most part, *Presence*, the Speed Art Museum exhibition curated by Julien Robson, features representational practices like painting, photography and video that reference real things or events, yet all of these works are antirepresentational. By placing one work inside a viewing box, *Presence* focuses viewers’ attentions and foregrounds “being here,” lending each viewer’s subjective response the status of a public event. A kind of laboratory experiment, visitors to *Presence* unwittingly test whether the art experience is limited to what the work depicts or whether its presence also triggers related experiences. Do we regard *Maria* as a portrait of Gertsch’s nude wife or do we suddenly remember sunbathing nude, deciding against it, hoping others wouldn’t, or wishing we’d tried it just once? If beholding *Maria* provokes these or other thoughts, then *Maria* is the catalyst that stimulates such thoughts.

One of *Presence*’s tacit premises is that the work’s actual presence, its status as an object, coexists with its virtual presence, those cognitive gusts aroused by first hand engagements that remain ancillary to the work. Such cognitive experiences entail free association – one endures the work’s presence to grasp a more sensible picture, remember related experiences and ideas, or produce meaning from disassociated content fragments. This is not unlike the way we hear parts of a sentence and then try to figure out what might have been said by substituting words that make sense given the context. Robson carefully selected works that have this dual quality; that is, they exhibit the Heideggerian sense of “objective presence,” yet by personalizing our own experiences with them, we attribute relevance, effectively generating the “handiness” that Heidegger favored. To follow are the philosophical ramifications of presence that each work happily explores.



## PRESENCE 1: *Franz Gertsch*

Since Gertsch painstakingly pricks holes in wooden panels to create precisely reversed images, his monochrome woodcut prints' initial appearance as an amalgam of white dots is no surprise. The net effect is not unlike the nineteenth-century Neoimpressionists Alfred Sisley, Paul Signac, and others, who suddenly emerged after centuries of superbly rendered paintings. Their fascination with the optical theories of their day led them to devise image-making strategies, whose strokes of combined color effectively placed cognition prior to representation. Unable to identify their paintings' subject matter, the viewer tries to decipher their underlying forms as time unfolds. According to the Art Institute of Chicago's 2004 exhibition, *Seurat and the Making of La Grande Jatte*, Seurat's first works were black-and-white drawings, little explorations that taught him how to mold space using contrasting tonalities. Gertsch's monochrome woodcut prints indicate his similar fascination with tonal space.



Every time we regard Gertsch's *Maria* (2001-2002), we notice different features that avail "new visual experiences," the capricious effect Wittgenstein termed "dawning of the aspect." We first notice her extended body, then the towel's patterning, the dim light sporadically highlighting her body, and finally, the variety of leaves, sticks, and earthy matter enveloping her prone body. What would we think if we didn't already know that *Maria* is based on a photograph of his wife from twenty years ago? In the late 1990s, the nude returned as a popular genre among figurative painters and photographers, so Gertsch's revisiting this image seems timely. Eric Fischl's early 1990s photographs of topless Saint Tropez bathers seemed unseemly, especially since one sensed a voyeur greedily devouring his subject from a distant telescopic lens. By contrast, one senses Gertsch's tender admiration for his wife, who appears quite relaxed, hardly self-conscious of her role as her husband's muse.


Gertsch is best known for his daunting hyperrealist portraits, so Robson's selection of a woodcut print demonstrates his goal to emphasize the cognitive experience. Gertsch's precisely rendered "representational" paintings fall



closer to what Wittgenstein termed “the continuous seeing of an aspect,” whose directness eschews interpretation. With *Maria* and his other woodcuts, different aspects unfold at each moment, especially when we alter our physical location to draw up close or scan each work from a distance.

## PRESENCE 2: *Ik-Joong Kang*


Kang’s installation *Buddha with Lucky Objects* (2004) is inspired by the Tang, the Buddhist shaman’s sacred room. Here, hundreds of everyday, household objects dangle against a curved wall decorated with thousands of small, hand-painted colorful Buddhas, known as Mudang paintings. A fan tripped by the spectator’s presence temporarily blows air, shakes the objects, and makes a clanging noise, thus affirming the presence of both the viewer inside the curved wall and the flopping objects at hand. The most curious viewers probably crawled around the floor to figure out exactly how it worked. However ridiculous this action may seem, interpretation always requires action—as compared to seeing, which Wittgenstein considered a state.<sup>5</sup>



Since the related cacophony is also noticeable to those wandering outside the viewing box, those who have yet to experience the work are immediately struck by what is happening inside. If you are like me, Buddhist rituals, shamans, and sacred rooms are unfamiliar territory, but you have experienced rooms shaking due to gusts of wind, massive trucks driving by, or earthquakes. Either way, this shaking evokes a shaman’s deep energy connection to some source, whether God, a natural phenomena, or human presence.

## PRESENCE 3: *Bill Henson*

This 1983-1984 photograph stems from Henson’s series of triptychs, in which images of seemingly drugged-out, dirty, twenty-somethings are juxtaposed against blurry images of gorgeous gilt, baroque interiors. Robson and I have tried to determine whether these photographs were actual or staged. In the end, it matters little whether they’re real or fictional. Not unlike



*Drunk* (1999), Gillian Wearing's live-action video footage of drunks, Henson's compassionate photographs of lost souls appeal to our sense of humanity. Here, the central figure is a woman, perched like a bird, nesting on refuse, fully conscious of her vulnerability. If she doesn't fly away,

an Existentialist would consider her content, while the Postmodernist would classify her as a caged bird. Given her crusty, naked body, she seems rather free, not unlike one of Sally Mann's children playing outdoors.

Her intense reflective mood suggests that her freedom is in question. Is she fantasizing about her next meal, some clothes, a better hide out, new friends, or some meaningful activity? Perhaps she considers herself lucky that she need not toil in an endless job, that sex is abundant, or that her life consists of chance and risk, which still excites her. After all, she has lasted longer than most. Since she is not alone, perhaps this image is post-coital or he is dead. If we interpret her as deciding where to go next, this is the rare image created by a man whose female subject desires more than a man.

A year after Henson made this triptych, Agnes Varda's film *Vagabond* featured a drifter named Mona, who ends up in a ditch. While bartering her way around France, Mona gains admiration from female characters, yet the film's male protagonists warn her to stop wandering. Several films by Francois Ozon, of *Swimming Pool* fame, revisit this theme, though his young female drifters survive by carrying out dastardly deeds on trusting bourgeois vacationers! Like Varda, Henson situates his free spirit on an ephemeral pedestal, rather than cast her as a societal menace.

At first, it seems odd that Henson's heroine is bookmarked between two rather similar images: the one on the left captures two stools, while the one on the right focuses on one. They appear to be from the same site, though it's not certain. Note the compositional relationship between the central image and the one on the right, which contains the full stool accompanied by another's single leg. It would be rather flat-footed to view our heroine as a stool pigeon, though routine attacks on free spirits, such as outlawing squatters and

loiterers, tag them as trouble-making decoys. Similarly, contemporary design attitudes that consider ornate spaces unworthy of their upkeep costs, frame them as outlaws, echoing Austrian architect Adolph Loos's claim that "ornament is a crime."

Ironically, Robson first experienced Henson's work hanging in a similarly ornate Vienna museum. Since one can't say no with a yes image, one can only imagine that the museum curator selected Henson's work for its affirmative message, which was extendable to his institution's galleries. Historical sites, especially those built to manifest outmoded ideologies, risk vagabond status, leaving aging patrons to protect their continued presence. Since the left-hand image emphasizes each stool's autonomy, one assumes the same of the diptych's central figures.

#### **PRESENCE 4: *Mark Wallinger***

I first experienced *Threshold to the Kingdom* (2000) as part of Wallinger's 2001 survey at London's Whitechapel Art Gallery. This video's feeling of excitement and wonder is familiar to anyone who has passed through an international arrivals gate only to find oneself besieged by well-wishers awaiting loved ones. I immediately identified with it, for even when I visit countries where I know no one, I peruse the crowd for someone who's come to welcome me or scan for hand-held signs carrying my name. *Threshold to the Kingdom* linguistically links passengers entering the United Kingdom to souls passing through heaven's gates, granting the curious immigration guard St. Peter's distinctive role.

No wonder the filmmakers of *Love Actually* (2003) appropriated *Threshold to the Kingdom* for their film's 3-minute long coda. This film's graphically intense ending features all the main characters, accompanied by hundreds of others, greeting loved ones at an airport arrivals lounge. One of Danto's famous cases concerns "indiscernibles," objects that look similar, yet none is alike and some are not even art. The "arrival" film's dual existence—live video footage (Wallinger's *Threshold to the Kingdom*) and a staged film (*Love Actually*'s coda)—requires a deeper analysis of their otherwise "indiscernible" differences.



Viewers experience ecstasy while watching Wallinger's slowed-down footage, layered with a Renaissance hymn based on *Psalm 51*, the prayer for cleansing and pardon. Its famous line "Do not cast me away from your presence" suggests that God's presence affirms our own, while God's absence darkens our day. *Love Actually* occurs during the Christmas season, when Christians

celebrate God's earthly birth (fleshly presence). Coincidentally, *Love Actually's* filmmakers also selected a God-centered song, the Beach Boys hit *God Only Knows*, whose refrain is "God only knows what I'd do without you."

As Robson can attest, I have wondered whether the filmmakers actually remunerated Wallinger for his original work. Robson's disinterest in my query reflects his awareness of the works' differences. The filmmakers stole the video's look, but not its meaning. And since Wallinger appropriated the video

imagery from the everyday, no one owns this experience! Aware of the video's contradictory vision, Robson has remarked how Wallinger's critical work reminds us that "the promised land (the UK) is a myth that beckons the less privileged, a welcoming portal that also exercises the power to curtail the dream that it perpetuates." A tear-jerker, *Love Actually's* coda similarly pans immigrant families so as to appear inclusive yet, when compared to Wallinger's video, it is flat-footed since there's nothing there to interpret. *Love Actually's* coda is merely representational, depicting people happily reuniting with loved ones.



## PRESENCE 5: Gerhard Richter

Richter's paintings are among the best known of our era. It's especially interesting that Robson selected an abstract work, for Richter has always argued that even his abstract paintings are representational. That is, they represent brushstrokes. It's truly odd that none of the authors writing in Richter's 2002 Museum of Modern Art catalog discussed his work in terms of either how viewers experience them or how they manifest the artist's experience of painting. Nonetheless, his dense abstract works consist of thousands of superimposed strokes of paint that provide a glimpse of what lies beneath the layers of scraped

and raked surfaces. It wouldn't surprise me at all if Richter also studied Seurat's practice. In fact, five small black-and-white conte crayon studies for *Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte* (1884-86) are so Richter-like that it's difficult to imagine how a nineteenth-century viewer could have grasped such ghostly forms.




Richter titled this 1989 work *Atem (Breath)*. Although the Greeks considered *pneuma*, loosely translated as breath, the vital spirit pulsing through all living matter, there doesn't seem to be a linguistic connection between the German "atem" and the Greek word "pneuma." Still, one senses a life force pulsing underneath the opaque gobs of paint. This work also has a particularly fluid quality, like a waterfall in constant motion. One even senses a reflecting pool. Incredibly luminescent, *Atem* suggests flames dancing within it, making it *Presence's* most objectively present work. One imagines diving inside this pool of paint, which would most certainly take one's breath away. Despite Richter's continued conviction that his work is "about" representation, nothing could be less pictorial and more experiential than *Atem*.

## PRESENCE 6: *Chris Cunningham*

Inspired by the 1997 song *All is Full of Love* from Icelandic performer Björk's album *Homogenic*, Cunningham created *All is Full of Love* (1999) to be commercially viable. It is thus *Presence's* only work that is immediately useful in the Heideggarian sense of "handiness," since its purpose is to attract listeners via

visuals. When I remarked to Robson that listening to "Homogenic" makes me cry out loud, he remarked that it had a similar effect on him, which he accredited to the phenomenological effects of Björk's voice. I rather tend to recall fond memories from those days.



Björk's lyrics suggest that we are all as vulnerable as Henson's free spirit! She reassures, "you'll be given love, you'll be taken care of, you'll be given love, you have to trust it." Her lyrics allude to love's role in transforming the will. "Twist your head around. it's all around you. all is full of love. all around you." Incidentally, during *Love Actually's* opening scene, the Prime Minister (played by Hugh Grant) expresses her exact sentiment, "love is actually all around."




Rather than ground Björk's song in everyday imagery or images of those deeply in need of love, Cunningham uses her song to frame two humanoid robots who fall in love and kiss while still being assembled. As they gain presence, they move from inanimate machine parts to machines with human-like qualities like self-awareness and emotional responses. This video was created during the height of cyborg scholarship, when myriad literary critics, sociologists, and anthropologists were noting society's transformation from humans with real bodies to humans with scientifically-enhanced body parts. Although this kind of scholarship has fallen out of vogue, humans are ever more altered by psychopharmaceuticals, artificial limbs, Lasik Surgery, pace makers, angioplasty, plastic surgery, Botox, etc. Cunningham's video thus invites us to entertain the possibility of robots coming to life. Despite the presence of robotic humans, the robots' presence remains altogether alien.

## **PRESENCE 7: Berni Searle**

Even if you've never lain in snow or sand and made an angel with your legs and arms, you know this winter ritual from cartoons like *Peanuts* or movies like


*Chasing Amy*. Here, Searle is not making a snow angel, though this was the first thing I guessed she was doing. She's rather spreading flour around, metaphorically laying the ground for South Africa's future, while producing patterns that incidentally resemble wings. Her two-screen video features her laborious bread-kneading ritual from two vantages, one overhead and the other frontal. Searle's flour-spreading ritual recalls other cultures' daily ablutions like India's *rongoli*, a daily creation of colorful sand drawings sited on the ground in front of one's home.



Searle's flour-spreading ritual levels the playing ground, offering a ritual new beginning for South Africa's post-apartheid society, already thirteen-years old. She not only sweeps the flour around the floor with her arms, she kneads a massive amount of flour into a bread loaf. Soon covered with flour, her body resembles other cultures' initiation rights (like Sudan's Dinka tribe), whereby bodies are either dusted with white powder or painted white to symbolize purity, paving the way for the individual's next stage in life.

## PRESENCE 8: Valerie Sullivan Fuchs

Millions of memories are stored and written on our bodies, yet they lay dormant (forgotten), until some event sparks their recollection. Fuchs's video



*Apocrypha* (2005) amasses a vast sea of stories, told with varying degrees of accuracy (her title implies questionable authenticity), all the while characterizing consciousness as comprised of dislodged memories floating by from every angle, which we somehow organize and sensibly relay. Standing only four feet away from the projection screen, each viewer intimately confronts Fuchs's video album, whose vibrant soundtrack features individuals' overlapping tales of her Kentucky grandmother's (Mamaw) refreshing antics.

Each storyteller's memory tends to trigger another recollection.

Each spectator thus assembles MeMa's life story from barely audible, spliced tales of excellent cooking, lending clothes, beautiful garden, jars of olives, generosity, specialness, and singing. No one disagrees that MeMa was beautiful inside, seemed unusually free from prohibitions, and always enjoyed herself. The title *Apocrypha* suggests the way time dislodges reality, enabling MeMa memories to conform to each storyteller's wishes.

As one absorbs these stories and follows the scrolling scenery, one can't help but travel back in time, to recall one's own grandmother stories. Hirakazu Koreeda's film *After Life* (1998) presents dozens of characters required first to remember and then to dramatize their most important memory on film, as a precursor to entering heaven. Watching others intensely select memorable events forces one to simultaneously rolodex through one's personal history for equally significant moments. Meanwhile *Apocrypha's* images of neighborhoods and parks, presumably MeMa's haunts, scroll by in various directions, cycling through red, green, and blue monochrome imagery. As tossed around bits of memory fragments, Fuchs video engenders cognitive experiences that require our participation to make sense of them, while tossing us head-first down memory's lane.

## Conclusion:

To follow is a summary of the ways the exhibition *Presence* explored presence's philosophical applications:

- 1) Experiencing Gertsch's woodcut print exemplifies Wittgenstein's "dawning of an aspect" and Heidegger's "making present," as viewers assemble particulates (white noise) into graspable aspects that vary in time and space.
- 2) Kang's installation emphasized human presence, demonstrating the necessity of each human's "intrusion on reality."
- 3) Whether staged or real, Henson's triptychs grant presence to the otherwise invisible, oft-neglected people and disposable spaces.
- 4) The existence of both Wallinger's *Threshold to the Kingdom* and the later *Love Actually* forces an analysis of "indiscernibles," different works that resemble one another.
- 5) Despite Richter's representational claims, the lusciously abstract *Atem* exemplifies "objective presence," since its phenomenological attributes overwhelm its "meaning."
- 6) Cunningham's music video is totally fictional, yet its commercial applications concretize Heidegger's notion of "handiness."
- 7) By locating responsibility in everyday experience, Searle grants ablution a national, even international, significance.
- 8) Fuchs's video installation characterizes the way consciousness telescopes from one memory to another, as recollections trigger ever more recollections.

### notes

1 Arthur Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 43.

2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968), p. 211e.

3 Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 1.

4 Donald Kuspit, "Deconstructing Presence," *Bill Viola: Survey of a Decade*, (Houston: Contemporary Art Museum, 1988), p. 73-80.

5 Wittgenstein, p. 212e.

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