

PRESENTATIONS ON ART EDUCATION RESEARCH

ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN
ÉDUCATION ARTISTIQUE

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION
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DU POTENTIEL DE RECHERCHES
EN ÉDUCATION ARTISTIQUE

J. James Victoria
Elizabeth J. Sacca
Editors/Directeurs



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PREFACE

This second publication in the series Presentations on Research in Art Education is comprised of the papers and proceedings of the conference "Phenomenological Description: Potential for Research in Art Education" conducted by the Ph.D. program in Art Education at Concordia University.

The purpose in organizing this symposium was to bring together scholars from diverse disciplines who could elucidate on, and contribute to, an understanding of phenomenological description and its potential for art education research.

The paper of Professor Wagner provides us with an account of phenomenological description in art derived from the work of the noted phenomenological sociologist Alfred Schutz.

The paper by Professor Aoki discusses research developments in curriculum based on Habermas' three modes of inquiry. He focuses on the "Situational-Interpretive" and "Critical Inquiry" modes as opposed to the "Empirical-Analytical" mode as the bases for new directions in curriculum inquiry.

In his paper Professor Beittel traces the evolution of his research toward qualitative description of the art process, and provides us with an understanding of the qualitative as the regulating principle which governs man's purposive activity.

The respondents interpreted the ideas in each of these presentations and discussed their potential for art education research. The responses to the papers were by Professors Burton and Zurmuehlen, Bourbeau-Poirier and Boughton, and McKay and Parker, respectively.

On the final morning of the conference the speakers and respondents conducted an exchange on the ideas presented. The transcript of that discussion follows the papers.

Editors

PREFACE

Cette deuxième publication de la série Actes de la recherche en éducation artistique comprend les textes et la discussion de la conférence intitulée "Description phénoménologique du potentiel de recherche en éducation artistique" dirigée par le groupe du programme d'études du doctorat en éducation artistique de l'Université Concordia.

Ce symposium avait pour but de réunir des experts dans diverses disciplines qui soient en mesure, en apportant des éclaircissements, de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension de la description phénoménologique et de son apport dans la recherche en éducation artistique.

L'exposé du Professeur Wagner nous fournit une explication de la description phénoménologique en arts, inspirée des travaux du socio-phénoménologue réputé Alfred Schutz.

L'exposé du Professeur Aoki traite des recherches effectuées en matière de programmes d'études d'après les trois modes d'enquête d'Habermas. Il porte surtout sur les modes "situationnel-explicatif" et "recherche critique" par opposition au mode "empirique-analytique" comme bases de nouvelles orientations des recherches sur le curriculum.

Dans son exposé, le Professeur Beittel retrace l'évolution de sa recherche tendue vers la description qualitative du processus propre aux arts et nous fournit une explication de l'aspect qualitatif comme principe régulateur des actes intentionnels de l'homme.

Les répondants ont interprété les idées avancées dans chacun de ces exposés et discuté de leur potentiel pour la recherche en éducation artistique. Les commentaires sur ces documents ont été émis respectivement par les professeurs Burton et Zurmuehlen, Bourbeau-Poirier et Boughton et McKay et Parker.

La dernière journée de la conférence, les conférenciers et les répondants ont procédé à un échange de points de vue sur les idées présentées. La transcription de cette discussion se trouve à la suite des exposés.

Les Directeurs.

Dans la perspective phénoménologique et sociologique d'Alfred Schutz, les arts présentent des "régions de significations". Les objets d'art appartiennent au domaine des choses rencontrées dans la vie de chaque jour; les techniques de fabrication les placent dans le "monde du travail". Ils deviennent des objets d'art seulement en vertu des intentions de l'artiste et de la compréhension réceptrice du destinataire (public). Dans les arts d'exécution, le ou les exécutants servent de médiateurs entre l'artiste et le public. Dans chaque cas, le potentiel artistique de l'oeuvre d'art est réalisé dans le moment de son appréciation. C'est seulement dans l'acte de voir une peinture ou d'entendre une composition exécutée que l'intention créatrice de l'artiste rencontre l'intention réceptrice des membres de l'assistance. Comme point de rencontre des significations esthétiques, c'est le point critique en éducation artistique. Afin de mettre les oeuvres d'art à la portée des étudiants - un public d'art potentiel - le caractère esthétique ou le ton des sentiments des créateurs de ces oeuvres, des professeurs comme médiateurs en éducation et des étudiants comme public potentiel doivent être assez proches les uns des autres pour permettre une affinité suffisante entre les intentions et les significations esthétiques de tous les trois. Là où cette relation intérieure entre l'oeuvre d'art et les étudiants, le professeur et l'étudiant, fait défaut, la recherche en éducation artistique aura à s'étendre depuis l'exploration des significations symboliques exprimées par l'artiste dans sa création jusqu'à l'exploration de la qualité du sentiment de son public potentiel: pour un temps, l'éducateur en art peut avoir à se convertir en anthropologue explorant les besoins émotionnels et les intérêts de ses étudiants.

Introduction Remark

In this paper, I propose to submit a set of general considerations

of the complex features of the creation and appreciation of objects of art and the meanings they assume for the artist on one hand, and his audience on the other. Further, I intend to deal with the intersubjective setting in which the intermediation between artist, work of art, and audience takes place; that is, with the sphere in which the problems and difficulties within the areas of art education arise. On either level, I hope, these expositions will convey some indication of that method in action on which this conference focuses: the phenomenological method.

Phenomenology as Psychology

The phenomena to which phenomenology refers are phenomena of consciousness of "inner" experiences regardless of their content.

While Edmund Husserl must be recognized as the founder of phenomenological philosophy, we are here merely concerned with the starting plane of his work: a phenomenological psychology as the field of "phenomenological description." From it, we shall not move towards the lofty and lonely heights of Husserl's Transcendental Ego but towards the fields of ordinary people with their common experiences in a familiar "world".

Phenomenological psychology presupposes the meeting of two extremes: the immediate grasping of the content of experiences and the ordering of the observations with the help of an interpretive frame of reference. If we have only the first, we wind up with what in literature is called stream-of-consciousness writing: everything is phenomenal and nothing psychologic. If we have only the second, we are left with abstract theoretical schemes: everything is theoretic and nothing phenomenal.

The foundations for a fruitful descriptive phenomenological psychology were laid in the second half of the last century. The explorations in question were strictly subjective. They were carried out with introspective methods, aiming at examining conscious experiences and discovering the internal forms and structures in which they appeared. The truly revolutionary feature of these attempts was the rejection of the speculative method of philosophical psychology -- the only kind there was -- and the insistence to deal concretely with the subject matter of consciousness in the only form in which it was truly accessible to the psychologist: his own.

Four thinkers from three different countries contributed to these foundations: The German Franz von Brentano, who established the principle of intentionality: you cannot deal

with perceptions, experiences, and consciousness without being aware that you deal with consciousness of objects, be they external things, other persons, or feelings and ideas. The American C. R. Clay, who discovered that the experience of the present moment is not a point in time but an extended period: into it reaches that which went on immediately before; and it reaches forward in anticipation of what is immediately to follow. The American William James, who gave us the conception of the stream of consciousness with its free-flowing "transitive parts," its "resting places" or "substantive parts," and its adjacent currents or "fringes." And the Frenchman Henri Bergson, who explored the experiences of "inner time" or "durée," which cannot be likened to the mechanical conception of clock-time; and who contributed basic considerations of the phenomena of memory.

Husserl began his phenomenological explorations in 1900. He used or rediscovered most of the insights of his predecessors, developed and synthesized them, and added his own discoveries. He alone is responsible for giving phenomenological psychology its most characteristic methodological feature. He established as a firm procedure what the others had only dimly seen: Pre-established explanations and judgments are to be prevented from hiding or distorting the phenomena of consciousness to be observed; therefore, all such prior "knowledge" etc. was to be "bracketed" in a "phenomenological epoché."(1)

The fact that phenomenological psychologists avail themselves only of subjective, personal data is not as scary as it sounds: After all, each person's consciousness is if not a depository so the "sedimentation" of all of his or her experiences, including those of other persons or of his encounters with art objects. Phenomenological introspection can be the source of a tremendous range of insights and experiences, including those of "outer objects" and other people.

Nevertheless, it remains a lonely undertaking. If we deal with the creation of works of art, with their appreciation, and with art education, we deal not merely with isolated individuals; we deal significantly with actions in a social realm, with interchanges between persons, with collective ideas about art, with social processes of communication, and with social procedures of education. This is the baseline of the considerations to follow.

The Life-World

There is no straight-line connection between phenomenological description and social matters. Nevertheless, the two have been linked together in the work of Alfred Schutz. Significantly,

he started as proponent of Max Weber's "sociology of understanding." With it, Weber had made a step within his field which may be compared to that taken by the pioneers of phenomenological psychology. He turned away from the positivist principle of the causal interpretation of social processes in favor of the interpretation of social phenomena as results of the actions and interactions of humans whose conduct sociologists ought to try to understand in terms of their motivations and objectives. Thereby, a "subjective approach" was introduced into Sociology: humans with their volitions, aspirations, goals, feelings, and intentions were put into the center of the sociological stage.

Schutz saw the tremendous potentialities of this approach which Weber had merely sketched toward the end of his life. But he found that its core concept, understanding, was badly in need of clarification and elaboration. He found the means for developing Weber's beginnings into a viable sociology in the insights offered by Bergson, James, and Husserl. The latter gained particular significance for Schutz, prominently because he himself had marked the point at which it was possible to break through the individualistic confines of phenomenological psychology. In an early part of his work, Husserl had turned from the consciousness of the solitary philosopher to that of the common human being living in the concrete circumstances of his daily affairs. This is the consciousness to start with, the consciousness of "anybody" in the "natural stance." The term applies to the "state of mind" of most of us most of the time of our waking life, while going after our ordinary concerns with their practical objectives, using routine procedures and "naively" take for granted that things and people are what they are and work or react as they do. Similarly, we expect them to be or to do the same tomorrow. As long as we can assume this stance, the "world" around us is reliable. Should we find unexpectedly that our routine expectations are thwarted, we have to "stop and think," as Dewey said. We try to find explanations and remedies, we improvise, seek alternate courses of action, or give up. In short, when things can no longer be taken for granted, we are forced to show that we can think, make decisions, and are not the automatons which positivists and behaviorists tell us we are.

For reasons of his own, Husserl rushed away from this point of departure only to find, toward the end of his life, that he would have to return to it. He now gave it a new name and a new connotation: the life-world, that is, the actual sphere of ordinary life in which the individual with his "natural stance" lives, acts, encounters objects and other people, orients himself practically toward the pursuit of practical affairs, seeing this "world" in the light of his actual experiences as a

composite of the "conclusions" from his own experiences and observations with the explanations, instructions and directives he has received from others. Together, these ingredients make up his image of the world, of which he knows only a small sector from personal experience; all else he knows about in notions ranging from well-informed ideas to the vaguest images. This life-world, from the outset, is populated with others, and it has its own historical dimension.

It was not Husserl but Schutz who worked out these fruitful ideas and applied them successfully to the analysis of matters social.⁽²⁾ As he has shown in detail, the life-world has its particular features: a cognitive "style" dominated by pragmatic considerations and purposes. Part of these concern people, others material objects which are used to make other objects, to serve for one's personal convenience, etc. Conspicuously, the life-world is the sphere in which individuals acquire the necessary skills for handling and making practical objects. It is not only a pragmatic world, it is largely a world of working.

Husserl added another crucial insight to the conception of the life-world. Man's experiences in it are fundamental for all spheres of human life and endeavours. The roots of every other human interest -- religious, philosophical, scientific, esthetic -- are here: a point which it will be well to keep in mind when speaking of the arts and their appreciation.

Provinces of Meaning

While the life-world is basic for all human experiences, it does by no means exhaust them.

William James was the first to call our attention to the fact that humans live in "many worlds" or "sub-universes." On this basis, Schutz developed his theory of the "multiple realities" or "provinces of meaning." They range from the pedestrian spheres of daily life to the rational realm of science and philosophy, and from those of esthetic experiences to those of private fantasies and dreams. In James' words, each such realm "whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion." Speaking philosophically, each has its own ontology. Likewise, it has its characteristic style of expression and cognition, its epistemology and, in a sense, its own logic: what is "perfectly acceptable" in one realm may make no sense in another. In dreams, we are not at all surprised when we fly all by ourselves; in everyday life we know that this is impossible. What is obvious and logical in common-sense thinking may not withstand scientific scrutiny; in reverse, what is rigorous logical deduction in philosophy may be nothing but idle speculation to common sense.

James had given a privileged position to one of his psychological sub-universes: The "paramount reality of sensations." Correspondingly, Schutz bestowed the title, paramount reality, on the sphere of the life-world. It is paramount not only because, usually, we spend the largest part of our waking life in it, but also because we predominantly judge recalled events in other realms by its standards: we say, it was only a dream; but we do not dream, "it was only life." Invariably, we use the same yardstick when gaging the mental sanity or judging the mental insanity of others.

The gap between the paramount reality of daily life and other provinces of meaning varies with the characteristics of the latter. Some are quite incomparable; some elements of the style of others are comparable and occasionally invite comparison. It is in the very nature of the natural attitude, at such occasions, to naively judge the ingredients of other provinces of meaning by its own pragmatic standards. Seen from their angle, an abstract painting is indeed meaningless: a picture which does not depict a "real" object is not a picture. But even the sophisticated visitor of an intellectual or esthetic province of meaning will sometimes be tempted to naively apply the standards of the latter to affairs of the life-world. So, when a philosopher of physics, with quite astonishing results, appraises the conceptions of physical objects and processes, which prevail in the everyday world, by the explanatory standards of modern physical theory.(3) Or, to take an example closer to our topic, when an estheticist views a picture in the living room of an artistically unsophisticated family and explains that pink-lemonade skies are intolerable.

With these considerations, I do not intend to prohibit the comparison of the phenomena of one province of meaning by the standards of another. However, I want to stress that, first, it is invidious if it is tied to derogative judgments: the feelings evoked by pink-lemonade skies may well be genuine. Secondly, even without such intentions, it is fallacious if the person making the comparison fails to realize what he is doing: he judges the phenomena of one province of meaning by the standards of another; that is, he judges them not in their own terms but from the outside. Intellectual honesty demands that, in this case, he spells this out clearly. The same, of course, is a precondition for any meaningful discussion of such matters: state your vantage point.

Life-World and Arts

What is the relationship between the paramount reality of the life-world and the provinces of meaning of esthetic experiences which, together, form the commonwealth of the arts? It is

customary to divide these provinces according to physical-artistic media: the linguistic-literary, the tonal-musical, and the visual spatial forms of art. Each of them has its specific characteristics and may be further subdivided. Phenomenologically, however, they also share significant common features.

At first sight, a work of art is a material object, something made with technical care by somebody. As thing, it is independent of its maker; it can be appreciated without reference to him. A composition, however, is a special case. Its original form, the written score, is only an instruction sheet for a technician who handles a certain instrument in order to produce certain tone sequences. Strictly speaking, the performance is the only sensorily perceivable object of art in the fields of music.

In designing a composition and in its performance, technical skills are involved: the composer must know how to apply the rules of composition (counterpoint etc.) and instrumentation; the performer has to master the techniques required for playing his instrument. Similarly, in the visual arts, the maker of a material object of art has to be a technician: the painter must know how to prepare his paints and how to apply them with his brushes to the canvas; the sculptor will have to expertly handle chisel and hammer, etc.

The physical and thing-character of objects of art and the techniques applied in their production are hard facts. They plant the arts solidly into the world of work. Without them there would be no art. Yet, taken by themselves, they are not art either.

Any man-made object is an object for some purpose. The purpose is not in the object but in the maker and user. If we do not see it this way so because thing and purpose are linked in our consciousness from way back. Thing and purpose, for persons in the natural stance, are one. Yet we ought to realize that they do not form an unquestionable unity. That means, in terms of the present topic: the "art" is not in the object, it is in the mind of its creator and beholder.

However, it would be wrong to separate the two completely from each other. There exists a kind of dialectical relationship between the two. Art, we may say, moves along a dual track. One of these tracks runs through the life-world, the worlds of objects and technical processes, the world of work. The other track runs through the minds of persons after they have "leaped" out of the natural stance and into the sphere of emotional-esthetic intentions and experiences.

For most of us, esthetic experiences would be impossible without the object which evoke and mediate them. It may not be amiss to pursue the technical track of the arts on hand of the example of a composition, chosen here for its delicate complexity.

Typically, a musician will need and use sheets of paper covered with the score of the composition to be played. These sheets serve a similar technical function as the pages of a cook book: They indicate, with the help of a notation system and some scanty auxiliary instructions, what to do in what succession on a designated instrument. It is a recipe. The instrument itself is a mechanical device built for the physical purpose of producing tones of a certain range and timbre. Whether the recipe in the cook book or on the score sheet is successfully applied, depends essentially neither on writer nor instrument: it depends on the technical "know-how" and skill of the cook or performer. The notational system of the score is based on a social convention; it can be learned in the same fashion as the alphabet of a language. In neither case does knowing what the signs stand for make anyone into a musical or literary genius. The instrument, again, is an artifact whose designer and maker, except in rare cases, is of no interest. It is "naively" accepted as a technical object. Its features, as a mechanism, can be explained in terms of an arrangement of technical components designed to produce tones according to established physical laws. These tones can be causally produced by going through the technically appropriate motions in manipulating the instrument. Again, these mechanics can be technically-rationally explained, in the same sense as the principles of a gasoline engine, to any curious twelve-year old. Yet, to know how an instrument works is not equal to being able to work, that is, to play it; its technical handling must be learned in a long and trying process.

To gain technical mastery of the instrument means to have freed one's attention from the execution of the prescribed technical sequences of its manipulation. The path from seeing the notes on a sheet of paper to the production of their prescribed tone sequence is reduced to a quasi-automatic action. Only the achievement of this will enable the musician to devote his attention fully to the "meaning" of the composition and its expression.

Like composing, painting is a lonely art form. Unlike composing, it yields a material object which does not have to wait for a performer in order to be brought into the sensory field of a beholder. The physical means of its presentation are not hidden behind a denotational system like the colors in the diagram of a "numbers painting" for would-be artists.

The thing-character of the visual art object places it within the sphere of the paramount reality of daily life next to practical objects. It may be put to purposes other than those which lead to its creation. Since it does not have to be performed, it is there in complete separation from its creator. In contrast to the simple process of putting musical notations on paper, which can be done in the most sloppy fashion without in the least impairing the artistic value of the composition, the making of a painting is a slow and most painstaking technical process. The artist, so to speak, stands constantly with one foot in the working world and the other in that of artistic fantasy.

The thing-character of a visual-arts object completely eliminates the need for a simultaneous presence of performer and audience which makes for a vivid intersubjective reciprocity of the musical experience. The viewer looks at a dead object, not a live musician. If the painting has an esthetic effect on a viewer, it issues completely from its symbolic character. The canvas is a stand-in for artistic meanings: that of the artist's intention and that of the beholder. They may be widely at variance.

The technically conditioned separation of the artist from his potential audience is one of the root problems of art education.

Seen in terms of their technical character, the differences between the musical and the visual arts are considerable: the sensory appeal to the ear cannot be equated to that to the eye. A musical composition comes to life only when performed and heard. By contrast, a painting is brought finished before us. Phenomenologically, this makes for a quite crucial distinction in the way in which works belong to the two realms are perceived and experienced. In the first case, the event of appreciation is essentially an event in time; in the second case, it is an event in space. This makes for a striking difference in the way in which the inner perception of a work of art as a whole can be achieved. A composition in performance unfolds itself gradually in the flow of its musical phrases and themes: it can only be perceived as such a succession of flowing parts. As Husserl called it, it is built up polythetically in the beholder. Only after the performance had ended, will the listener experience and achieve a synthesis of the performed work, that is, grasp it as a whole. By contrast, a painting is immediately seen as a whole, at one glance, or monothetically. We may pay attention to its details after having grasped it in toto. But, whether the event of appreciating an object of art essentially in time or in space, it remains an event. It is this fact which constitutes the phenomenological similarity of experiences of art in spite of the

diversity of forms, media, and apperceptual dimensions of their concrete contents and appearances.

This similarity of the phenomenological experience of works of art, then, rests with the character of the experience of any work of art as an event. A painting, too, is transformed from a material object into an object of art in a performing act which is as fleeting as the presentation of a composition. It comes to life only when viewed by somebody who perceives it not as a piece of canvas smeared with paint but who sees it as a picture. Its object-stability is deceptive: any object of art becomes an object of art only through an event: the event of its intentional appreciation as a medium for the expression and reflection of artistic meanings.

The consideration of the relationship between the material and life-worldly externality of objects of art and their emotional-esthetic=artistic content leads to the following conclusion: the material existence of a piece of art is a mere potentiality. The realization of this potentiality depends not only on an intentional act of apperception on the part of the beholder, but on his ability to connect the apperceived object with meanings which are rooted in some intangible spheres of his inner life.

Understanding an Object of Art

The term, meaning of an object of art, is equivocal. The question is: whose meaning?

Basically, there is the meaning it has for the artist, the intent of its expression; and its effect on the beholder, its meaning for him. In the case of a composition, the performer is inserted between artist and listener; in re-creating it, he re-interprets it. And if a philosopher of esthetics explains to us the "real meaning" of an object of art, he adds a kind of meaning very different from the others: it is not gained in the immediacy of experience but based on reflection. Of course, agreement between the immediate meanings of a work of art is not a foregone conclusion either.

Similar equivocations occur when we speak of "understanding" a work of art: Do we want to understand the intentions of the artist? the meaning attached to it by a beholder? the interpretative intentions of the performer? or the theoretical explanations of the philosopher?

I surmise that, in art education, one deals to a sizeable degree with the last kind. The difficulty with it is that, often, it is an attempt at transposing symbolized meanings, expressed in a non-linguistic medium, into the medium of language. The latter

originated in the pragmatic purposes of everyday life, and remains rooted in it. The literary arts transcend the pragmatism of language. However, in other art forms the discrepancy between artistic medium and verbal explanations remains formidable. It is difficult to evoke the same kind of feeling through words which ought to be intuitively experienced through other sensory channels. The attempt has been made many times. But we should realize the necessity to go beyond such an indirect approach. A maximum of efforts should go into attempts at understanding the three ordinary forms of artistic meaning: that of the creator, that of the beholder, and that of the performer.

Art in Action: A Social Phenomenon

These considerations imply, first, that art is a deeply subjective matter and secondly, that it is a matter of multiple subjectivities. Thus, it gains intersubjective significance, that is, leads to direct involvement of individuals with one another. The following constellation results:

The intention and motivation of the artist and his project.

The realization of this intention in the actual process of creating a work of art: the use of material media as means of forcing the artistic idea (meaning) into a permanent yet symbolic form for future appreciation.

The event of the appreciation of the work of art by members of an audience.

The motivation of the beholders, the reasons for their interest in, and their preferences for certain arts and artists.

The effect of the event of appreciation on members of the audience: their understanding of a work of art and the meaning it gains for them.

The core of this pattern is the event of appreciation, the crucial nexus in any province of art. Here, the spheres of artist and audience overlap: his intentions and meanings encounter the intentions and meanings of others. Since this "encounter" is directly mediated by the physical medium used by the artist, it also decides what kind of audience an artist can have.

An audience of isolated individuals occurs in two common forms: readers who absorb a work of fiction in solitude, and viewers of pictures in a gallery who view them solitarily although in the accidental presence of others.

Some media demand performers who present a work of art in person to an audience. Cases in point are: a poetry reading, a piano recital, the performance of a play or an opera, the appearance of a chamber-music group or an orchestra.

A performer is a personal mediator between artist and audience. Vicariously, he has made the composition his own; he has definite ideas about its meaning and presentation; and he performs under the influence of the reactions of his audience. Only by drawing the audience vicariously into his performance can he gain that kind of intersubjective contact with which the performance would fall flat.(4)

The pattern becomes more complicated in the case of the performance of an ensemble, a theatrical or musical group. Our understanding of what, here, is intersubjectively involved, has been greatly advanced by Alfred Schutz. His essay, "Making Music Together," is a beautiful "study in social relationships" among chamber-music performers. After showing what the individual member of the group brings to the performance in terms of prior instrumental skills and musical understanding, Schutz entered into a lively description of the quite complex spontaneous process in which the performers-in-action relive the inner experiences of the composer, or at least a, for them, adequate facsimile of it, while being in the "vivid presence" of one another. Each performs his part while seeing and sensing the facial expressions and movements of the others, and hearing the blending of the polyphonal melody they are playing together. At the same time, they all anticipate not only the next phrase of the composition but also the next instrumental action of his or her partners: "Making music together" is a highly spontaneous intersubjective and interactive experience whose success, the resulting performance of the composition, is not at all explained by the mechanics of each of the instrumental voices involved, as notated in the score. Neither does it result from the external synchronization of the "tempo" of the parallel-running performances of the musicians, which could be marked out by a metronome. (5)

Schutz's descriptions, however, cover only one of two intersubjective spheres which are here involved. The other, which cuts across the first, is the subtle, osmotic flow of emotional meanings linking the audience to the performers.

All this considered, it is not astonishing to see the immense complexity of the problems of art appreciation and education. In the language of research, each of the factors mentioned is a quasi-independent dimension of the whole: each point of linkage and transition from one to the other is problematic and potentially critical. The whole is a fragile structure; it could

easily become disjointed.

I do not know whether or to what degree you share my feeling that at present, in this and other respects, we live in a precarious if not critical situation. If you do, and have decided to face this situation, I suggest that you start with the preliminary quest for an understanding of the multiple problems on hand. My expositions, thus far, may be taken as a loose outline of an extensive program for basic research, enlightened by phenomenological insights and not directed at specific dimensions but at their interrelations and interdependence.

Social Problems of Art Education

I take it that art education, in North America, is largely an attempt to bring appreciation of the arts to those segments of the young generation who pass through the system of higher education. The major aim, then, would be that of educating art audiences for the sake, of course, of making the life of individuals richer as it otherwise would be.

Why has the intention, to bring artistic creations closer to students, become a problem?

At its inception in our civilization, the esthetic-expressive realm we call the arts was created as the festive affair of all members of a community of life. There were neither separate arts nor individual artists. Everything and everybody was enveloped in the same feeling tone. The history of our arts is the story of the destruction of this community of life: of the reduction of the appreciation of the arts to that of a social elite, of which present day middle-classes and students are only the latest and broadest stratum; of the growing isolation and alienation of the artists from society; and of the institutionalized measures to educate art audiences.

Today, there is no effective community to which artists and audiences would belong. There are growing difficulties in finding affinities between the feeling tones of artists and the public. We are even losing the subterfuge of art education in the 19th Century, when educated strata closed themselves off from the ugly realities of their social existence by indulging in a cult of the Renaissance and of Classical Greece.

That such romanticism had been possible at all, was due to the fact of the separation of meanings intended by the artist and the meanings attached to his work by an audience. Modern intellectuals are remote from Classical Greece; but they find something in its art they can translate into one aspect of their

own feelings. Since works of art are defenseless against interpretations, various modern generations could keep the Greek arts in focus, each of them able to give it an esthetic interpretation in accordance with their own inclinations.

Through this interpretive-adaptive technique, each new audience generation came up with a new version of art history and art interpretation. I suspect that this technique has lost its efficiency: we are running out of possibilities of connecting the classical art forms with the ever changing feeling tones of present day generations.

There are two reasons for this. One of them is the existence of modern artists. Toward the end of last century, they started to find out that they could not express in the forms of the classical tradition what they had to express in their media. Thus, they began to violate the established rules of their crafts. Their new styles separated them from the art establishment and thus increasing rejection and isolation. Some of them fell into despair. Others responded to hostility with hostility, and decided to declare war on a society which denied them recognition and existence.(6) By the time an avant-guardistic segment of the art public had come around to accept intention and style of a generation of modern artists, the latter were already supplanted by a successor generation with often drastically different stylistic innovations. The arts of the twentieth century, largely became discontinuous.

In their extreme forms, these developments annihilated the established standards without lending itself to the creation of reliable new standards. I concede that standards mean nothing in the face of spontaneous reactions to a work of art. But the lack of standards makes itself felt when we try, for instance, to convince someone that maybe his negative reaction was too hasty and that he should take a second look.

The second reason rests with the new audience generations. The accelerated technical and social changes, the push of economic shifts, the impact of a series of wars, all these violent experiences have produced not merely changed outlooks and feeling tones but intellectual disorientation and emotional uncertainty. In the areas of higher education, the repercussions of these shifts have been aggravated by the recent rapid expansion of college enrolment, now embracing not only the majority of all middle-class youth but a more-than-token representation of so-called underprivileged strata. The ranks of potential art audience have been tremendously swelled at a time when the general psychological discomfort of these generations led to a widespread rebellion against traditional middle-class values and orientations, threatening simultaneously to strip the established

ways of art education of their meaning.

There is evidence that members of recent student generations have found their ways to the appreciation of individual contemporary artists and their works entirely on their own, bypassing art education. Affinities between the feelings of possibly disparate artists and possibly bewildered young people may be strong enough, in some case, to link artist and audience, or at least work of art and beholders. More significantly, also outside of any curriculum, this generation had brought about a kind of quasi-community feeling among themselves which found its expression in Rock and Roll. The "composers" and "musicians" came largely from their ranks; their "concerts" drew audiences whose numbers, enthusiasm, and endurance dwarfed anything in the history of music. And, in spite of the hysteria of the student rebellions of the Sixties, I think it constituted the most thorough -- not to mention noisiest -- protest of recent student generations against the generation of their parents and "the establishment."

There is no doubt in my mind that this social phenomenon, whatever it is, is subjectively-intersubjectively the genuine article. I doubt, though, that it could be compared to the appearance of Jazz which evolved from folk-music spontaneity into a legitimate form of the modern musical arts. But, as I have said, I lack the standards to judge this: who knows what will have become of Rock and Roll twenty years hence?

Whether or to what degree academic art education can assert itself in its role as an educational guide mediating between works of art and potential audiences, is the problem. There is always the chance that it can be done, especially when its proponents are willing to recognize the obstacles against their efforts which have not been created in the classroom but reach into it.

Also, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Rock and Roll generations are completely lost for anything else. I remember students who, at the height of the craze, discovered quite on their own items of the classical arts, starting with Vivaldi, reaching for Bach and even finding Mozart.

So there is hope.

A Note on Methods

My presentation had a lot to do with the descriptions of various aspects of the arts as a basically subjective concern within complex intersubjective relations and technical-social settings. By contrast, they were short on "method".

Thereby, I may have manifested my own shortcomings. However, to a degree, this was unavoidable. In a very essential sense, one cannot separate "method" from content when he involves himself with the phenomenological approach. Statistical techniques can be set down without substance. An investigator guided by phenomenological insights will always find his "method" entangled with his subject matter.

Having pointed this out, I may now take an analytical, that is, a purely artificial step of separating out from my expositions what has been, in an innocuous fashion, methodologically involved. Obviously, I will not be able to offer recipes for research procedures, like the Chi Square Method of a statistician. Instead, I will have to concentrate more on about what to do than to spell out, in technical detail, how to do it.

These expositions have been directed upon two major objectives. One of them was essentially phenomenological and aimed at an understanding of the inner phenomena of artistic creation, the symbolic meaning of works of art, and their inner appreciation by their beholders. The "methods" involved, here, are borrowed from phenomenological psychology and will yield results which constitute what I will call basic research in the area of our concerns. The other objective was largely sociological and aimed essentially at a comprehension of the reasons why, in too many present day cases, the intersubjective link between artists and their potential audiences has been impaired or completely disrupted. Where phenomenological understanding fails to bring satisfactory answers, the extraneous factors of the lives of artists and audiences will have to be consulted.

Speaking first of the basic phenomenological aspects of art experiences, we can point to the following methodological considerations.

A genuinely first step had been pointed out: you may turn to yourself as a primary source of experience and subject of observation: what is my experience when I experience an object of art? Why does it appeal to me? And so on. This is introspection; it should be carried out with a serious effort to keep your preconceived notions out of the inner picture you are trying to gain. Such introspection is invaluable as a source of first-hand insights. But, after having gained them, remember that your own experiences do not exhaust the world, and not even the world of the arts. What you gain in this fashion, is a good basis for formulating questions which you will have to pursue by asking and consulting other persons.

There is no logical second step after this. There is the attempt at learning what the intentions and motivations of an

artist are; if possible, from himself. But even if you could establish human contact with him, you must not forget that, essentially, he does not express himself in words but in his medium. It will take a good amount of sympathetic introspection to get what is important for him.

In most cases, we can only deal with an artist's work. It may allow us if not to reconstruct so to imagine what he may have meant -- always keeping in mind that, now, we are involved in interpretation of the work but not in understanding the person of the artist. Motivational interpretation may be precarious, but it must be tried as long as we insist to treat works of art as creations of humans.

With the attempt at arriving at the artist's intentions and meanings by contemplating his work, we necessarily allow our subjective understanding enter into our consideration. Thus, we are moving from phenomenological description to phenomenological interpretation. This is acceptable as long as we are not reporting ascertained facts but possibilities: given this particular work of art, it is likely that its creator connected this particular meaning with it.

Another, more definite, step away from the phenomenological-psychological level occurs when we turn to the symbolic content of works of art. Here, at least in one significant sense, we are shifting the investigation to a social and historical level. The symbolism involved here is largely social, that of social communities or groups. The objective, then, is to establish the cultural, religious-communal meanings (and others), possibly connected with inquiries into the art styles of certain periods. Since much excellent work has been done, in this respect, by Ernest Cassirer, Susanne Langer, and others, including phenomenologists, it will be best to start with their investigations.

Turning methodological attention upon the musical or theatrical performer, we come into an area intermediary between phenomenological psychology and intersubjective-interactional inquiries.

A performer will have to be understood both in his own motivation and in his understanding of the composers whose works he performs, etc. But the study of performing groups reaches into the sociological sphere of interaction and the study of intersubjective relations. Schutz's study of "Making Music Together" is a brilliant model for such an investigation. Like Schutz, some of you may have here the advantage of being able to involve themselves directly in such undertakings.

Turning from artist and performer to audience, we are getting deeper into sociological territory as well as into the fields

of our most serious problems. The crux of the matter, here, is to gain access to the feeling-tone of any potential art audience on the one hand, and possibly at the larger social conditions which may influence it? If the distance between the meaning-content of the works of art in question plus its understanding by the art teacher and the potential audience groups of students is too large, more drastic steps will have to be taken.

In case a researcher finds out that he has not enough in common with the persons he wants to study, he is well advised to look first into the literature which may convey to him some ideas about their background, living conditions, and thinking. This may help him to rethink the problems he encounters in the narrower spheres of his work. Such efforts may help him to regain access to descriptive-psychological explorations with possibly better results.

If need be, an educator may have to temporarily redefine his own role. If the communication gap between him and some of his students is too large, he could decide to act like an anthropologist and imagine that he is facing members of a strange tribe and is called upon to find out "what makes them tick." This means, that he has deliberately to set aside what he thinks he knows about them and, at the same time, what he as teacher wants to convey to them. Instead of trying immediately to establish a dialogue with them which he considers meaningful, he should for a while simply observe and listen. This may be bewildering at first; but it could eventually lead to an understanding of their feelings and their interests, so that he will have a chance to start teaching them.

There is, of course, no guarantee that such an attempt will succeed; not even every anthropologist or sociologist is capable of doing such explorations. But it is worth the try; anybody's future work may gain from such an experience.

I am well aware that these "methodological" hints are inadequate. However, they should have made clear the underlying principle: There will be no fruitful phenomenological description unless the person concerned with it inserts himself or herself into life as human experience.

Concluding Remark

Concerning the possible usefulness of these expositions for those who are involved in, and concerned with, art education, I cannot say more than the following: They work in a field in which sensitivity, imagination, and ingenuity are at a premium. I am confident that they will find ways to put to use whatever they may find of interest to them and their work in this paper.

FOOTNOTES

1. This first epoché, a form of "bracketing" of both of all pre-existing interpretations of what appears in one's consciousness and all judgments of the "reality" of such phenomena, must be distinguished from Husserl's further epochés, which he called eidetic and transcendental and which served as stepping stones of the development of a "transcendental phenomenology" by which he hoped to carry his investigations to the outermost limits of subjectivity.
2. This is not to say that Schutz was the superior philosopher of the two. But he was a person with a thorough knowledge and a keen understanding of the fields and problems of the social sciences of which Husserl and most of his students knew very little.
3. To mind comes the famed British philosopher of physics, Sir A. S. Eddington, who warned us of the immense dangers connected with crossing the threshold of a room: We must try to step on a plank which moves past at the speed of 20 miles per second, and which gives only a treacherous appearance of being solid: it consists mostly of empty space, in which atoms buzz around like a swarm of flies. Even if we do not miss the plank altogether, it would be perfectly in accord with natural law should we just fall through it into empty space (New Pathways of Science, 1933: 342).
4. If a violinist, after a performance, is approached by a music critic who followed him score in hand and tells him: I admire the precision with which you played this passage of a flight of one-sixteenth notes in staccato, he may accept that as a recognition of his technical skill. But it may not be his ambition to be a musical stunt-man, like certain fold-music fiddlers who play their instrument upside down or in other contortionist ways without losing a beat. What the artist really wants to hear is the spontaneous and tumultuous applause of the audience at the end of his performance, which tells him that he has touched their emotions, even if they should not know what a staccato note is.
5. Schutz is borne out by the following episode. During the early Forties, records for chamber music players came on the market, recorded by professional artist, in which one instrument had been blended out. A refugee friend of ours, who had managed to bring his cello along from the old continent, complained constantly that he did not know any musicians who would play with him. For Christmas, we bought him a few of these records so that he could play trios or quartets. He was excited about the present; but a week later he told us

dejectedly that he simply could not play anything accompanied by the records.

6. As example of an artist in extreme defiance, I may mention Georg Gross in post-WWI Germany. His drawings were a continuous savage attack on these of his contemporaries who profited from the catastrophic consequences of economic collapse and inflation. The statements of disavowal, which he issued after WW II in the United States makes me suspect that his earlier artistic acidity was an expression of aggressive pathological tendencies which he projected into the medium of his art.

Paul Klee is an example of the artist in despair. In the Thirties, he did a series of canvasses entirely in brown, containing disjuncted parts of human figures. Friends of his in his native Switzerland, who had their house full of Klee's pictures, told me that these paintings directly reflected his state of mind: a person on the verge of "falling apart"; they feared that, at any time, he may "really go to pieces." -- At that time, the anxieties of Klee were heightened to the critical point due to the circumstances of his external life. Prior to Hitler, he had moved to Germany as a country preferable for an artist. The National Socialists did not touch him personally, because he was a Swiss. But they put his name on top of the list of the exponents of "degenerate art." He could not exhibit or sell anything. While he was free to return to his native country, he was not allowed to take his paintings with him. He felt he had to remain in Germany simply to protect them from destructions.

7. For an explanation of the basic elements of a methodology adequate for a sociology of understanding, the appropriate writings of Schutz should be consulted. They are named in the attached bibliography.

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RESPONSE TO HELMUT R. WAGNER'S
"A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ART"
Marilyn Zurmuehlen

Ma réponse est centrée sur deux exemples de description phénoménologique. John Holt est cité en exemple pour avoir utilisé la réduction phénoménologique en ignorant la qualité unique des interactions d'enfants avec un violoncelle afin de comprendre sociologiquement les traits "essentiels" de leur style cognitif. Les inspections de Robert Coles sur ses expériences avec l'un de ses patients révèlent le problème de l'intersubjectivité. Le doute est vu comme une caractéristique essentielle de la position à adopter en entreprenant une enquête et la mémoire comme la clef pour aboutir au sens.

I conceived of my response as an application of some of Professor Wagner's considerations. I'll begin by sharing a province of meaning which John Holt (1967) established in his life-world.

On days when I have a lesson, I bring my cello to school, take it to a classroom and give the children a turn at "playing" it. Except for the timid ones, who make a few half-hearted passes with the bow and then quit, almost all little children attack the cello in the same way. They are really doing three things at once. They are making the machine go. They are enjoying the luxury of making sounds. And they are making scientific experiments. They start off by working the bow vigorously back and forth across one of the strings. They keep this up for a long time. Just the feel and sound of it are exciting. Then they begin to vary their bowing a bit, trying different rhythms. After a while, they begin to move the bow so that it touches more than one string, or they move to another string. But it is important to note that the first few times they do this, they do not seem to be doing it in the spirit of an experiment, to find out what will happen. They do it for the sake of doing it. They have been bowing one way, making one kind of noise; now they want to bow another way, and make another kind of noise. Only after some time does it seem to occur to them that there was a relation between the way they bowed and the kind of noise they got. Then there is quite a change in their way of doing

things. This time they move more deliberately, watchfully, thoughtfully, from one string to another. You can almost hear them thinking, "Ah, this string makes this kind of noise, and that string makes that kind of noise." But they have to do a good deal of what seems like random bowing, activity for its own sake, before they begin to think about what they are doing. They have to pile up quite a mass of raw sensory data, before they begin trying to sort it out and make sense of it.

After they have done a good deal of bowing they begin to think about using the fingers of their left hand to press the strings down on the fingerboard. This does not have much effect, for two reasons. In the first place, their fingers are not strong enough to hold the strings down tightly enough. More important, they do not at first make the slightest effort to be sure they are holding down the same string they are bowing. The bow works furiously across all the strings. The left hand goes up and down the strings, pressing them here and there, but the two activities are not connected. While this goes on, I say nothing. After a while, the child begins to be aware of something. What? Perhaps his left hand becomes aware, so to speak, of holding down a vibrating string some of the time, and a silent string the rest of the time. Perhaps he becomes aware that some of the time it does not. At any rate, after a while he begins to make a deliberate effort to hold down the same string he is bowing on, looking from one hand to the other. This is harder than it looks, especially for a little child holding the cello in a very awkward position. When he gets the hang of it, he bows away some more, pressing down here and there on the bowed string, again in what seems like a random, undirected way, for some time, before he begins to conduct a series of new experiments, this time to see what happens when he moves his hand up and down the string.

It doesn't take a child long, by such steps, to grasp the basic idea of the cello, the relationship of the bow, the string, and the left hand. But while he has been figuring this out, he has been ceaselessly active. One could say that he is having too much fun--a weak word, really--playing the cello to want to take time to figure it out. A scientist might say that, along with his useful data, the child has collected an enormous quantity of random, useless data. A trained scientist

wants to cut all irrelevant data out of his experiment. He is asking nature a question, and he wants to cut down the noise, the static, the random information, to a minimum, so that he can hear the answer. But a child doesn't work that way. He is used to getting his answers out of the noise. He has, after all, grown up in a strange world where everything is noise, where he can only understand and make sense of a tiny part of what he experiences. His way of attacking the cello problem is to produce the maximum amount of data possible, to do as many things as he can, to use his hands and the bow in as many ways as possible. Then, as he goes along, he begins to notice regularities and patterns. He begins to ask question--that is, to make deliberate experiments. But it is vital to note that until he has a great deal of data, he has no idea what questions to ask, or what questions there are to be asked (pp.47-49).

The children at the beginning of this experience appear to be functioning in the cognitive style of the paramount reality --they are wide-awake, they suspend doubts, and while Holt seems to compare some of their activity with play, I suggest that Schutz's (1970) definition of working as, "a meaningful spontaneity based upon a project and characterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements gearing into the outer world," (p:254) is apt. The last requirement has a better fit with this reality if we bracket our possible preconceptions about the "nature" of playing the cello. While Schutz specifically designates the play world of the child as a nonparamount reality, which is not compatible with the meaning of everyday life, I think Holt's point is that for these children their way of interacting with the cello was taken for granted by them, and so the act of attention to the cello was in the "natural attitude," that is, "the mental stance a person takes in the spontaneous and routine pursuits of his daily affairs" (Schutz, p.320).

One of my intentions in discussing Holt's interpretation is that I think it represents the eidetic approach in phenomenological inquiry in the worlds of both the children and Holt. During their later activity the children seem to have established "essential" characteristics of playing the cello from the spontaneous interpretations of their sensory perceptions: Holt's attention was on understanding the "essential" features of the children's cognitive style and he seems to have used phenomenological reduction to disregard the uniqueness of individual children's conduct in order to sociologically understand such "essentials." Beyond these attempts at sedimentation of some of the terminology of phenomenological sociology with my previously

acquired knowledge, my interest in the Holt account is to propose it as an instance of a research procedure such as might be generated from Professor Wagner's considerations.

Holt observed these children in the "concrete circumstances of his daily affairs" as a teacher, and his consciousness of their activities was added to the sedimentation of his previous experiences. By interpretation and in retrospect he has established meaning for those observations, and he has presented them in a form which invites our understanding of them. What doubt arose which led Holt no longer to take for granted the cello-playing situation and so to engage in inquiry? Perhaps his recognition that the children's beginning interactions with the instrument were quite different from his own. Once he focused on these events it seems to be that we find a key, both to his means for arriving at meaning in them and to his method of conveying that meaning to us, in Langer's (1953) concept of memory. She writes: "There is a normal and familiar condition which shapes experience into a distinct mode, under which it can be apprehended and valued: that is memory. . . Memory is the great organizer of consciousness. It simplifies and composes our perceptions into units of personal knowledge" (pp. 262-263). Clearly, Holt did not recount the totality of his observations, but rather selected and interpreted from his memory. I can mention other examples of memory as an organizer in research--Beittel's use of it in Alternatives for Research in Art Education, but I assume that you will experience this more directly from him; a graduate student I worked with three years ago who employed photographs to enhance his memory of children's block building; and last semester another graduate student who kept a journal of children's interactions with fibers, fabrics, and stuffed forms. Both of these students arrived at understanding of the "essential" features of the children's cognitive styles in these situations.

Yet another reason for reading you the Holt selection is in response to Professor Wagner's statement that "...for the province of meaning of music, and possibly others, the neat separation from the sphere of the life-world cannot be maintained, regardless of how a person may manage to move from one sphere to the other and back." I want to suggest that for some of these children at least there was a moving from the sphere of the life-world into the world of art (specifically, music). Although this may be an incipient aesthetic attention, Langer (1951) points out that "The earliest manifestation of any symbol-making tendency is likely to be a mere sense of significance attached to certain objects, certain forms or sounds, a vague emotional arrest of the mind by something that is neither dangerous nor useful in reality" (p. 100). I "understand" the previously mentioned lack of a neat separation of the life-world and the world of art because I think I have experienced it with others. In an interview (Zurmuehlen,

Note 1) with a graduate student who worked in ceramics and sculpture, he spoke of building a dog house: "Jake was at home, but he was in the rain, so he had to have this house. There was a lot of pressure to get it built before it started snowing." However, when he recalled his thinking during the building, he recounted: "I even thought that maybe what I ought to do is build another house like this, and put a large socket, like this electric socket here, on the inside which would blow the scale of the room. You know, this little bitty house, say 36" x 30" x 40" with this life-size, reality light socket in it." He indicated his consciousness of these dual realities by saying, "The idea of the dog house was to build a very sound structure from engineering givens. My premise is that the dog will be warm and dry and the house will be sound. And you always bring to it a certain competency that you want, and you're making those decisions all the way along the line, like 'Oh, this isn't a work of art, you know, but wait a minute. Where do you draw the line about the kind of effort that you're going to put into it?' And it is an object, just like a house would be an object or a table, or a good pair of shoes, or an automobile. And so you are creating an object into the world. So where does your responsibility for the word 'art' and the word 'functional object' come into play?" Such a mixed attitude also is revealed in the words of the potter, Hui Ka Kwong: "Your work, your art, is just like your life. If you don't want to live then you don't work. If you do want to work, when you go into the studio you withdraw from the world--and just keep on, just like you live. . . Sometimes when you're a little depressed, you don't do much. But if you feel good and make a good pot, you live again" (Smith, 1957, p.26).

In discussing methodology Professor Wagner has spoken of the value of introspection as a ground for forming questions to be pursued by further means. The following recollections and interpretations of Robert Coles (1975) seem to me to illustrate this method. He writes:

When I was a resident in child psychiatry at the Children's Hospital in Boston, I came to know Boston's various museums exceptionally well, and perhaps, from a somewhat peculiar vantage point. My mother and father had always taken my brother and me to the Museum of Fine Arts, the Isabella Gardner Museum, the Museum of Science; but now I was a daily visitor, and with me were children who, often, had never been inside "this kind of a place," as one Boston youth thirteen--black, and born in rural Alabama--kept calling Mrs. Gardner's "Palace" (p. 185).

Dr. Coles describes his unsuccessful attempts for two months to engage this student in dialogue by asking conventional psychiatric questions, and then he reveals: "I was a little desperate

for myself (what would my psychoanalyst-supervisors say?) and for him too (what would the school and court authorities say, the latter involved because of a spate of minor but foreboding delinquencies, which ranged from playing hookey to small-time grocery store theft?)" (p.186). So it was with relief that the therapist agreed to go for a walk at the patient's suggestion. Coles recalls that,

As we walked away from the hospital, the young man began talking--not much, but more than I had ever before heard. He would point out cars to me, the ones he liked, and remark upon their virtues: color, design, equipment. In a few minutes we were within sight of both the Museum of Fine Arts and the Gardner Museum. He had never seen either, and he asked me what they were. I told him. He said nothing. Or rather, he changed the subject: where could we get a coke, or root beer--he loved the latter. I did not really know; we had been walking in the wrong direction for that. As we came within sight of the Gardner Museum, he asked me if they had anything to drink in there, and I said water only, and he said that he was thirsty enough to settle for that, and so we marched in. He was stunned by what he saw: a large and beautiful garden in full bloom in the middle of a cold, snowy Boston winter. I shall never forget his immediate and only question: "How come they let us in here?" I tried to explain that anyone could come in on most days, from late morning to late afternoon. . . . We never talked about the Gardner Museum very much thereafter. We would go by it--I took walks with him on each visit and thereby we got to know each other--but he declined many invitations I issued to return. Once I asked him why: "It's a house; I don't think they like a lot of people in there" I asked him who "they" were. He did not know; or if he had a thought or two about the subject, he was not going to say anything. Instead he diverted my attention to the Boston Museum of Fine Arts: "Why don't we try that place?" We did, and he liked what he saw--long corridors, large rooms, and as he put it, "plenty of place to run or hide." Hardly a suitable aesthetic response; but I was surprised by the obvious pleasure he felt--and by his request that we return there the next time. I told him we could go there as often as he wished, and he seemed pleased.

I have since then become much interested in the ways

children express their ideas and feelings in the drawings and paintings they do. In the three volumes of Children of Crisis I have so far completed, and in the two volumes of the series I am now working on, children's art figures prominently. Often I am asked how I happened to develop that interest, and often when I give the answer, I am met with a degree of incredulity. But the fact is that the first black child I treated came to love talking about some of the paintings he saw in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and eventually loved doing some drawing of his own. And that way he could talk not only about what he saw or himself created, but what those "pictures," as he called them prompted him to remember about his own life (pp. 187-188).

I think the point is obvious that Coles' introspections led him to questions which he pursued in children's art. In addition, this account deals with the problem of intersubjectivity, that is, how is the experience of a successful communication with another Self possible? Buber (1965) spoke of the solitariness of man as an originator. "Only if someone grasps his hand not as a 'creator' but as a fellow-creature lost in the world, to be his comrade or friend or lover beyond the arts, does he have an awareness and a share of mutuality. . . . The child, in putting things together, learns much that he can learn in no other way. In making some thing he gets to know its possibility, its origin and structure and connexions, in a way he cannot learn by observation. What teaches us the saying of Thou is not the originative instinct but the instinct for communion . . . it is the longing for the world to become present to us as a person" (pp. 87-88). So Buber (1965) conceived of dialogue as the relation in education. He wrote: "Trust, trust in the world, because this human being exists--that is the most inward achievement of the relation in education. Because this human being exists, meaninglessness, however hard pressed you are by it, cannot be the real truth" (p. 98). There is a sense in which this dialogue can be experienced with those not present through the use of symbols. John Ciardi (Note 2) speaks of horizontal and vertical audiences--the horizontal being composed of our contemporaries and the vertical of those who lived before us and people who may live after we do, and so he said, "I write for Dante."

In dialogue with their art and with him the children with whom Coles worked constituted their lives out of the meanings which they gave to their past experiences, and these meaning contents shaped their future interpretations of experiences. It is this kind of possibility for the Self that Langer (1953) refers to when she

writes: "I once heard an excellent artist, who is also an articulate philosopher say: 'When I was a young child--before I went to school, I think I already knew what my life would be like. Not, of course, that I could guess what my fortunes would be, what economic situations and what political events I'd get into: but from the very beginning of my self-consciousness I knew what anything that could happen to me would have to be like" (pp. 390-291). How is this possible? Eiseley (1969) tells us that "We live by messages--all true scientists, all lovers of the arts, indeed, all true men of any stamp. Some of the messages cannot be read, but man will always try. He hungers for messages, and when he ceases to seek and interpret them he will be no longer man. . . . Each man deciphers from the ancient alphabets of nature only those secrets that his own deeps possess the power to endow with meaning" (p. 146). For Watts (1967) these messages are accounted for by his attitude that". . . man is not so much an organism in an environment as an organism-environment relationship" (p. 72). Thompson (1972) maintains that "Our schemes of history tell us more about ourselves than they do of the past... " (p. 196) and this is so because we construct our own realities. Ornstein (1976) gives us a specific instance of this process: "Mulla Nasrudin wished to get rid of several annoying boys and constructed a false and intriguing story about a feast which was supposedly being offered. As he elaborated his story further and further, the boys ran off to the feast. Nasrudin followed them, saying, 'It might be true after all,' after considering his own persuasive story" (p. 27).

The message metaphor holds the ideas of meaning and relationship, and in the worlds of art this dual attitude seems quite prevalent. Witness Emily Dickinson's (1968) writing, "This is my letter to the world that never wrote to me. . ." (p.5).

I think it is significant that both Holt's and Coles' accounts of their inquiries began in the worlds of their everyday working lives. As doubts arose about what they were experiencing, Holt's questions led him to remember the children's activities and, through phenomenological reduction, to arrive at "essentials" of their cognitive style. I think he may be considered as living predominantly in the world of science after he began to doubt--that is, not to take for granted his apprehensions of the children's interactions with the cello. Coles' doubts began with the problem of intersubjectivity. In his interactions with one adolescent he came to understand that his realities of Boston's museums and even of psychiatry were not the realities of his patient. It seems to me that his meaning province moved into the aesthetic world rather than the scientific world. I suggest that Coles' understanding of the world of that adolescent derived from an attempt to deal with his own feelings. There is a sense in which his account of early experiences is what Langer calls a

a presentational symbol--it is very close to her definition of literature as a prime symbol. She considers it crucial to the expression of sentience, or the feeling of life, that the artist not be expressing raw emotions, but rather that mediation must intervene to articulate those feelings. I suggest that Coles' writing of this account allowed him to comprehend his experiences with one individual, and then to employ phenomenological reduction as he sought out experiences with other children in their worlds of art.

I take it that one of the messages from the phenomenologists is that doubt is an essential characteristic of the stance for beginning inquiry; therefore, we should welcome it. However, as educators we well may ask, "Are there means for evoking it?" I think that Ornstein (1976) in his interpretation of Sufism suggests one method. He writes of the Sufist tales that, "Although all these were originally intended by the dervish storytellers from the Middle East as 'teaching stories,' they have little in common with the parable or didactic story of most Western cultures. Instead of convincing the reader that a certain type of thought or action is good, these teaching stories illustrate patterns of human behavior, and lessons in intuitive wisdom, which could not be put in any other way. They guide the reader along unfamiliar philosophic paths. Some are meant to familiarize the reader with the unusual; and some are intended to shock--as a fresh stimulus to mind to upset its normal patterns of thought" (p. 123). I take it that phenomenological description may be viewed as a research methodology for guiding us to be conscious of what was unfamiliar.

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A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ART EDUCATION
 Given in response to Helmut Wagner's
 "A Phenomenological Approach to Art"
 David Burton

Les descriptions de l'interaction et de la subjectivité en art d'Helmut Wagner sont développées sur le terrain de l'éducation artistique. Les rapports entre l'éducateur en art et l'étudiant en art sont rapprochés phénoménologiquement à travers l'objet d'art, l'oeuvre d'art, l'acte créateur et l'expérience de la signification. On a accordé une attention spéciale aux problèmes de la création et de la perception de la création.

The phenomenological approach to art described by Helmut Wagner is characterized by an interactive relationship between the artist and his audience. This ideally leads to an intersubjectivity between them. The work of art is the object of consciousness of this relationship. It is an artifact through which the audience is led to the mind and consciousness of the artist. We see this most clearly in Professor Wagner's example of the musical composition. The persuasive succession of themes draws the listener into a pact with the composer. Their commitment to each other becomes more and more inexorable as each theme unfolds.

The visual artist's audience, on the other hand, is often estranged from him or her by the very fact that the work of art is given all at once. The viewer, like the listener, does not linger. The artist's ability to interact with the viewer often must be achieved in the first instant of viewing. The artist must capture the viewer's eye with the power and drama of the work, and simultaneously convey the promise of deeper interaction, successive layers of subtlety and complexity requiring the viewer's attention in order to be revealed.

In earlier times, this double whammy was produced by representational images. A successful portrait, for example, depended in large measure directly on the painterly skill of the artist. The immediate recognition by the viewer of a masterfully-done portrait prompted a curiosity into how this miracle was achieved. Thus the viewer was drawn into the polythetic structure of the work of art. Interaction, and sometimes intersubjectivity, was then able to take place.

Abstract works of art are of course capable of the same sort of

interaction and intersubjectivity. Indeed the argument is often heard that abstract art is more capable in this respect. However the interdependence between capturing the viewer's eye and following through on the promise of interaction is not so compelling as in representational art, and therefore, it is harder to achieve. Consequently many artists settle for capturing the viewer's eye, and do not bother to interact with him. Obviously, no intersubjectivity is likely to occur under these circumstances.

While art education is necessarily involved in the problems of contemporary art, it primarily (and happily) rests on the relationships of interaction and intersubjectivity Professor Wagner has already described. It now falls to me to explicate these relationships in greater detail in the particular context of art education.

Relationships are always relationships between things. I will not keep you in suspense: in art education, interaction is the relationship between acts and experience, and intersubjectivity is the relationship between the art student and the art educator.

Interaction and intersubjectivity are merely long words as they are applied to art education at this point. They lack the context through which their meanings can be understood. They require the same methodic tracing out that Professor Wagner provided for the work of art. The first step then is to place the art student, the art educator and their acts and experiences in a context which can be recognized simply by its outward appearance. This context is a phenomenal structure, and contains the object of consciousness toward which we can direct our attention.

An object of consciousness is that to which our minds attend. It is what we focus on. When we first encounter something in the world, we are likely to be only superficially conscious of it as phenomena. Phenomena are not the things themselves, but rather manifestations of the possibilities inherent in things. We approach phenomena in different ways. For example, a chair's perceptual phenomena might include its weight, color, and form, and the experience of sitting in it. Regarded in other ways, its phenomena might include my memories of it, my expectations of seeing it when I enter a certain room, and my imaginative speculations as to what I might be able to do with it sculpturally.

By describing phenomena, we gain an understanding of the nature of our own experience. We then sense another deeper object of consciousness of which the initial experience is only a part. We readjust our focus to this new object of consciousness by setting aside the initial experience.

Setting aside objects of consciousness does not mean they are eliminated. They remain present, though they are bracketed, as in a mathematical equation. Setting aside an object of consciousness simply frees us of the need to attend to it specifically at the moment. It allows us to push on to deeper meanings. Eventually the entire phenomenal structure can be set aside in this way, and the relationships between the art student and the art educator, and their acts and experiences can come forward and present themselves to us unencumbered by artificial points-of-view.

In the case of a structure made up of relationships, objective goals or purposes serve as the initial object of consciousness. They in turn can be traced back to the motive forces that make them necessary. Beyond these motives are the nature of the relationships themselves.

The phenomenal structure in which I wish to place the art student, the art educator, and their acts and experiences is the simplest possible context in art education. It is, an art student making art in the presence of an art educator. I call this the "art-making situation".

Because we are considering only the relationships between these four factors, a great many of the nuts and bolts of art education can be set aside from the onset. They include the various other types of lessons typical of art education, such as lessons in art history, aesthetic education, art appreciation, and so on. Considerations of artistic medium and technique, content of instruction, and physical setting, are also set aside mutatis mutandis. It does not matter to their relationship whether the art student is working in charcoal or clay, or whether he or she is drawing in the artroom or in the courtyard.

In setting aside the accoutrements of the art-making situation, the question immediately arises, to what end is all this effort and material intended? What is art education trying to accomplish anyway?

Obviously the art educator intends for the art student to make art, to make objects that are in fact art. It is the physical art object, the painting, the ceramic pot, that is the focus of their attention. It is the physical art object that is the phenomenal object of consciousness. It is the physical art object that both the art student and the art educator refer to, point at, and talk about in the art-making situation.

But "making art" is not an entirely adequate phrase to embrace the situation. First of all, art is created, not merely made. Making, though very necessary, covers only the manipulation of

materials and the mechanics of certain processes. Making art allows the art student to deliver the goods. But something more is needed to be art.

Art must mean something. It has a meaning. When the art student merely "makes" art whatever meanings are involved are usually only rearranged from meaning he or she is given or has at hand. To create art is to actually bring meaning into existence where there was no meaning before, and this involves considerably more than the manipulation of materials and processes. To create art the art student projects certain phenomena into the world. They are thrust forward in the same way a singer projects his or her voice. In art education we do not speak of "projecting". Rather we are original, spontaneous, expressive, imaginative, and creative. I would add to these the projective aspects of memory, perception, and the other modes of consciousness, and collectively label them "creative acts".

The object of consciousness is seen in a different light as well. It is no longer simply a physical art object. It is now a work of art. It embodies the meanings of the art student's creative acts. The work a work of art does is what it means.

It is quite obvious when art is truly being created the art student attends very closely to the situation at hand. The entire situation is the object of his or her consciousness, with the work of art forming a focal center. The art educator attends to the same creative acts, though he or she is considerably limited in sensing everything the art student senses just as the art student senses it. The art educator can watch what is happening to the physical art object, and perhaps talk with the art student, but these modes of inquiry have their limits.

It is equally obvious that the art educator is not necessary to the art student in order to create art. As indispensable as we like to think of ourselves, the art student is quite capable of creating art without an art educator anywhere around. The art educator is therefore cast in a dependent role. His or her function appears to be contingent on that of the art student. This is particularly evident when the art student seizes the initiative of his or her own creative acts. The moment the art student shouts Eureka, the art educator is usually left behind in the dust, catching only an occasional glimpse of the meaning about to be born in the work of art. The object of consciousness, the art student's creative acts, become a personal object of consciousness for him or her, squeezing out the art educator. The art student, now understanding the meaning of the work, is able to make quantum leaps that the art educator cannot follow. The significance of the creative acts needed

to achieve the work of art become obscured by the meaning of the work of art being disclosed.

The art educator can view the art student's creative acts quite reasonably in perspective, as they are sedimented in a pattern of overall formative experience. Sedimenting means to be deposited in sequential time much as silt is deposited in sequential layers in a riverbed. Layers of meaning or of silt can therefore be analyzed and understood in cross-section.

Viewing a number of creative acts over a period of time indicates a fundamental shift in the attention of the art educator. He or she is no longer concentrating on the particular creative acts needed to bring about a work of art, but rather on creative acts as they contribute to a pattern of experience extending over a period of time. Creative acts are now seen from two different points-of-view, as creating a work of art, and as contributing to overall experience.

This shift away from the work of art may seem somewhat unorthodox, but it is precisely what is required for two reasons. First, the art educator must do away with his contingent dependency on the art student in order to have an adequate basis for any kind of insightful consciousness of his or her own. This is done by creating a separate object of consciousness which is the formative experience of the art student. Second, the basis for creative acts is grounded in the art student's own structure of experience as we shall see momentarily. Whatever insights the art educator might have into the creative acts of the art student come from this more fundamental level, and so his or her attention is very correctly directed there.

Art education can therefore be described at this level of consciousness as creative acts directed toward formative experience. This sums up its objective goals, and as such, it can be set aside. But this only begs the question from where do creative acts and formative experience come?

Behind the objective object of consciousness is the motive object of consciousness. The art educator's acts, what he or she intends through teaching, and the creation of meaning in the phenomenal experience of the art student, comprise the motive object of consciousness.

In creating a work of art the art student creates meaning. The meaning is then sedimented into experience. The important point here is that what is sedimented is the phenomena of meaning itself, not the phenomena of objects. We normally intend phenomena toward objects because we know the objects are already there, waiting for us. In the art-making situation there is not

art waiting for us beforehand (either as a physical art object or as a work of art) because art does not exist until it is created. The art student must work it up from raw phenomena, so to speak. It begins to exist when it begins to mean. The work of art's phenomena are meanings; they are not simply intended properties.

The art educator intends that his or her actions contribute to the sedimentation of meaning in the experience of the art student. This can be seen most clearly in his or her concern for the art student's formative experience. How creative acts are sedimented into experience is the overriding motive of the art educator. To the degree he or she is able to sense the meanings created or sedimented by the art student, the work of art can be guided and encouraged. This is very important because the art educator has a great deal of control over what lessons and concepts are taught, what materials are used, essentially what experiences are had. His or her presence is indeed an important factor in the art-making situation.

The art-making situation moves from creative acts directed toward formative experience, to teaching directed toward the experience of meaning. Please notice the initiative radically changes the emphasis of art education from an object of consciousness to an interpersonal consciousness. This objective aspect is set aside, and is replaced by an interactive relationship.

In art education, we do not use the term "interaction" very much, but we do speak of "finding meaning". Actually the art educator takes part in the building up of meaning in experience. I do not think he or she contributes very much to the creation of meanings. This is the domain of the art student. It is in the sedimentation of these meanings into experience that the art educator interacts and finds meaning. The reason interaction serves to sediment meaning so well is it is the nature of interaction to be sedimented. Interaction is a sequential exchange of views, insights, intuitions, what-have-you made over a period of time. Meaning is reinforced at each layer of exchange by the consciousness of the other person. Because interaction has a continuity over time, it is readily sedimented, and any meaning in it is likely to be sedimented as well.

The more the art student and the art educator interact, the more each will come to understand the point-of-view of the other. Eventually they realize they not only share a meaning, but that they are a meaning in each other's lives. Each sees his own presence in the life of the other person. This realization is called "intersubjectivity". Again, this is a term we rarely use in art education. Rather we speak of "caring".

We have arrived at the end of our analysis of interaction and intersubjectivity in art education. Interaction is the relationship between acts and experience, and is known to us as "meaning". Intersubjectivity is the relationship between the art student and the art educator, and finds its dimension in "caring". Ultimately meaning and caring bear on one another and become one in art education.

It is the intuition of "caring to mean" as the basis for creation and for art, that the art educator tries to encourage in each art student. Unless the art student cares deeply about creating a meaning, none is likely to occur. There are no indifferent meanings in art.

But unfortunately this intuition is not conveyed in just so many words. It is only realized between people who understand and care for each other's values. Along with caring to mean, the art educator himself must mean to care. He must have his fundamental intention caring for the art student and his or her meanings. The important point here is that the art educator carries the initiative for interaction and intersubjectivity to the art student. This initiative is always at hand for the art educator. This originates with him or her just as the creation of meaning originates with the art student.

Dans cet article "Toward Curriculum Inquiry in a New Key", l'auteur, désenchanté par l'absence de progrès marquants dans la recherche en curriculum dans les dernières années, soumet quelques propositions. Il considère d'abord que la littérature sur le curriculum est établie fondamentalement sur la formulation d'une base logique du curriculum de Tyler de 1950. Comme indication d'un nouvel examen sérieux par des chefs de file, il cite la transformation de Bruner et Schwab depuis leur adoption de l'enquête en curriculum basée sur la "structure des disciplines". L'appel de Beittel et de Eisner pour retourner à la racine de la pensée du curriculum et les demandes pressantes des "Reconceptualists" de prendre en considération le niveau profond de structure et d'intention dans l'enquête en curriculum s'établissent à partir des perspectives avancées.

Rejetant comme inadéquate la pensée d'un curriculum qui prend pour centre le "professeur", "l'enfant", "la structure de la discipline" et "la société", l'auteur opte pour un cadre plus large qui englobe "l'homme et le monde". En prenant pour centre un nouveau foyer, l'auteur assure pouvoir produire de nouvelles voies d'orientation pour guider l'enquête sur le curriculum.

Partant du cadre de travail d'Habermas, l'auteur esquisse trois orientations pour la recherche en curriculum; analytico-empirique, interprétative situationnelle (phénoménologique) et critique. Il conclut en fournissant une réflexion personnelle sur sa propre orientation vers l'enquête sur le curriculum.

INTRODUCTION

"There are some good indications that educational research may have reached a crisis stage with its major Fisherian experimental design tradition and perhaps that the paradigm has never worked." (1)

Whether we agree or not with A. J. Magoon that educational research is in a crisis stage, there are no doubt noteworthy

indications of search efforts for alternative research possibilities in education. The convening of this conference, Phenomenological Description: Potential for Research in Art Education is in itself such an indication.

The theme of the Conference reminds me of Aldous Huxley who some years ago admonished us to

"intensify our ability to look at the world directly, not through the half-opaque medium of concepts which distort every given fact into the all too familiar likeness of some generic label or explanatory abstraction." (2) (Emphasis mine)

In these words Huxley reflects a research attitude with a familiar ring to phenomenologists: "to the things themselves" which as a mode of inquiry, H. Spiegelberg has described thus:

"the direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced, without theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from unexamined preconceptions and presuppositions." (3) (Emphasis mine)

Some educational researchers have begun to show serious interest in "the directly experienced", marking for education a real advance. In this paper, I wish to explore, from a curriculum generalist's perspective, some thoughts on possible new directions in curriculum inquiry. This personal exploration has been motivated, in part, by my general disenchantment with the lack in recent years of fundamentally significant advances in curriculum inquiry and, in part, by my fervent hope that the talks and discussions at this conference act as a spur toward vitalized curriculum research praxis.

SOME BELL-WEATHER SIGNS IN CURRICULUM INQUIRY

Since Ralph Tyler's formulation in 1950 of the Curriculum Rationale, (4) curriculum writings over the last quarter century have been abundant, making it increasingly difficult to make sense of the path or paths being trodden. The bulk of this literature, however, has been devoted to the elaboration of Tyler's language of ends-means relationships through the use of increasingly sophisticated but reified languages of systems theory, games theory, decision theory, and the like.

However, since the sixties there have been bell-weather signs in curriculum, a few of which we should take serious note. We who are in the domain of curriculum studies remember the early sixties when much was made of Jerome Bruner's The Process of

Education, (5) wherein the understanding of the "structure of the disciplines" was considered to be the open sesame to Curriculum Studies. Not many of us remember, however, how Bruner in 1971, ten years after the publication of The Process of Education, announced what amounted to a refocus away from his earlier stance:

If I had my choice now, in terms of a curriculum project for the seventies, it would be to find a means whereby we could bring society back to its sense of values and priorities in life. I believe I would be quite satisfied to declare, if not a moratorium, then something of a de-emphasis on matters that have to do with the structure of history, the structure of physics, the nature of mathematical consistency, and deal with it rather in the context of the problems that face us... . We might put vocation and intention back into the process of education, much more firmly than we had it there before. (6) (Emphasis given by Jerome Bruner.)

Likewise, J. J. Schwab, heavily involved in the sixties with science oriented curricula (e.g., Biological Sciences Curriculum Studies), advocated, as did Bruner, curriculum thought controlled by the codification of disciplined knowledge. However, by the onset of the seventies, we find him grimly commenting to curriculum people:

"...the field of curriculum is moribund, unable by its present methods and principles to continue its work and desperately in search of new and more effective principles and methods... . The field has reached this unhappy state by inveterate and unexamined reliance on theory in an area where theory is partly inappropriate in the first place and where the theories extant, even where appropriate, are inadequate to the tasks which the curriculum field sets them." (7)

At the turn of the present decade, then, we find both Bruner and Schwab giving recognition to the inadequacies of existing curriculum inquiry modes but unable at that time to suggest fundamentally new direction.

Among the few educators who, early in this decade, called for the need for probing into the deep structure underlying curriculum research thought, are two educators, Kenneth Beittel and Elliot Eisner, both grounded in art education. I have found them seriously questioning underlying presuppositions of the dominant tradition in curriculum conceptions and research, calling for close examination of curriculum orientations at the root level. In Alternatives for Art Education Research, (8) Beittel urged the uncovering of "the root metaphors in art

education", "the experiential core of art", "the expressive situation", and in Conflicting Conceptions of Curriculum, (9) Eisner asked for surfacing "conceptual underpinnings" and "the goals and assumptions...of major orientations to curriculum." Theirs has been a vibrant call for calling into question the constraining mould of tradition.

In like vein, curriculum generalists labelled "Reconceptualists" have begun recently to press for recognition of the deep level value and intent base of underlying curriculum perspectives. For instance, James Macdonald, one of the senior members of the Reconceptualist School has commented:

"In the field of curriculum we have been fussing about with the problem of values and perspectives for some time... . It is clear that curriculum thinkers have been unaware of the different levels and kinds of value perspectives that are involved in curriculum thinking." (10)

Likewise, Michael Apple concerned with the assumptions that educators bring to their curriculum work, pointed to the fundamental difficulty of curriculum thought modes that rest on the models and language systems that are applied to designing educational environments and to a large portion of educational research. He has called upon curriculum researchers to become aware of the latent dilemmas involved in the modes of discourse they employ, discourse that tends to obscure fundamental human interests. He has argued that

1. Educators, especially members of the curriculum field, have taken an outmoded positivistic stance that disarms critical self-reflection and have given it the name and prestige of the scientific method.
2. That because of our lack of reflectiveness, we have perceived our dominant style of scientific rationalizing as being interest free, when this may not be the case, thereby contributing to an already strongly manipulative ethos of schooling.
3. That educators may find it necessary to seek new forms of rationality that are less restrictive than those on which they have drawn so heavily in the past if they are, in fact, to design more humane educational environments. (11)

It is quite apparent that the foregoing authors, particularly Beittel, Macdonald and Apple, have identified the crisis in curriculum research as related to the mono-dimensional effect of the dominance of the traditional orientation to research,

what Paulo Freire (12) has termed a "limit-situation" within which many curriculum researchers seem encapsulated.

What seems to be needed in curriculum inquiry, therefore, is general recognition of the epistemological limit-situation in which current curriculum research is encased, i.e., a critical awareness that conventional research has not only a limiting effect but also to some degree a distorting effect on new possibilities in curriculum research. Accordingly, we need to seek out new orientations that allow us to free ourselves of the tunnel vision effect of mono-dimensionality.

Such a search beckons us to probe and to clarify perspectives underlying research approaches. Fortunately, we in North America, witnessing a reverse-Columbus phenomenon, have discovered European scholars and their disciples whose scholarship Radnitzky (13) has collectively identified as the "Continental Schools of Metascience". These Continental scholars have been concerned with "Ways of Looking at Science", and their insights into these ways have provided us with a rich avenue that could open up possibilities for curriculum research. Notable among these scholars is Jurgen Habermas, an anthropological philosopher, whose tri-paradigmatic framework will be discussed in this paper.

CENTRING CURRICULUM THOUGHT

The term "curriculum" is many things to many people. In attempts to give focus curriculum people have tried to centre their thoughts on the teacher (as in the "teacher-centred curriculum") on the child (as in the "child-centred curriculum"), on the structure of the disciplines (as in the "discipline-centred curriculum"), on society (as in the "society-centred curriculum"), and so on. I find these centering attempts too confining, and I believe that in spite of some years of activity based on these centres, these research activities have failed to make significant advances in curriculum thought. I criticize these "centres" for not providing sufficient scope and contextuality that allow entertainment of views of human and social acts we call "education". Hence, I find it important to centre curriculum thought on a broader frame, that of "man/world relationships", for it permits probing of the deeper meaning of what it is for persons (teachers and students) to be human, to become more human, and to act humanly in educational situations.

Given this centre, which I consider to be an irreducible unit, I am able to view man situated in his world and acting upon himself and his world. Translated into a school situation (see Figure 1) I can view two persons, one typified as teacher (P_t) and the other as student (P_s) with their intentional acts

directed towards each other and a displayed object (D), be it canvas, a painting, or "arting-guiding" image or idea. I can see the teacher and the student, as Dr. Wagner stated in his conference paper, as "humans with their volitions, aspirations, goals, feelings and intentions" (14). Such a centre will allow me to view a teacher or a student and "an individual in his dual appearances as a thinking and willing being within the immediate spheres of his experience and as a social actor involved in interchanges with others in face-to-face relations." (15)




Figure 1: Intentional Acts of a Teacher and a Student

If curriculum is given such a centre, we can bring to unfold manifold ways of viewing "man/world relationships" (including man-man relationships), making possible the discovering of perspectives which undergird curriculum thought.

In this paper concern is, of course, for alternative curriculum research perspectives or orientations. Hence, it is appropriate to ask: Is there a formulation of orientations that can advance our search?

MULTIPLE ORIENTATIONS IN A CURRICULUM EVALUATION RESEARCH:
AN EXAMPLAR

"No program can be evaluated in its entirety. But we can increase our vision of whatever we are viewing through the employment of as many perspectives as we can find appropriate and utilize for our purposes." (16)

A province-wide curriculum evaluation research we just conducted

can serve as an exemplar of how multiple perspectives can guide curriculum inquiry, in this case, an evaluation of a provincial school curriculum. In launching the British Columbia Social Studies Assessment, (17) we initially posed the question: What are possible ways of approaching the phenomenon of Social Studies in British Columbia?

We took our cue from what Beittel called appropriately the "Rashomon effect", a notion borrowed from Kurosawa's acclaimed film in which the same event is disclosed interpretatively from different perspectives. Simultaneously, we were mindful of the need to counter-balance the dominant orientation in evaluation, a point M. Q. Patton ably pointed out recently:


"The very dominance of the scientific method in evaluation research appears to have cut off the great majority of practitioners from serious consideration of any alternative research paradigms. The label "research" has come to mean the equivalent of employing the Scientific Method...of working within the dominant paradigm." (18)

We began our evaluation work aware of the need for multiple perspectives, and of the potential of Jurgen Habermas' tri-paradigmatic framework (19) in providing alternative orientations appropriate for our evaluation research interests.

Guided by these orientations we projected evaluation plans, conducted evaluative activities and compiled six reports. The following diagram shows how the reports match the framework containing the three paradigmatic orientations. (20) (See Figure 2)

The orientational framework we used provided three root orientations: the empirical analytic orientation, the situational interpretative orientation, and the critical reflective orientation.

It is to these orientations that we must now turn.



- A. Teacher Views of Social Studies.
- B. Teacher Views of Prescribed Social Studies Curriculum Resources.
- C. Views of Goals of Social Studies.
- D. Student Achievement and Views in Social Studies.
- E. Interpretative Studies of Selected School Situations.
- F. "An Interpretation of Intents of the Elementary and Secondary Curriculum Guides" (in Summary Report, 1978).

Figure 2: Orientational Framework of the Reports Included in the B.C. Social Studies Assessment 1978.

THREE CURRICULUM INQUIRY ORIENTATIONS

"Man has been set in this world that surrounds him, with its rich and varied activities. It may be conceived by the human intelligence and formed by human action and endeavour. Schleiermacher calls this world, as opened to our reasoning, understanding and to our activity, the universum... . It signifies that great totality of being and becoming, of nature and of history in which we ourselves are partly links and partly masters that forge the chain. Our relation to this universum...is manifold. (21)

Man's relation to the world is manifold, and man relates to this world through varied activities. The quality of the relationships and the kind of activity depend on the orientation man assumes in establishing his relationship with this world.

In curriculum inquiry, there is an array of orientations that a researcher might adopt (see Figure 3). Here are three possibilities. First, there is the empirical analytic inquiry orientation in which explanatory and technical knowledge is sought. This research mode is familiar to us as "science". Second, there is the situational interpretative inquiry orientation in which research is conceived of as a search for meaning which people give in a situation. Such an account is called phenomenological description. Third, there is the critical inquiry orientation which is gaining some visibility in research literature. Researchers within this orientation are concerned with critical understanding of fundamental interests, values, assumptions and implications for human and social action. These orientations are discussed briefly in the following sections and a chart summarizing these discussions is included.




Figure 3: Possible Orientations to Curriculum Inquiry

THREE ORIENTATIONS TO CURRICULUM INQUIRY

(T.Aoki)

"Man experiences three root activities: WORK, COMMUNICATION and REFLECTION. These activities yield three forms of knowledge: NOMOLOGICAL, SITUATIONAL INTERPRETATIVE, and CRITICAL."

EMPIRICAL-ANALYTIC (Technical) ORIENTATION

Root Activity: Intellectual and technical WORK (relating man to natural world).

Interest: in intellectual and technical control of world. Interest also in efficiency, certainty and predictability.

Knowledge Form: Nomological knowledge (facts, generalizations, cause and effect laws, theories).

Understanding is in terms of facts, etc.

Knowing: empirical knowing.

Explaining: giving causal, functional or hypothetico-deductive reasons.

SITUATIONAL INTERPRETATIVE ORIENTATION

Root Activity: COMMUNICATION (relating man to social world).

Interest: in experientially meaningful, authentic intersubjective understanding (in terms of meanings to actors).

Knowledge Form: Situational knowledge. Knowing of structure of interpretative meanings.

Understanding is in terms of meanings people give to situations.

Knowing: giving meaning.

Explaining: striking a resonant chord by clarifying motives, common meanings and authentic experiences.

CRITICAL ORIENTATION

Root Activity: REFLECTION (relating man to self and social world).

Interest: in improving human condition by rendering transparent tacit assumptions and hidden assumptions and by initiating a process of transformation designed to liberate man.

Knowledge Form: Normative knowledge. Knowledge of thought and action to improve humanness and human/social condition.


Understanding is in terms of reflection.

Knowing: critical knowing that combines reflection and action.

Explaining: tracing to underlying unreflected aspects to call for action.

Man/world relationship

"man and world"



Reality is out there.

Life in this world can be explained with certainty, predictability.

Theoretical Studies

Behavioural Theory
Systems Theory
Cybernetics
Structural Functionalism

Some Scholars

Descartes (I think; therefore I am).
Locke
Skinner
Vienna Scholars

Evaluation (Ends-Means)

Achievement oriented
Goal Based Evaluation
Criterion Referenced Evaluation
Cost Benefit Evaluation

Man/world relationship

"man-in-his-social-world"



Reality is intersubjectively constituted

Life is a mystery

Theoretical Studies

Phenomenology
Sociology of knowledge
Ethnomethodology
Linguistic Analysis
Hermeneutics

Some Scholars


Schutz, Berger and Luckman
Garfinkel, Goffman,
Hussori (To the things themselves)
Spiegelberg, Cicourel
Palmer, Hirsch

Evaluation (Situational Interpretative)

Phenomenological Interpretative Evaluation

Man/world relationship

"man-in-his-world, with his world"



Reality is in praxis (thought and action).

Life can be improved.

Theoretical Studies

Critical Theory
Critical Social Theory
Psychoanalysis

Some Scholars

Gouldner, Adorno
Wellmer, Marcuse
Habermas
Frankfurt Scholars
Ulrecht Scholars
Paulo Freire

Evaluation (Critical)

Discovering Underlying Assumptions, interests, values, motives, perspectives, root metaphors and implications for action to improve human condition.
Uncovering ideologies.

Empirical Analytic Inquiry Orientation

Of the three orientations, the empirical analytic is without doubt the dominant one in education research communities throughout North America. The "scientific" enterprise, as most educators know it, is embedded in this orientation and carries with it the weight of tradition and prestige. Research in education is typically defined in terms of this orientation, and in typical graduate research seminars in education, we find faculty and graduate students devotedly engaged in mastering the rules and techniques of complex and sophisticated designs and analyses appropriate for this orientation. By rigor in research is often meant understanding the complex research designs and sophisticated mathematics based statistical analyses appropriate for this orientation.

According to Habermas, the root human activity of those engaged in empiric-analytic research or its utilitarian derivatives (applied sciences) is intellectual or technical work. Seen as a productive process, intellectual or technical work has as its basic intent a cognitive interest in control of objects in the world. By acting upon the objectified world man through work transforms it, in the process generating empirical analytic and technical understandings which enhance efficiency, certainty and predictability. Thus, the form of knowledge sought is nomological and law-like knowledge that gives man explanatory power, understood within this orientation as equivalent to giving cause and effect, functional or hypothetico-deductive statements.

Within this orientation is technical interest in the utilization of predictive knowledge, as in behavior modification, technology, engineering, and the like. In support of this interest in technical control has developed a number of control oriented theories such as cybernetic engineering, management theory, general systems and structural-functionalism.

A researcher within this orientation assumes a detached stance toward his world, which through his intellect and will, attempts to subdue it. Intellectual control of this world is approached indirectly, mediated by conceptual constructs, and knowledge about the world is gained through guided observation and carefully designed and controlled manipulation. The scientific experiment is the exemplary paradigm. Hence, the researcher approaches his world objectively, distancing his own subjectivity from the objectified world. Validation of knowledge gained in this orientation proceeds through the ground of corroborative empirical evidences found within this objective world.

Life is viewed differently from one orientation to another. Within this orientation there exists a view that human and social

life can be explained away with degrees of certainty, probability and predictability.

When a researcher becomes engaged in empirical-analytic research, he defines his research world through a statement of his researchable problem accompanied by a description of and the research method associated with it. The problem and the method determine the limits of what he sees in the research situation. Circumscribed by the problem and methodology used, he collects relevant data. These data are then transformed into second-order descriptions guided typically by pre-determined theoretical constructs. What this means is that these second-order descriptions (generalizations and idealizations) are once removed from the first order descriptions of those who dwell in and who experience life within the situation defined as the research situation. When scientist Adolphe Patmann said "Life is always more than what science can say at any given time", he was referring to how in order to arrive at these generalizations and idealizations, the uniqueness and messiness of any lived situations tend to be reduced out.

Knowing of the reductionism that goes on in second order research ventures, the curriculum researcher needs to be concerned about what second order knowledge fails to reveal.

Situational Interpretative Inquiry Orientation

At this very moment I find myself situated in my world of "conferencing" people. In this world of mine, my "I" is at the centre. I am experiencing life as I am living it now guided by my common-sense typified knowledge about educators' conferences. I define my life by giving meaning to my paper presentation, to you who are listening or not listening to me, and to on-going events here as I notice them. I am continuously involved in meaning-giving activities as I construct my personal world of meanings. The structure of these meanings is my present reality.

At this moment I see you sitting across from me, in my visual and auditory presence, experiencing your life of "conferencing". You are situated with yourself as centre and that central point is your "I". You are experiencing life as you are now living it in your common-sense conferencing way, defining it by giving your own meaning to things, people and events about you. You, too, are continuously involved in meaning-giving activities as you construct your own personal world of meanings. The structure of these meanings is your present reality.

Hence, in a social situation wherein things, people and events move together, there are many ways in which they are given meaning by the people in the situation. In other words, people are

continuously interpreting the events that they experience, and these interpretations differ from person to person. A researcher oriented towards situational interpretative research must keep two significant features in mind: 1) people give personal meanings to each situation experienced, and 2) people interpret the same event in different ways.

Whereas the most human activity of concern within the empirical analytic orientation is man's productive intellectual and technical capacity to work, the activity of concern for those in the situational interpretative framework is communication between man and man. Since research guiding interests of the situational interpretative researcher are insights into human experiences as they are lived, he needs to direct his efforts toward clarifying, authenticating and bringing to full human awareness the meaning structures of the constructive forces of the social cultural process. The form of knowledge sought is not nomological law-like statements but deep structures of meaning, the way in which man meaningfully experiences and cognitively appropriates the social world. Hence, when he comes to know situationally, he knows his world in a different form and in a different way compared with those of the empirical analytic researcher.

The view of man/world in lived situations is one of man-in-his-world-of-fellowmen. Whereas in the empirical analytic stance, as we have seen, man and world are given second-order constructions through the medium of conceptual constructs, in the situational world man and social world are seen as united. This is not to deny the objectivity of the social world but rather to say that the subjective "I-in-my-world" is in a dialectic relationship with another's "I-in-my-world". This means, for instance, that in my lived world, I as subjective am active, and act upon my social world; hence, I am able to "name" my world. But I realize, however, that my fellowman subjectively acts upon his world, names his world, and influences me. In this sense my "I" and his "I" are dialectically related. Communication is indeed intercommunication between people in face-to-face situations.

In seeking out, therefore, the structure of meanings which are not accessible to empirical-analytic science, researchers in the situational-interpretative orientations must attempt to provide explanations of an interpretative kind. That is, whereas "explaining" within the empirical-analytic orientation means giving causal, functional or hypothetic-deductive statements, in the situational orientation "explaining" requires striking a responsive chord among people in dialogue situations by clarifying motives, authentic experiences and common meaning. The researcher, hence, cannot stand aloof as an observer as is done in empirical-analytic research, but must enter into inter-subjective

dialogue with the people in the research situation.

Within the situational interpretative orientation there are different approaches, each allowing a description of the meaning structure in a situation. There is a growing interest among educators in theoretical studies that falls within the phenomenological attitude. The phenomenology of social understanding requiring investigation of meaning-giving activities in the everyday world in the main research interest of some social and cultural ethnographers, particularly ethnomethodologists who follow the tradition established by Garfinkel and Goffman. Interpretation of text and text analogues embodied in social-cultural phenomena is the guiding interest of those who engage in hermeneutics.

Such interpretations are called phenomenological descriptions, providing accounts of first-order experiences people experience, without which, it seems to me, second-order descriptions are deprived of content. The situationally-interpretative oriented research is vitally complementary to empirical-analytic research and deserves close attention by curriculum researchers, particularly for those whose interest lie in the study of curriculum-in-use, curriculum development in situ, or curriculum evaluation in situ.

Critically Reflective Inquiry Orientation

The third form of research is within the orientation represented by critical theory.

Whereas in the empirical-analytic research mode the root activity is productive work, and in the situational interpretative, the activity of communication, that of critical theory is reflection. In reflection, the actor through the critical analytic process uncovers and makes explicit the tacit and hidden assumptions and intentions held.

We have noted that researchers within the empirical analytic orientation are interested in second-order descriptions of social phenomena, i.e., nomological law-like statements resulting from mediated and systemized theoretical interpretations of experience. These first order accounts are, we noted, common sense typifications of meanings which an actor gives to situations in terms of his immediate acts in his daily on-going life. Critical researchers are interested in questioning these descriptive accounts, whether they be second order or first order, and in probing for the underlying bases in order to reveal tacitly held intentions and assumptions. This process is what some refer to as critical reflection.

In critical inquiry the researcher himself becomes part of the object of inquiry. The researcher in becoming involved with his subjects, enters into their world and engages them in mutually reflective activity. He questions his subjects and himself. Reflection by himself and participants allows new questions to emerge which, in turn, leads to more reflection. In the ongoing process which is dialectical and transformative, both researcher and subjects become participants in an open dialogue.

However, it is important for the researcher to remember that critical perspective is a two-bladed knife, cutting both ways. Werner states:

"We must be reflective of the very perspective we use for critical sense-making. Any clarifying of perspective of others or within programs is itself perspective guided. In arguing for point-of-viewism one cannot presume himself free of a viewpoint. One way to deal with this dilemma is to make explicit and reflect upon the theoretical, and methodological beliefs within which our own thinking is situated."(22)

Reflection in the sense used here is not the kind of activity that people as actors engage in in their daily life. For in their day-to-day existence, actors deal with their concerns in routine ways without probing beyond the immediate exigencies. Missing is a conscious effort to examine the intentions and assumptions underlying their acts. However, in critical reflection the everyday type of attitude is placed in "brackets", as it were, and examined in an attempt to transcend the immediate level of interpretation. Critical reflection leads to an understanding of what is beyond; it is oriented towards making the unconscious conscious. Such reflective activity allows liberation from the unconsciously held assumptions and intentions that lie hidden. These may be repressive and dehumanizing aspects of everyday life which man needs to face in his personal and social life. For example, at the personal level the content of reflection may be the "rationalizations" an actor uses to hide underlying motives for his action. Or, at the societal level, the content of reflection may be the "ideology" used to speak for social policies and practices, rendering obscure society's coercive interests that lie beneath. In this case critical reflection demonstrates interest in uncovering the hidden "true" interests embedded in some given personal or social condition.

Reflection, however, is not only oriented towards making conscious the unconscious by discovering descriptions of underlying assumptions and intentions, but is also oriented towards the implications for action guided by the newly gained consciousness and critical knowing. It is interested in bringing about a

re-orientation through transformation of the assumptions and intentions upon which thought and action rest. These may be preconceived norms, values, images of man and the world, assumptions about knowledge, root metaphors and perspectives. Critical reflection, then, with its research-guiding interest to liberate man from hidden assumptions and techniques, promotes a theory of man and society that is grounded in the moral attitude of liberation.

Curriculum research within this orientation would ask that focus be given not only on the knowledge structure of life experiences, but also on the normative structure as well. Thus, in such a bifocal context, phenomenological description of educational phenomena may be regarded as incomplete, but significant in making possible critical reflective activity. For instance, van Manen describes the work of the School of Utrecht led by Langeveld, (23) whose interest lies in "phenomenological pedagogy". Langeveld is said to argue that phenomenological disciplines are constructed within the dialogical context of an ongoing situationally interpretative activity but guided by some meaningful purpose of what it means to educate within the critically reflective orientation. In describing Langeveld's pedagogical research position, van Manen states:

"educational research must always be structured pedagogically; that is, it should be grounded reflectively in the emancipatory norms toward which all education is oriented." (24)

As I understand the field of critically reflective social theory -- and I speak as a novice in this realm -- I see it as a broad domain, essentially one of the manifold attitudes that man can assume in relating to his world. Hence, it can have related but diverse frameworks such as those reflecting disciplines such as the sociology of knowledge, literary criticism, critical social theory, praxiology, psychoanalysis and phenomenological pedagogy. These disciplines deserve close examination by educational researchers for what they can offer in providing a research perspective oriented toward human and social transformation and change.

A PERSONAL REFLECTION

I have given an array of research orientations. By relating to this array, I wish to conclude with a personal note by making observations and reflections upon the biography of my research interests and my personal transformation over the last several years as mirrored in a set of doctoral students' reports of their research constructs, which in academia go by the name of "dissertations". They are listed as follows:

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

Completed

- Study 1 - A Comparison of Bales' and Flanders' Systems of Interaction Analysis as Research Tools in Small Group Instruction. (University of Alberta, Robert Anderson) 1972
- Study 2 - A Tri-Dimensional Interaction Analysis of the Valuing Process in Social Studies. (University of Alberta, Raymond Hanson) 1975
- Study 3 - Toward a Cybernetic Phenomenology of Instruction. (University of Alberta, Max van Manen) 1973
- Study 4 - Knowledge Organization and Instructional Systemics: A Problem in the Epistemology of Curriculum. (University of Alberta, Andrew Hughes) 1975
- Study 5 - Toward a Conceptualization of Ideal Styles of Curriculum Design Making in Small Groups. (University of Alberta, Douglass Ledgerwood) 1975
- Study 6 - Emic Evaluative Inquiry: An Approach for Evaluating School Programs. (University of Alberta, Donald C. Wilson) 1976
- Study 7 - A Study of Perspectives in Social Studies. (University of Alberta, Walter Werner) 1977
- Study 8 - Toward an Existential Phenomenological Approach to Curriculum Evaluation. (University of British Columbia, Peter Rothe) In process

I view Studies 1 and 2 as attempts by Bob Anderson and Ray Hanson to investigate life-in-the-classroom by examining school programs-in-use. In their studies they approached teachers and students as their objects of study from an etic stance. (26) In so doing they examined classroom life as experienced by teachers and students using second order constructs codified as Interaction Analysis Systems of Bales, Flanders, or Flanders modified. The first order lived experiences of the actors in the classroom went unexamined.

In Study 3, two perspectives were adopted, one "etic" and the other "emic". Max van Manen's interest in contextuality led him to entertain General Systems Theory as a way of exploring inter-related sub-systems within the instructional system. To complement the etic posture, he included another perspective to view

the phenomenon of instruction. As a part of the study van Manen examined phenomenologically the pedagogical relationship between Don Juan and Castaneda as he interpreted the text of The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge (27) Wherever appropriate the dissertation was written in "the first person singular" a brow-raiser in some research quarters.

Study 4 was influenced conceptually by Basil Bernstein's interpretations of codified knowledge within the framework of sociology of knowledge. Andrew Hughes examined the types of codified knowledge embodied in Social Studies curricula and made an empirical analytic study of curricula-in-use in the classroom. In Study 5 Douglass Ledgerwood set out a culturally based frame of "life-styles" and examined ethnographically acts of group members involved in curriculum development. In Study 6, Donald C. Wilson reinterpreted the etic/emic framework of Pike and the elucidatory/evaluative framework of Gene Glass, and ethnographically studied two cases of curriculum implementation. Don set aside the "installation" view of implementation and, instead, adopted the view of situationally interpreted meanings teachers give to program received.

In Study 7 Walter Werner explored literature widely in an endeavour to grasp the meaning of "perspective". He initially brought to his task two orientations, the empirical analytic from his earlier graduate work and the hermeneutic from his theological interests. He extended his orientation base by exploring sociology of knowledge, philosophical anthropology, and critical theory. His total effort was focussed on an analysis of perspectives that man-in-his-world employs.

Study 8 is an ongoing one. In this study Peter Rothe, concerned with the ontological condition of teachers and students in the situation of a curriculum-in-use, has studied existentialism (particularly as expressed by Heidegger), existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, etc., to enable him to explore the lived experiences of actors in the classroom. Through the use of socio-cultural ethnography and ethnomethodology, he analyzed the day-to-day lived experiences of teachers, students and administrators.

These are young curriculum scholars who have good familiarity with the literature of the curriculum field, who because of the tendency for abstracted reification in curriculum thought have grounded themselves for substantive content in at least one school subject area, and who have strengths in the domain I refer to as "the conduct of inquiry". In this connection, we are in accord with the general public in sounding the slogan "to the basics", but in our bailiwick, by this we mean a thrust into the underlying epistemic, axiological, telic and ontological bases

which reveal for us in increasing fullness orientations such as the ones we examined in this paper.

In the brief accounts of the doctoral studies is reflected, too, a biography of the transformation of our own research orientation. Increasingly, we have come to give phenomenological emphasis. But at times we felt "suspended as in brackets", wondering whether or not we were constructing a mystified dreamworld, in the process estranging ourselves from the mainstream flow of educational researchers. At other times we found ourselves frustrated, finding difficulty trying to make sense to colleagues how we see our research world. In the process, we have become more sensitive to the urgency of coming to know how to communicate cross-paradigmatically at the level of deep structure. We feel there are significant educational implications for such a concern.

At this point in time we are asking the question: "Descriptive knowledge, phenomenological or otherwise, what for?" We take a cue from the first line of Tao, "The way that can be described is not the way." We find this relevant to education because we believe education to be a moral enterprise concerned about what it means to educate and to be educated. In this connection, some of us feel that the inherent logic of "application" often found in education talk --the notion of "applying thought to practice"--should be problematic, at least when reference is made to the world of people. We feel that for too long "thought" and "practice" have been set apart, an act which has tended to invite reified "thought" on the one hand, and a theoretical utilitarian "practice" on the other. For too long, we have not been aware that second order thoughts were being "applied" to the first order social world of practice. A phenomenological study of the phenomenon of "application" is called for. Such an explanation might provide us insight into possibilities of contextualizing "thought" and "practice" within a new framework wherein the relatedness of the situational interpretative and the critically reflective orientations may lead us further along the way. This is our current interest and thrust in curriculum inquiry.

Today, I no longer feel discomforted as I did once when Bruner called for a moratorium, when Schwab pronounced the fact of the moribund state of curriculum inquiry, or when Magoon cried "crisis" in educational research. There are now curriculum researchers with whose ventures I can strike a vibrant and resonant chord. Although not too long ago this chord sounded strange deep inside me, that strangeness is fast fading. I think it is partly because in being at a conference such as this, I feel a sense of emergent becoming. By being here, I am becoming. I am experiencing a sense of committed involvement in co-creating research paths upon which we might meaningfully tread, as before us unfolds a clearer vision of a different research reality.

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- (2) Aldous Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*. Huxley's admonition is fundamentally phenomenological and is reflective of his concern for reductivism through abstraction.
- (3) H. Spiegelberg, *Doing Phenomenology: Essays on and in Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, p.3. Spiegelberg's book discusses the practice of phenomenology.
- (4) Ralph Tyler, *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. The Tyler rationale for curriculum development is comprised of four steps based on a commonsensical ends-means schema. They are as follows: 1) determine purposes, 2) identify learning experiences, 3) organize these learning experiences, 4) evaluate achievement in terms of purposes stated. It is the predominant paradigm in curriculum literature.
- (5) Jerome Bruner, *The Process of Education*. New York: Vintage Books, 1963. A report of a curriculum conference at which noted disciplinarians assembled and, as expected, it recommends rigor in a knowledge centred curriculum, knowledge defined within the empirical analytic orientation.
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- (11) Michael Appel, "Scientific Interests and the Nature of Educational Institutions". In William Pinar (ed.), Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975. p. 121. Among curriculum theorists Apple is a leading critical social theorist.
- (12) In Paulo Freire's curriculum thought see Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. or Education for Critical Consciousness. New York: The Seabury Press, 1973.
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- (14) Dr. Helmut Wagner in his conference paper, "A Phenomenological Approach to Art" describes Alfred Schutz's endeavors in breaking through the individualistic confines of phenomenological psychology.
- (15) Helmut Wagner, "The Scope of Phenomenological Sociology" In L. G. Psathas (ed.), Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973.
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- (22) Walter Werner, "Evaluation: Sense-Making of School Programs". In T. Aoki, (ed.), Curriculum Evaluation in a New Key. p.20. (See 16 above.)
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- (24) Ibid.
- (25) Studies 1 to 7 are unpublished doctoral studies, Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta. Study 8 is an inter-departmental study, Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, University of British Columbia.
- (26) The terms "Etic" and "Emic" frames were coined by anthropologist Pike who abstracted them from "phonetic" and "phonemic" as used in language. "Etic" refers to the stance of an outsider who observes the ongoing events; "Emic" refers to the stance of the insider who lives within the ongoing flow of lived experiences.
- (27) Carlos Castaneda, The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Answering Dr. Aoki's paper, I bring together the triple orientation in curriculum evaluation he has innovated in social sciences and those undertaken by a few researchers in art education in the last few years. These last persons are equally unsatisfied with an evaluation victim of the cult of the number. Rather, they try to propose a critical and interpretive evaluation of the situation. Then, the research in evaluation becomes an emancipating and transforming creative work.

INTRODUCTION

Je me dois d'abord de remercier le Dr. Aoki pour son exposé qui, à mon avis, manifeste l'essence de l'esprit nippon, i.e., "le parfum des cerisiers en fleurs qui embaume par un matin ensoleillé". Je crois que le Dr. Aoki oeuvre dans le curriculum comme un artiste fait une création artistique. Comme l'artiste, en effet, il s'échappe de la montée des forces du système de déterminations où le champ de l'évaluation du curriculum devrait normalement le contenir. Il renverse un certain ordre pour se tourner vers ce que la méthode scientifique appelle des interdits, i.e., la recherche de tous les possibles quand il s'agit d'approcher le phénomène des études sociales de toute une province. Pourtant sa conduite déviante produit un travail créateur qui, de son propre aveu, le "transforme" lui et l'équipe de chercheurs qu'il a formée. Une évaluation créatrice porterait donc en elle les promesses de la liberté même si elle connaît des moments d'inquiétude et de frustration.

DES CLES NOUVELLES

Je dois vous avouer que pendant plusieurs jours, le titre de l'exposé qui présageait le texte qui allait venir m'a inquiétée. "Toward Curriculum Inquiry in a new key" me donnait à penser que la phénoménologie (thème de la présente conférence) allait être proposée comme la seule clé qui pourrait répondre à toutes les questions posées dans le champ de l'évaluation du curriculum.

Je crois que toute doctrine rigoureuse que ce soit la phénoménologie, l'herméneutique, le marxisme, l'existentialisme peuvent manifester les mêmes limitations que le mode psychométrique imposé par la tradition behavioriste qui considère l'homme comme un réacteur programmé si elle se propose comme le "passe-partout",

l'unique voie. Heureusement, le Dr. Aoki nous donne non seulement une clé, mais trois.

LE PROJET DE LA PHENOMENOLOGIE

Le projet de la phénoménologie est une description de l'existence. Elle explique l'expérience mais ne la systématise pas. Cela ne veut pas dire que la description phénoménologique se réduirait en fait à l'impressionnisme d'une description du monde. Si tel était le cas, on verrait que tous les amis de la facilité, de l'improvisation brouillonne, pourraient ainsi trouver une justification "phénoménologique" à leur paresse intellectuelle. L'attitude phénoménologique ne peut non plus s'interpréter en termes "psychologistes". Elle n'exprime pas la "projection" sur les choses de nos réalités subjectives. Elle ne propose ni une thérapie ni l'écriture d'un roman autobiographique. Mais au contraire, nous dit Husserl (1913), c'est la vérité d'un monde qui se révèle et s'accomplit dans l'épreuve de la qualité. Décrire l'essence en phénoménologie, c'est expliquer les structures du perçu tel qu'il se donne. Cette perspective peut être pour l'évaluateur du curriculum beaucoup plus intéressante et concluante que celle du behaviorisme qui consiste, on le sait, à mettre "entre parenthèse" le monde, l'essence.

LE CURRICULUM ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'HOMME

Le Dr. Aoki nous présente le monde du curriculum comme n'étant centré ni sur l'enseignant, ni sur l'enseigné, ni sur les structures de la discipline, si sur la société. Pour lui comme pour les humanistes, le curriculum propose un cadre beaucoup plus large, celui de la relation de l'homme au monde et/ou de l'homme à l'homme. Ceci permet une signification plus profonde de ce que c'est pour maîtres-et-élèves d'être humain, de devenir dans les situations scolaires d'apprentissage.

Ici, dans la province de Québec, le curriculum en éducation artistique est entendu de la même façon humaniste que celle proposée par le Dr. Aoki. Le but, en effet, "spécifique et irréductible de l'éducation artistique est l'expérience esthétique" (R. Rioux, T.I, p.106). Les arts plastiques ont pour mission d'intensifier, de raffiner, d'élargir les capacités des personnes à percevoir et à comprendre leurs sensations à la manière de l'art. L'éducation artistique développerait donc une personne en augmentant ses capacités à expérimenter les qualités esthétiques qui se trouvent dans les objets naturels et créés par l'homme et dans l'environnement.

EVALUATION MULTIFORME

Je crois que toute évaluation d'un curriculum à orientation

humanistique doit être multiforme. Elle devrait d'abord inclure une évaluation normative, i.e., une évaluation de la qualité de conceptualisation que sous-tend le curriculum. Selon le Dr. Arthur Efland (1973), les buts poursuivis par un champ d'étude peuvent se justifier en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

1. La "relatabilité" i.e. que les buts spécifiques d'un champ disciplinaire donné doivent servir les buts de l'éducation en général.
2. Une signification unique et particulière des idées qui sous-tendent le curriculum. Il s'agit ici du pouvoir qu'a le curriculum de suggérer une matière distinctive et une approche qui ne se retrouvent pas dans les autres champs d'étude.
3. Un pouvoir de prescription, i.e., le pouvoir de suggérer des sources fertiles de contenus et d'activités.

Parmi les multiples perspectives ou les "3 clés" que donne le Dr. Aoki dans son exposé, il y a l'orientation critique théorique. Cette orientation qu'il propose et qu'il tient du Maître de l'école de Frankfurt, le philosophe Habermas (1972) va beaucoup plus loin que l'examen critique des buts d'un programme. Son orientation rend explicite les intentions cachées. Elle fournit une compréhension critique des intérêts, des valeurs, des attitudes et des implications pour l'action humaine et sociale. Elle fait une étude réflexive de l'éducation afin de mener à bien le projet de l'émancipation des étudiants au moyen d'une pratique. En éducation artistique, l'orientation critique théorique serait avant tout une interrogation sur l'intégration des étudiants au moyen de l'art dans le cadre de ce que le Rapport Rioux appelle "Bonne Vie", "Bonne Société".

Le Dr. Aoki bâtit son évaluation du curriculum en utilisant non seulement l'orientation critique théorique mais aussi l'orientation situationnelle interprétative. Il examine consciemment la réponse personnelle, idiosyncratique et porteuse de signification que les étudiants donnent à une situation. Puisque le seul plaisir qui est un ingrédient nécessaire de l'expérience esthétique est celui que le corps éprouve à se sentir à l'aise devant lui, il s'agirait, pour l'évaluateur en éducation artistique, de décrire les structures de "l'épreuve de l'agréable" dont jouissent les sens au contact des qualités esthétiques des oeuvres.

L'évaluateur pourrait aussi décrire le phénomène du maître qui communique la valeur de la discipline art, au moyen des media et de ses interactions avec la classe.

Dans le même ordre d'idée, je pourrais ajouter que Robert Stake

(1976) croit qu'un évaluateur doit connaître les intérêts et le langage de son audience. Durant, l'évaluation donc, il peut passer un temps substantiel à comprendre les besoins des personnes pour lesquelles l'évaluation est faite. De cette façon, il peut non seulement identifier les buts, les transactions pédagogiques et le degré d'atteinte des objectifs mais interpréter la situation pédagogique dans ce que Stake appelle une "responsive evaluation".

Eisner (1974), de son côté, pense qu'une évaluation de programme en éducation artistique s'apparente à celle de la critique d'art et doit comporter les éléments habituels de la critique d'art: description, analyse, interprétation et jugement. L'une des façons privilégiées de pouvoir faire cette interprétation qualitative semblerait être pour Beittel (1973) et ses disciples l'observation participante. Grâce à cette interprétation qualitative, administrateurs, parents et professeurs auront un portrait de ce qui se passe dans les ateliers.

Enfin pour être complète, une évaluation de programme doit rendre compte des savoirs factuels ou nomologiques, des lois, des concepts, des théories apprises en art. Elle explique les raisons hypothético-déductives ou fonctionnelles. Elle explique aussi la vie avec certitude et prédictabilité. Il s'agit ici de l'orientation analytique-empirique traditionnelle dont fait mention le Dr. Aoki et dont se méfient les chercheurs en éducation artistique.

CONCLUSION

Je conclus en disant que la description phénoménologique n'est qu'une partie du portrait. Elle doit être complétée par l'analyse empirique traditionnelle et la critique réflexive des idées qui animent un curriculum. C'est d'ailleurs le message que nous a livré suavement le Dr. Aoki dans son exposé dynamique "Toward Curriculum Inquiry in a New Key". (1978)

Comme mot de la fin, je dirai que je crois que l'exposé du Dr. Aoki nous invite à une évaluation créatrice qui sera pour nous comme pour lui une promesse de liberté et d'émancipation transformatrice.

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RESPONSE TO TED T. AOKI'S PAPER
"TOWARD CURRICULUM INQUIRY IN A NEW KEY"
Douglas Boughton

Trois perspectives de recherches pour l'étude du curriculum étaient mises en relief dans la présentation du Dr. Aoki. Cette présente réponse examine le potentiel de l'orientation "situational-interpretive" pour l'évaluation du curriculum. De fortes parentés étaient observées entre les modes d'enquête "interpretive" et l'épistémologie de l'art. A cause de ces points en commun, il fut proposé qu'une recherche paradigmatique démontrant les intérêts et les méthodologies de recherche pertinentes avec l'épistémologie de l'art serait une orientation appropriée pour la recherche sur le curriculum en éducation artistique. Pour développer plus à fond cet argument, on examina les rôles des évaluateurs de curriculum et des critiques d'art. Pour terminer, on examina un modèle pour l'évaluation du curriculum (en arts visuels) présentant les orientations de la recherche "interpretive".

My responsibility to this conference is to interpret Dr. Aoki's paper and suggest possible applications of his ideas to art education research. Since he has developed, in some detail, a triparadigmatic framework, identified originally by Jurgen Habermas, it is unnecessary for me to further elaborate upon the nature of these research orientations. Instead I propose to examine the appropriateness and potential of these alternatives in the context of visual arts curriculum inquiry.

Dr. Aoki made reference to "bell-weather signs" in the writing of curriculum theorists of the last quarter century. Their concern, he said, was with the epistemological constraints that characterize research in the empirical analytic orientation. This paradigm tends to focus attention almost exclusively upon behavior that can be quantitatively measured, and confuses the quality of educational experience with efficiency in an industrial technocratic conception of education.

Some art educators have also demonstrated "bell-weather signs" in their expressed discomfort with the methods of science as a means of generating knowledge about art and art education. Beittel (1960), Larson (1966), D'Amico (1966), and Eisner (1974) are some who have reported, in one form or another, reluctance of art educators to accept empirical analytic methods of research

or evaluation. Their fundamental concern is that the methods of "science" and art are antithetical. Empirical analytic methodologies rely greatly upon procedures of group comparison, are less concerned with the significance of individual behaviors; and seek causes of, rather than reasons for human action. Such concern reflects some important values underpinning the purposes of art education that can be traced to fundamental ways of knowing in art.

Dr. Aoki suggested that man's relation to the world is manifold, and he relates to this world through varied activities. The quality of the relationships and the kind of activity depends on the orientation man assumes in establishing his relationship with this world. In the context of curriculum inquiry a researcher may choose from three possible orientations. Of these, the situational interpretative appears to demonstrate epistemological congruence with the nature of knowledge acquisition through artistic inquiry.

Embodied within Habermas' (1971) explanation of historical hermeneutic research are the salient characteristics of the way man comes to "know" art. The modality for knowledge acquisition in the hermeneutic tradition is mediation through an interpreter's "pre-understanding" of text or text analogs. Understanding of meaning is the central purpose. Mediation of artistic knowledge has, for several hundred years, been the institutionalised function of the art critic. The critic, presumably, possesses highly refined skills of apprehension (connoisseurship) and the ability to clearly articulate the meaning of the work (critical description) to those with less understanding. Essential to the act is possession, by the critic, of extensive and widely differentiated knowledge of artistic phenomena.

The process of artistic criticism is not the only mode of artistic inquiry. The act of producing an art object (while not unrelated to criticism) can result in the production of "tacit" knowledge.* During the process of artistic production the artist usually makes a huge number of aesthetic decisions. Each manipulative action requires subsequent artist consideration and judgment. Decisions range widely in importance according to the degree of change embodied in the final product. The primary mode of knowledge seeking action by the artist is interpretation.

The epistemology of art is characterized by a concern to interpret the nature and meaning of man's interaction with art forms. Such interpretations are deliberately and explicitly subjective since they are the products of human interpreters. Habermas suggested

* See Polanyi's (1959, 1964) discussion of "subjective" (tacit) versus "objective" knowledge.

that the understanding of meaning is directed in its very structure toward the attainment of possible consensus among its actions. Lack of consensus, however, should not necessarily invalidate given explanations since it is manifestly impossible for any two interpreters to bring the same frame of reference to bear upon the same visual phenomenon.

It would seem reasonable, then, to argue that a research paradigm demonstrating research interests and methodologies congruent with the epistemology of art would be a more appropriate orientation for curriculum research in this field. I am not suggesting that the situational interpretative should be the exclusive orientation but perhaps it should be dominant.

Let me illustrate the nature of the data that may be produced through situational interpretive inquiry methods by way of a field example. When I first became interested in the possibilities of phenomenological description for art education research I explored various approaches to classroom observation and attempted to develop a curriculum evaluation model for the visual arts that was derived from an interpretive tradition (Boughton, 1976). In the course of testing interpretive modes of classroom inquiry, I recorded the following situation.

The class, a grade six, had been assigned the task of selecting a simple object to draw. The drawing was to demonstrate understanding of the techniques of shading to create an illusion of solidity. Color was also to be used so that understanding of the relationship of value and color was clearly illustrated.

My practice in the classroom was to walk around the room with a small tape recorder and attempt, through discussion with the students, to establish the meaning attributed by the students to the actions they were engaged in. Richard was drawing a model aircraft he had built himself. This is a transcript of my discussion with him:

Researcher: What's the aim of the lesson, Richard?

Richard: We're supposed to be looking at color and texture of different things.

Researcher: Okay.

Richard: And shading. Like really, when you look at things you get different color and there is shading on it. Like say if you got an angle like this (demonstrated with model aircraft) you have shadows here (pointing).

Researcher: What are you drawing, is it a Spitfire?

Richard: No it's a Mustang.

Researcher: Why did you choose it?

Richard: I like drawing aeroplanes. I have a couple at home and this was the only one I could bring. (At this point the teacher who had overheard the discussion broke in.)

Teacher: You were asked to bring a simple object, that's not.

Richard: Well, no not really.

Teacher: Tell me, which way are you looking at that?

Richard: Well, I'm looking at it like this, (student held up model so that it was viewed from the top.)

Teacher: Do you want to look at it like that? Or do you want to look at it like this? (Teacher indicated side view of model.)

Richard: Like this. (Student indicated previous view of model.)

Teacher: Why?

Richard: Well like this it looks as if it's coming around into a dive. (Student indicated the action of a fighter banking prior to diving.)

Teacher: Which is the most pleasant view to the eye? Which angle does it look best at? What is the most pleasant looking angle to the eye?

Richard: Well, sometimes it's like this. (Student indicated top view.) There's a lot of angles.

Teacher: Something like this? On a slight angle but not completely flat - all right? (Teacher indicated three-quarter view of the model.)

Richard: All right but I want it like that. (Student indicated the same view as before.)

Teacher: Now do you think you could sketch something like that? (Three-quarter view indicated.)

Richard: Yes.

Teacher: Right, well try something like that. It is more interesting to look at. It is more . . . the shading parts are more interesting. You can make better shading. Show me the dark parts. (Student did so.) Now look back at your drawing. All you can see is an outline. Where is the third-dimension?

Turn your page over. I'll hold it and you sketch it. (Teacher held model at three-quarter view.)

Sketch - don't just draw a line.

This exchange indicated to me that the teacher had a pre-conception about single "most interesting view" for the object. However, later discussion with the teacher revealed that she requested Richard to change his view because children always draw things from the top and never as you "really" see them.

My interpretation of this encounter was that the teacher held a preconceived notion about the "reality" and "correctness" of perception (how one "really" sees) that prevented her from dealing with the meaning attributed by the student to his image. This incident provided the key to further inquiry into the manner in which teachers with little art background were able to deal with the curriculum materials under investigation. As a result of the data generated through interpretive inquiry an hypothesis was developed for testing in the empirical analytic inquiry mode. Teachers with little art background, it seemed, were more likely to expect predictable outcomes than teachers with a broad art background.

At the time the incident with Richard occurred, I was struck by the lack of understanding of the student's interest that the teacher demonstrated. When I probed further I realized that she was simply demonstrating, in rather extreme form a style of pedagogy that is reflective of the zeitgeist of current educational thought in North America. The teacher has a responsibility to decide a priori the "desired" or "proper" outcome of a lesson, then to select the means to bring about that outcome.

Had Richard's teacher been aware of the methodology of phenomenological inquiry I suspect her interaction with him may have achieved at least a degree of resonance. I believe that the situational interpretive inquiry orientation outlined by Dr. Aoki is singularly appropriate as a means of conceptualizing classroom practice in art education. If the theory of art education were to be reconceived within an interpretive paradigm vis-a-vis the current prediction and control mode the effect upon teacher training and classroom implementation would be nothing short of revolutionary.

The above observation, however, does not directly deal with the focus of Dr. Aoki's paper - that of new directions for curriculum enquiry. Nevertheless it is too important a comment to remain unsaid.

Another educator, concerned with the limitations of traditional approaches to curriculum evaluation is Elliot Eisner (1975). He has proposed an approach utilizing procedures of "educational criticism" and "educational connoisseurship" that he regards as a necessary compliment to existing evaluation technologies. Connoisseurship and criticism are techniques borrowed from the arts. The former is directed towards refining the levels of apprehension of the qualities that pervade classrooms. The latter deals with the art of disclosure. The task of the critic is to articulate the ineffable qualities of classroom life in vividly descriptive language. Although describing "the ineffable" is something of a paradoxical task the critic should use metaphor, analogy, suggestion and implication to unveil the elusive qualities of classroom interactions. If I understand Eisner's proposal correctly the connoisseurship/critic interprets classroom life without entering into discourse with the actors in the social situation.

I have been intrigued for some time by the implications of Eisner's proposal, and by the possibilities of the situational interpretive research orientation for curriculum study. Both perspectives have strong relationships with the epistemology of art. I am also intrigued by the relationship of curriculum and art works and by the similarity of role of the curriculum evaluator and art critic. Note these parallels:

- i) The roles of "art critic" and "curriculum evaluator" are essentially the same. Both individuals collect data about an object or event and interpret their meaning for an audience.
- ii) Both curricula and art objects depend for their structure and content upon hundreds of decisions made by their creators.
- iii) The forms of both phenomena are characterized by a discrete number of generic elements.
- iv) Both "art" and "curriculum" are open concepts, that is, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that can adequately define "good" and "bad" art or "good" and "bad" curricula.
- v) Both art criticism and curriculum evaluation are evaluative

activities. The art critic draws upon his internalized knowledge of artistic phenomena to make judgments about the worth of a work of art. The curriculum evaluator draws upon his widely differentiated knowledge of educational theory and practice to assess the value of a programme.



The major difference between art objects and curriculum is that art objects are generally inanimate and do not change their form while curricula, on the other hand, are dynamic social constructions.

I have suggested that a strong relationship exists between the forms of knowledge seeking within the situational interpretive research orientation and artistic activity. I have also noted some relationships that exist between curriculum evaluation and art criticism. The suggestion that follows is for a possible model of curriculum evaluation that reflects a predominant situational interpretive orientation, and also demonstrates some of the characteristics of evaluative inquiry proposed by Eisner. The development of this model has been described in greater depth elsewhere (Boughton 1976).

To develop further the analogy between art criticism and curriculum evaluation I have proposed a model for art criticism (see Figure 1). The simple premise upon which this model was constructed is that art criticism requires attention (by the critic) to the art work for the purpose of making judgments of its value. These judgments, and the reasons that support them, are clearly communicated to an audience. (Beardsley, 1971; Dewey, 1934; Ecker and Kaelin, 1972; Zuniga, 1973). In addition to this premise the following assumptions were held to be sound:

- i) That a two-dimensional art work is produced by manipulation of all or some of the elements of line, shape, value, texture and colour.
- ii) That decisions about specific manipulations, by the artist, of these elements determine the final form of the object.
- iii) That decision making is central to the production of an art work.
- iv) That the artist's "paradigmatic criteria" will be embodied in decisions about specific manipulations of the elements.
- v) That the critical reasons (Beardsley) offered by the critic in support of his judgment of an art work will reflect his "paradigmatic criteria".

Figure 1
 Model for Act Criticism
 (Two Dimensional Works)



The form of the model presented in Figure 1 demonstrates the process of art criticism as the juxtaposition of two sets of paradigmatic criteria; the critic's (represented by the outer circle) and the artist's (represented by the second circle).

Paradigmatic criteria are employed by the artist and critic for different (but related ends). They are used by the artist to choose between manipulative and organizational alternatives. The critic uses his paradigmatic criteria to select from for his attention and to judge the value of the work.

These criteria have their origins in the "personal knowledge" (Polanyi, 1974) of individuals who are concerned with making judgments about the quality of artistic phenomena. They reflect the individual's world view which is determined by his "biographical situation" (Schutz, 1973). I will return shortly to this very important concept to elaborate upon it in more detail in relation to curriculum evaluation.



The subject of criticism (the art work) is represented in terms of its minimal elements fashioned, through decision making processes (the centre circle), into a unique relationship. The critic, through prior knowledge, will be aware that the artist attended to each element, either separately or together, for the purpose of gaining feedback. Decisions made on the basis of that feedback, resulted in the revision to the arrangements of elements until the product was regarded by the artist as complete.

The methodology of art criticism requires an act of refined perception (Eisner, 1975; Feldman, 1970) which necessarily implies skills of interpretation and analysis. The outcome of critical analysis is a "qualitative exposition" which is a richly descriptive account of the qualities and values of the object under examination.

Because of the similarities between art criticism and curriculum evaluation that were noted before, the framework of the model of art criticism can be used as a pattern to formulate the model for curriculum evaluation in the visual arts (see Figure 2).

The structure of the model remains the same while the following terminological substitutions are made. Within the Paradigmatic Criteria dimension "critic" and "artist" are replaced by "evaluator" and "actors" (curriculum developers, teachers, and students). The elements of two-dimensional art work are replaced by the elements of curriculum described as Agents, Content, Implementation, Outcome, Rationale, and Resources. The central Decision component remains, as does "Qualitative Exposition".

Figure 2.
Curriculum Evaluation Model
for the Visual Arts.



- i) Evaluation includes the act of juxtaposing the paradigmatic criteria, held by the evaluator, against those of the actors in the curriculum situation.
- ii) The object of evaluation (the curriculum) is a product of the actors' decision-making activities relative to any or all of six elements of curriculum.
- iii) Decisions made about the curriculum elements will largely determine the ultimate form of the curriculum. As well, these decisions will embody the paradigmatic criteria held by the actors.
- iv) Curriculum elements are not specified for evaluative attention in any particular order.

By extending the analogy of art criticism to curriculum evaluation the less restrictive framework characteristic of the epistemology of art is preserved. This is evident in two ways. First, it is proposed that features of curriculum are selected, examined, and judged in light of the evaluator's paradigmatic criteria. Mann's (1969) observation regarding the role of personal knowledge in the initiation of research is usefully adapted for clarification of this point. A research project begins with a decision about what to select for attention, and that decision is governed by what one's personal knowledge leads him to believe will be valuable and fruitful. The evaluator's problem is to select, from an inexhaustible realm of designs and meanings, those he will attend to, and that decisions is grounded in personal knowledge. The evaluator approaches the phenomena to be examined with a set of predispositions in the form of highly abstract models of what designs it would be of value to discover. These "models" can be regarded as his paradigmatic criteria.

In the context of curriculum assessment the expressed form of these paradigmatic criteria will frequently constitute shared meanings and values, held by actors within the social (curriculum) group. The degree of congruence that exists between the sets of criteria possessed by actors and evaluators will vary, due to such determining background factors as cultural origin, philosophic orientation, educational background and so on.

Although the elements of curriculum are defined by the model, they are not specified to exist in any pre-determined relationship. The nature of their relationship is determined by application of the paradigmatic criteria shared by the "actors". Because the model does not delineate an "ideal type" for curriculum or curriculum development the evaluative questions are

not predetermined.

The major translation from a model of art criticism to curriculum evaluation is necessary in the area of observation methodologies. As was mentioned before, the structure of the proposed model is analogous to the framework of aesthetic criticism, and the primary mode of inquiry in that context is interpretation of meaning. The obvious difference between art criticism and curriculum criticism lies in the nature of the object of investigation. The art object is inanimate; it attributes no meaning to its own structure, whereas curriculum is comprised of an ever changing system of relationships among people, objects and events. To complicate the issue, people manufacture their own meaning structures to explain their relationships to the system.

To derive data from an art object requires a simple process of observation; the object pays the viewer the courtesy of holding constant its form. Observation of the social construction that represents curriculum is a much more complex task. It is here that the "curriculum evaluator" can most productively make use of the trio of research orientations outlined by Dr. Aoki. Full discussion of the model is not possible here, given the time constraints of this paper. My purpose is not to "sell" a model it is presented merely as one illustration of the potential of alternative conceptions of curriculum enquiry.

It should be emphasized at this point that although my response has focussed largely upon the situational interpretive research orientation I have not deliberately neglected the empirical analytical and the critical. Dr. Aoki's message was very clear - our research perspectives must be broadened, we must attempt to develop alternative orientations in order to more completely understand the educational milieu. Each of the paradigms he proposed work together in a vitally complimentary fashion producing different kinds of understanding for different purposes.

The real issue that is likely to emerge in discussion of Dr. Aoki's paper is that of "dominant orientation". In the tri-paradigmatic research setting how are the diverse forms of information synthesized? Does one paradigm assume dominance over the others? What are the principles of information assemblage that will enable us to make sense of the knowledge generated by cross-paradigmatic research.

I applaud Dr. Aoki's message today. He has tackled, head on, a most critical issue of metatheory, and has indeed provided us with a vision of a new key to curriculum inquiry.

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La première partie de la présentation est un "avant propos historique" dans lequel les vingt-cinq dernières années de recherches en éducation artistique sont revues par l'auteur qui se place comme principal participant dans cette recherche. Les conditions qui ont fait naître et défendre une sorte de pragmatisme bien portant et une vue du monde discrètement mécanique (étouffée d'études et expériences psycho-statistiques) sont inventoriées. Les mêmes attitudes méthodologiques et positivistes furent bientôt la cause de lamentations avec le déclin de la romance attachée aux études "empiriques". Une lente évolution conduisit l'auteur et la culture propre à la recherche dont il faisait partie à considérer des solutions de rechanges rendant justice au côté individuel, unique et subjectif du faire en art. Le lieu entre la recherche et le pouvoir politique évoqua des polémiques anti-establishment, mais elles se sont apaisées dans une vue modérée, appelée ici "pluralisme métaphysique" qui milite pour la coexistence et la tension dialectique entre des positions de recherches non dogmatiques légitimement différentes. En tête parmi celles-ci est cette approche faisant la lumière sur les démarches qualitatives et phénoménologiques qui est le sujet de cette conférence.

Cet article soutient que le qualitatif supporte le monde expérientiel et conceptuel de l'homme, ne permettant pas la cassure sujet-objet héritée d'une science Newtonienne plus statique qui, dans son succès politique et technologique, a rendu confus la saisie par l'homme de ses origines expérientielles, le privant d'une confrontation directe avec la vie elle-même. En tant que "là" phénoménologiquement dans chaque événement directement vécu, le chercheur est partie de ce qu'il décrit. La sienne est une histoire d'un type spécial avec sa narration qualitative très particulière, sujet à tous les tropismes, et de plus brouillant tout écrit historique.

D'après Dewey, le langage lui-même est impropre à la préservation du qualitatif en raison de sa forme sujet-prédicat qui exclut, séparé du littéraire, la situation de la créature vivante. Heidegger montre

comment une pensée méditative peut se substituer au dérangement de la "pensée calculatrice" de l'homme, permettant au parfum et à l'être-des-êtres de se révéler. Ceci n'oblige pas à s'enfoncer dans les aspects dogmatiques de vues du monde mystiques ou animistes. Comme Richards l'a indiqué, nous pouvons être capables d'étudier l'émotif et le poétique avec l'émotif et le poétique sans faire de tort à l'utilisation émotive ou cognitive du langage.

De nouveau, suivant Heidegger, le fondement du faire de l'art est l'être lui-même. Les phénomènes artistiques se dévoilent eux-mêmes ontologiquement comme étant-vécus-et-projetés-dans-le-monde. De tels phénomènes ne sont pas expliqués mais peuvent être décrits qualitativement, d'une façon approchant la "compréhension" et "l'interprétation" mise de l'avant dans la phénoménologie herméneutique. Une "phénoménologie du dialogue" semble symboliser la relation entre celui qui décrit et l'évènement qu'il "a" qualitativement dans son expérience. La qualité n'est pas directement exprimable, sauf dans la parole poétique (qui est la parole vraie et générative pour Heidegger). Pepper et Dewey permettent l'exploration de la qualité au travers de la détermination des textures et des contextes. De telles descriptions pourraient éventuellement être repensées comme base pour enrichir la qualité dont elles sont véritablement une partie.

Le modèle analytique structurel et existentiel de Novosel organique du monde qui résoud la coupure déterministe-intuitioniste en tenant paradoxalement des deux, la structure et le caractère existentiel de la création en art. Les conditions antécédentes apportées avec l'artiste dans sa situation de création conduisent inévitablement au conflit dans l'évènement constitutif du travail, conduisant à une synthèse conséquente qui ne désintègre pas les éléments ou les fragments de chaque histoire unique. Cette "structure du fait d'exister" est précisément celle de la métaphore elle-même.

Dans la description qualitative, il n'y a pas tellement de méthodes que de "modes" ou de "climats" de description. Les conceptualisations à priori et les méthodes (sauf pour les catégories vides du modèle S-E)

détruisent la sensation du qualitatif avant qu'il surgisse dans les descriptions. L'approche suggérée est davantage celle de l'herméneutique dans ses trois significations étymologiques: (1) parler et exprimer, (2) énoncer, "expliquer" dans le sens le plus faible et (3) traduire d'une langue dans une autre. La description qualitative reconnaît la priorité du qualitatif dans toute expérience et pensée et essaie de mettre à l'abri sa chaleur et son rayonnement, la portant à l'enrichissement de la qualité de vie entre les individus.

Une partie finale de la présentation, la "Recherche épilogue" offre, parmi d'autres sujets, une proposition de recherche de l'auteur et de Joan Novosel-Beittel, intitulée "Body-Mind Changes Accompanying Sustained Immersion in Art Expression". Dans cette proposition un effort est réalisé pour intégrer un cadre de référence causal et interprétatif. Ceci est accompli par la sélection d'experts extérieurs (un philosophe, un psychologue et un médecin) qui essaient de rendre compte d'une façon globale et intégrée de dix artistes avant et après une immersion en activité artistique de dix semaines dans les locaux de recherches appelés Laboratoire de Dessin de l'Université de Pensylvanie. Les auteurs de la proposition décrivaient qualitativement la série de production artistique de ces dix artistes depuis un cadre de référence interne et interprétatif. Les deux points de vue seraient ensuite réunis.

Aussi, dans cette partie de l'exposé, le "Cycle of Abstraction for Describing and Interpreting the Qualitative Event (Q) de Novosel-Beittel est inséré sous la forme d'une table déterminant les dialogues intellectuel et expressif qui peuvent surgir des évènements qualitatifs, et conduire à des descriptions qualitatives détaillées de toutes sortes.

Enfin, également de Novosel-Beittel un exemple est présenté, illustrant une partie de ce qui est mentionné plus haut. Intitulé: "A Structural Example of How Description, Abstraction, and Interpretation can arise from Understanding of the Qualitative Event (Q) without Distorting Their Source in that Event," il montre comment deux cents pages de notes dactylographiées de dialogues d'un artiste, stimulé par la projection photographique de son art en cours de réalisation peuvent être condensées progressivement

à quelques pages d'interprétation résumant, sans perte de qualité, leur source de vingt sessions de réalisation artistique dans le laboratoire de dessin.

Historical Fore-word

The events on which I wish to reflect briefly are largely autobiographical. Since, however, they cover a span of 25 years at what is purportedly the number one institution in graduate art education (if not in football) and since they reflect my concentration within the field's research enterprise, I may be able to separate out what is more personal from what is more public. The hundred and twenty completed doctorates which I have advised reflect, in themselves, the ebb and flow of the climate for research.

There are no events that speak for themselves. There are no indubitable facts. There is no ancient text possessing a locked-in, immutable meaning and essence which I can bring forth as verity and validity. As Gouldner (1970) has forcefully argued, no inquirer into the human world is above the political. One of the exciting things about participating in this conference is that its politics is not tired. Art Education apologetics and doomsday crisising bespeak an unbelievable weakness in high places. Here we talk about the new --if not brand new, new to art education. As Yeats (1940) put it, in a couplet nicely knocking the over-played inevitability of the law of entropy:

All things fall and crumble away
And they who build them again are gay.

(I must add another historical reference to reclaim "gay" for its intended poetic function here.) We are here to "build again," and there is always a romance to that.

When I began teaching, advising, and doing research in Lowenfeld's Art Education section of the Department of Education at Penn State in 1953, there was a romance to the empirical. Numbers were not sheer positivism replacing all realities but their own, they smacked of a Pythagorean beauty, magic and wholism. True, they did silence irresponsible and easy speech--a kind of show-up-or-shut-up pragmatism. Largely atheoretical except for a pervasive belief in "big-daddy" education through art, we participated in a kind of discrete mechanism, happy for any connections or near-laws in a world that wasn't expected to make that much sense, number-wise and word-wise.

Societally, the romance was marked by the chance for support and action. In fast order, the creativity movement fused into the

curricular revolution, the Kennedy era into the Great Society. Studies in Art Education was launched in the late fifties, with Jerry Hausman and me its first editors. I remember having Frank Barron, Cal Taylor, Paul Torrance and like names within the early issues. I was able to spend over \$100,000 of the government's money on sponsored research in Art Education. Then, by the mid-sixties, the conference which was to "Woods-Hole" Art Education took place at Penn State; and philosophers, critics, psychologists, art historians, sociologists, methodologists, and artists rubbed elbows, if not heads, with art educators.

Then came a second generation of students, better trained, if not better educated, and the sadness of success set in. Numbers lost much of their magic and disintegrated into a kind of fundamentalists positivism. I remember attending the 1965 NAEA convention in Philadelphia and noting to my horror that tests of significance were used more like credos--repetitious mumblings to deaden the disappearance of meaning and big questions. No longer could a researcher construct an instant test, he had to follow the standardization track. A test was not defined by what it did, by its ability to yield high correlations with other variables, but by its credentials a priori. It looked as though each advance set us back an equal amount. I am not anti-progress. I am only reporting a homesteader's dismay at the disintegration of the research ecology.

But there were other forces shaping that ecology. The counter-culture, the young rebels, the political activism of the college students were affecting even Happy Valley, Pennsylvania. And inflation, fear and retrenchment came on progressively like the seven lean years of Joseph's dreams. A spiritual famine was upon us.

How much is personal history, how much cultural, is problematic. The pull toward the East, the "New Orientalism," as Harvey Cox (1977) calls it, was not in my head when I went to Japan in 1967 to study pottery methods of an old tradition, as these were mediated by a true master-craftsman in a little town in the southern island of Kyushu, Japan. Eastern lore came later, after I returned and tried to recover from reverse cultural shock.

While this "left hand" (the intuitive non-verbal one) of my Art Education persona was undergoing change, the right-handed one was also preparing to do so. I always reasoned, analogous to a kind of Jungian plumbing system, that as my clay act got cleaned up, my research act got cruddier--more like the native clays I still like to dig up and use, dried roots, stones, decayed wood and all, from ground to fire. "Back to the things themselves" occurred within my life and research before I read Husserl and certainly long before I cared about Heidegger, or even knew

there was a Gadamer.

I had done my bona fide experiments on some of the conditions affecting drawing strategies between 1961 and 1965. Already in 1966 I was doing mini-case studies, taking a kind of Allport-like look at the fascinating lawfulness within the idiosyncratic, the personal (and trans-personal) life-world of each artist. So when I returned from Japan and set out to demonstrate the conditions affecting drawing strategies so that Charles Steele, then a master's student at Penn State, could make a film about them to spread the word to others, I soon found, as did he, that it was much more exciting to study the world of each artist than focus on drawing strategy and assorted independent variables. Consequently I returned to Penn State a small grant I had received to make that film (the only grant I every returned) and began the series of case studies in depth in drawing which still continue.

For me, theory and philosophy and method must follow the route of my phenomenological immersion in inquiry. Some one has said that basic research is doing, even though you don't know what your're doing. If this be so, then, I've always done basic research. More humbly put, however, is that my route has been that of "creative negativity"--that path of somewhat sadder but much wiser that attends all experiencing, a view which Gadamer (1975) has so well characterized.

This personal reversal in thought and method was helped to clarity, I feel certain, by my earlier immersion in what some one at Penn State called "psycho-statistical research." At first, the earlier objectifying stance was replaced by the later subjectifying one. Polemics came to the fore, and the politicizing of the research establishment in Art Education became patent.

Slowly, the polemics subsided. In their stead came a slow maturing into a view which I will call "metaphysical pluralism"--a kind of rendering unto each world view what is appropriate thereto. This gradual onset of partial wisdom has enabled me to be critical of the counter-culture as well as the establishment, the East as well as the West, existentialism as well as positivism.

My hope is for a firmer ground for basic description of artistic phenomena. I see Dewey, the late Pepper, Gendlin, the late Heidegger, and Gadamer as helpful pointers along the way. The paper which follows takes up one of the cornerstone issues arising from the journey just described. It will be followed by a "Research After-Word" in which I will try to present a model for the variety of inquiries possible into man's qualitative experiential world in art. In that last section I will

also give an example of structure and reduction possible within the qualitative realm without sacrifice of meaning and understanding.

QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITATIVE

At first I thought of calling these reflections simply "Description of the Qualitative," but then I felt that the substantive term "description" was too static and burdened with "objective" overtones for the stance the problem demanded. "Qualitative Description" was better but had the same problem, only in a weaker form. Nevertheless, I have fixed on it because the qualification of "qualitative" rescues "description" for my purpose.

My position is essentially unchanged since the writing of the book Alternatives for Art Education Research: Inquiry into the Making of Art (Beittel, 1973). Here I hope to go behind the assumptions that were explicit in that book to those that were implicit. Also, recent books within education and research underscore my belief that this is a timely topic (Hamilton, et al., 1977; Willis, 1978).

In some philosophical thought, description and expression are opposed terms. Furthermore, description is not usually teamed up with a focus on the "qualitative." Some would even say that it cannot be, for that is the proper task of literary expression. Yet description is an acknowledged part of literary works. Phenomenology, itself, in its more rigorous, non-existential, non-hermeneutic stance, seems to also fast distance itself from the qualitative. By referring to qualitative description of the qualitative in my title, I have brought to the fore the subject-matter and methodological problems which this essay probes.

The route out of this tangle lies in the fact that reference to any qualitative event or experience points to a special kind of history. Qualities do not reside asymmetrically in objects. They are "had" in experience. A history in which the historian-narrator is directly involved at the event level is already an existential-phenomenological history. The narrative (really a description or story of events and contexts) is therefore qualitative at base. One might try to negate or bracket out one's being-in-the-event, but that's a pretty big bracket, and a useless one where the qualitative is concerned. We are involved directly, that is, in events and in a narrative about them. To neglect the qualitative for the conceptual, or not to use the conceptual in the service of the qualitative, is more than a great loss--it pretty effectively erases the very subject-matter of art and its transactional, contextual basis in experience.

A contemporary historiographer, Hayden White (1974) in his

analysis of great nineteenth century historians and philosophers of history, has developed a brilliant analytic which clearly reveals the tacit stylistic, formal, political and explanatory tropisms ineluctably operative in each historical narrative. Rather than see these tropisms as a source of irony or despair, I find them an enrichment of our studies which point toward a healthy acceptance of the diversity at ground of our common human condition. What comes forth in such narratives is still the events themselves, but as human events, as lived and experienced by persons with histories and purposes, and as interpreted by persons with like histories and purposes.

The objectifying thought, calculating and manipulating, which pervades our run-away materialistic society, is the chief obstacle to our in-dwelling of qualitative experience so that our thinking can approach it descriptively and qualitatively. We escape ourselves, to the extent we can do so, in flight into action and enjoyment, but these, too, all too often become but the reverse of our thinking dilemma: we subjectify rather than objectify. We move from the collective prison of our institutions into the subjectivity of the boudoir (Buber, 1970). We vacillate between the object-subject and the subject-object without grasping the dogmatism of these extremes, missing the non-subject-object world of qualitative being.

Philosophers as diverse as Dewey, Heidegger, Buber and Levinas speak to our plight. In Dewey's essay (1931) on "Qualitative Thought" written before his Art as Experience (1934), he warns us of the objectifying imperialism--even fascism-- of language structure itself in the presence of qualitative experience. Subject-predicate logic hypostasizes and freezes qualities into "whatnesses." The context of the live speaker drops out and leaves behind frozen conceptual categories. "Honey is sweet" replaces "honey sweetens" which replaces my experiencing of honey's interaction with me as a live creature. "The tomato is red" replaces "the tomato reddens" which replaces the reddening I can again experience directly, qualitatively.

If, however, thought becomes what Heidegger (1974) calls "meditative thinking," we may hope to dwell within the "situation" which Dewey says subject-predicate objectifying, thingafying, language forgets. Language then reverts to its original, poetic role of bringing a world to stand rather than pushing it away for my manipulation or its "objective" participation in the independently ordered rules of logical thought. The mystery, then, the qualitative wholeness of the world in which I have my being comes forth. I am engaged in a movement in which I and the object are qualitatively, situationally, and contextually bound together, inextricably and meaningfully so from the start.

The massacre of the qualitative, then, admits to its presence, consciously or not. If our poetic metaphoric mind is not satisfied, our experience of things qualitative does not so much disappear as atrophy. We inhabit a world in which our thought has imprisoned us, or threatens to do so, for the ground of true speaking is being itself, and our being-in-the-world is situational or pervasively qualitative.

The visual artist's way with speech is enlightening on this score. For all his pronouncements in speech, many of which are dogmatic in their ring of certitude and authority, the visual artist remains distrustful of speech in its developed and discursive forms. He knows implicitly the truth of Malraux's (1953) dictum that an artist may say what he will, but in practice he paints only what he can. In art departments a suspicion springs forth toward all those--philosophers, art historians, critics, art educators--who speak "about" art.

It is implied that art is its own form of knowledge. Were we to stop there, making and responding to art would require no developed speech at all, except that which points back into making and responding themselves. In one sense, that is true. Yet, where knowledge is implied, or even asserted, it is proper to ask "what is this knowledge about?" Or, if not that, as Heidegger shows, "how" or "why" it is. For where there is knowing, language should be able to approach it, to speak out, without disintegrating it.

For the present topic, the questions that arise are these: "How can we be ontologically adequate in what we say about the qualitative?" or, more simply, "How can we describe the qualitative qualitatively?" or, if these cannot be, "How can qualitative experience come into speech?" A further complication is placed upon us if we ask the question Pepper (1942) might frame: "How can our describing of the qualitative be cognitively adequate?"

This last question is both the easiest and the hardest of the set. It points both toward a clarification (as a warning) and also toward an impasse (epistemologically and metaphysically). In his demolition of "animism" and "mysticism" as two cognitively inadequate world views, Pepper can help us side-step the arbitrariness which previously was said to mark the pronouncements of many artists. Animism, with its search for and belief in "big spirit" comes forth with a claim for infallible authority, whether placed in priest, shaman, artist, politician, scholar, or demagogue. Mysticism lays claims to the indubitable certainty of immediate insight into the meaning of all things. Put these two together, for example, in a charismatic spiritual leader who sells mantras and speaks "scientific facts" toward a political brand of world betterment,

and we have a potent form of dogmatism (posing as a claim toward cognitive adequacy).

Mysticism is singularly appealing in this time, especially since, as Dewey indicates, there is a mystical ingredient in all experience. Intensity, spread, and fusion are enticing categories for the construction of spiritual ladders. Their confounding with the qualitative and the artistic are easily understood. But, at bottom, the appeal toward person and intensity are dogmatic insofar as they are made the basis for explanation or understanding.

Gendlin (1962) makes a distinction pertinent to the issue of cognitive adequacy. The validity of cognition and the causation of cognition are two issues which cannot prejudice the inquiry into "experienced meaning" itself. In this latter we look upon what we do actually experience, not at its possible causes nor at whether the understanding and interpretation following therefrom are construed to be valid from any a priori system purporting to lay down rules for some or all cognition or for the adequacy thereof. We need, in fact, what I. A. Richards (1955) called for: a method that uses the emotive and the poetic to study the emotive and the poetic; and this method must not prejudice either the emotive or the cognitive uses of language, but leave both functions free.

The fault may lie in the way we construe "thinking" itself. In an enlightening essay, Heidegger (1974) meditates on Leibnitz's statement "Nothing is without ground." Rather than follow this late-appearing assertion into only its scientific application, which he calls modern "calculating thinking," he goes behind it and places a new stress and meaning upon it: "Nothing is without ground." Nothing has being without ground. And the ground of being itself is Being, the nothingness, the allness, the mystery. For our deliberations here, I would like to argue that the ground of "arting" (the situation of making and responding in art, or one's being-in-the-world in art) is indeed being the "live creature" in its world with which Dewey began Art as Experience.

Thus there is a "knowing" in art and in the qualitative, and what it is "about" is "being" itself. We can then escape the subjectivist and narrowly conceive expressionist positions it is easy to fall into, for the experiential, the qualitative, the artistic reveal themselves only ontologically, as being-lived-forward-in-the-world, and we can have our dwelling qualitatively in the world of experience and within language (which to Heidegger in its basic sense is "the house of being").

At this point, however, the excursion through Pepper turns back

upon itself, for "cognitive adequacy" cannot come in too readily without the destruction of what in this instance it is "about." Thus I have held to "describing" as only possible "qualitatively" insofar as qualitative phenomena are concerned. It would seem that any claim toward "cognitive adequacy" would have to give way to ontological or experiential adequacy. "Explaining" would properly yield to "understanding," and our posture would be closer to Heidegger's or Gadamer's "hermeneutic phenomenology" (Palmer, 1969). It might also be close to some brand of "progressive organicism" (as opposed to "idealist organicism") (Pepper, 1942). And it must be remembered that in Heidegger and Gadamer we have a direct critique of Western metaphysics for its ontological impoverishment which has progressively denuded our experiential world of its qualitative scope.

In my book, Alternatives, I do not speak of methods of description but of modes. Modes are closer to attitudes, qualitative orientations, moods, states of being, in which knower and known are not broken apart into subject-object thought and language. The late Heidegger speaks of a questioning stance in which, through meditative thought, he interacts with some aspect of being which is coming to understanding. I have not said "text," as in common in hermeneutics (interpretation theory, or inquiry into understanding itself), for that already objectifies what is to be understood--although perhaps not, if we use the term "work" instead of "object," a usage common within aesthetics. Heidegger also may be said to rely on modes of being in his encounters toward understanding. He does not, for example, mind "doing violence to the text," for there is no objectively valid content which is assuredly the author's without his interaction with it. He thus asks about what the author has not said, about how this struggle into being emerged from nothingness. Still later, he seems to suggest a waiting, patient attitude, in which the one moving toward understanding is the "shepherd of being," protecting it and letting it come forth (Palmer 1969).

Gadamer's Truth and Method (1975) would seem to be about the truth of non-method and the truth-of-being of the questioner. A dialectic of question and answer is at work with the text. The basic form of inquiry becomes the dialogue. Heinrich Ott (1967) has further clarified the "phenomenology of dialogue" by looking within the dynamics of interaction of dialogue partners as they try to deepen their understanding of something between them.

It is refreshing, however, to also return to Dewey and his comments on the qualitative. There would be, to him, no real reason for describing the qualitative unless one wished to point the way for another, in which instance the simpler and more direct the description the better. Descriptions could also have for him, a commemorative and enlightening function, for whatever

is brought to clarity would be attributes of the guiding quality itself and could thus fund back into the experience of it, leading it on through resistances, integrations, fusions, and the like, toward a rounded, consummatory experience which is an experience in the fuller blown aesthetic sense. Thus the description can extend, round out, form, commemorate, and consummate what was there from the start. It would seem that in Dewey the form of those arguments is not too far removed from the drift into dialogue itself as this term is used in hermeneutic phenomenology.

As to "what" one can say, Pepper (1942) provides the clue in his description of contextualism. Quality is indescribable directly, but we can draw out the textures encountered and the minute strands comprising the local parts. There is no end, virtually, to this kind of action. Its danger would seem to be that of infinite extensionalization and dispersment, at the expense of integration. But, with the qualitative as a focus, all the local activity should be able to fund back into its source and synthesize into a richer level of experience. The locale is a part of the larger landscape.

Still more suggestive to me, presently, is a fusing of "progressive organicism" with the exegetic interpretive method of the late Heidegger or of Gadamer. The fruitful question from this view would seek to ask how or why each part of the forward motion of creating or responding is intuitively a fragment of a foreshadowed whole from the start, before even a number of the resistances and conflicts along the path appear.

Novosel's (1976) "structural-existential" model (the S-E model, hereinafter) moves into a progressive organicism cosmology which tries to heal the determinist-intuitionist split into the explaining-understanding split. In brief, the S-E model is an "interpretive analytic" which is useful for application within the existential stream once it has become history (or a "text" for interpretation). It sorts out events, statements, descriptions, and actions into three columns, which correspond to the structure of a metaphor: (1) the antecedent, (2) the constitutive (where conflict and clash with the antecedent appear in the form of "difference" and "newness"), and (3) the consequent (creative synthesis, resolution, metaphor, wherein the antecedent and constitutive are not submerged but "held-together-apart" in a novel form). This is "progressive organicism" because the fragments lead to nexuses which lead to conflicts which are overcome in integration into wholeness of form. It is "progressive" because the end is not ideal a priori but emergent from the conditions of forward movement itself. It is generative speech--"metaphor," which in the Japanese language has the meaning of "to speak in darkness". As lived metaphor, creating man moves through his essential vulnerability in action. All creative thought

exemplifies, from this perspective, a death-into-life movement, a transcendence of antecedents through conflict toward novel integration. The conflicts, the resistances, are radically "other." The dialectic through pain gives birth. There is no "self" to be disclosed or expressed; what expresses itself is the trace of being itself. The artist shepherds being through the matter of his dialogue; his shaping as he is shaped leads toward the birth of formed matter. A world view is implied that would grant the wholeness of fragments despite the history of conflicts--nay because of them--through which they must journey.

To respond to the S-E Model and the progressive organicism it implies, one would have to work out one's ontology of creating. One would have to participate in it not analytically but as a movement toward revelation or disclosure of the whole toward which the existence-in-structuring (the structural-existential) gravitates. Existence is not confined to a will-to-structure; it is, in creation, prior to, as participative in, emergent structure. Linear time is thus fractured as a unity, because the whole which being-in-time reveals in its formative tendency is implicit from the start. In like manner, the dispersal of being over time does not allow for calculating thought, because the "whole" which is known-unknown from the start has its own space-time, which is completely relative to the context of the observer (or, dependent on his own space-time referential system).

Nor is the direction through dialogue and hermeneutic phenomenology compatible with the neo-transcendent subjectivity of Foucault (1972) who, if I understand him, engages in a despairing structural analysis of unique instances of works (and all are unique) by embracing a calculating of coming-to-structure (as discontinuity) that abandons a priori calculation. On the contrary, the world in which we have our being would seem to be neither the world of prior structure or no structure, but that of coming-to-form, out of concealment, in which our own participation, grounded in our own being-in-the-world, allows no purely calculating thought to break in. Conceptual description can be in touch with a shared experiential base in the qualitative, but when it takes over, the quality of experience progressively recedes.

Students of mine who study with me the problem of inquiring into man's qualitative experiential world in art, reflect when they come to try qualitative description of the qualitative, fear of "subjective disclosure" on their part. They say that it seems as though they are learning more about themselves than what is qualitative. I used to accept this as inevitable, but now I see that it is as bad to psychologize the self as another (maybe worse). Insofar as one learns only about oneself, one is still operating under the subject-object split, that is,

within "subjectivity" rather than within one's proper and inescapable "subjectivity," for in the latter the work is revealed to us as it "is," as disclosing and manifesting itself as an "other" with whom we can be in dialogue. It is thus no static work, but only the work that is "working" in our dialogue with it. To Heidegger and Gadamer, and in a similar way to Dewey and the late Pepper, this subjectivity is man's common and inescapable fate, but also his glory: his living always within the generating warmth of the qualitative, no matter how far he may remove himself toward the "purely" conceptual (and even if he forgets the originating climate of the "purely" conceptual).

It is time to summarize what is being said about qualitative description of the qualitative and to bring our focus down to interest, motive, purpose and action, whether as teachers, artists, critics, researchers, or, indeed, as live creatures who have a qualitative experiential world at large and then, of course, also in art. We dwell within, we have our being within, the qualitative. Nay, the qualitatively experiential is our life itself. Dilthey (Palmer, 1969) one of the great "life philosophers" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, was fond of stating: "Behind life thought cannot go." I accept that dictum; yet within life, qualitatively grasped, thought can do much without fear of reduction of its source--more than that, with great chance of its enhancement. At the source, in the pervasive quality that stains all experience, there is a plenitude to draw from. The ground of life, I have argued, is being itself, and the "being of beings" is inexhaustible. Whether we await patiently, question and be questioned, shepherd being, do violence to the text (to go behind its surface), listen to the call of being, extensionalize the textures and their stands, or point as simply as possible in words--whichever wording and stance we accept, depending on our philosophical persuasion, we share, lead from concealment, fund back into and extend, that qualitative wholeness upon which we have based our thinking dialogue. Our thinking dialogue, in fact, unfolds within its circle, admitting the mystery, letting it speak, but not claiming infallible authority nor indubitable certitude, only the relativity but ultimacy and adequacy of authentic speech. This is hermeneutics (interpretation, understanding) in all of its etymological meanings: (1) to say, speak, and express; to carry the message from the gods to men (as did Hermes of the winged feet in Greek mythology); to oppose metaphor to metaphor, in generative speech; (2) to enunciate, "explain" in the weaker sense of to compose and divide, to extensionalize and then to synthesize; to do exegesis; and (3) to translate from one "language" into another (Palmer, 1969). These, then, are the modes and functions of qualitative description of the qualitative, and I have suggested some of the motives and purposes attached to these.

But why is description of the qualitative said to be qualitative itself? Negatively put, the reason is that conceptual, analytical thought fast loses touch with the wholeness of the qualitative. Having its origin there, it nevertheless behaves like academic psychology as it moved from philosophy--that is, it denies its origins. Need it do so? Perhaps not, if abstractness arrives gradually, perhaps along the route of the first and third meanings of "hermeneutics," saving anything smacking of "explanation" until the end, in which case the "explanation" will end with more of a fading "because" than an answered "why?" If, however, we have already spoken poetically and translated into speech something of the experience we have of the qualitative, the result will itself be qualitative. It will have authenticity, which is the adequacy of qualitative experience. Nothing can be more valid than that without dogmatically attacking the bases of this argument from outside. From within, much that I have said can be improved, I am sure.

Why, it might be asked, do I not settle for "qualitative interpretation" or "qualitative understanding" rather than "qualitative description"? Because the former would be too easily discounted in the current climate of art education thought, whereas the latter lays claim to the undergirdings of our most conceptually developed thought. Notice that I cannot say "rigorous", as is often done in "scientific" postures within the field. All thought, all description can be rigorous, and of all places where it has not been of late I would point toward art education's effort at being "scientific." Neither the Copernican nor Newtonian revolutions have touched us there yet, let alone the Einsteinian. As Heidegger has shown, meditative thought can reveal what calculating thought cannot. And Dewey has shown that qualitative thought is as advanced and as rigorous as any other form of thought. These philosophers from two different continents, then, would seem to support the claim that qualitative description of the qualitative is not only possible but essential to man's very quality of life itself. Behind the quality of life qualitative thought cannot go.

Research After-word

Calculating thought has largely pre-empted the word "research" for its own purposes, but we will here take it back into our alternatives. Indeed, as I and others have argued, the conceptual, the causative, the calculating, the cognitive, all have their origins from the base of the qualitative, the experiential, from felt meaning, from conscious attention and intuition working over feeling. More recently, Smith (1978) has urged us to "accept the dialectical polarity of causal and interpretative frames of reference," looking to the problem of their difference "not as a fruitless choice of either/or but as a challenge

to deal with both." Pepper (1966) has attempted to demonstrate (by arguments too lengthy for inclusion here) that qualitative and conceptual description can both deal adequately and simultaneously with the same event by way of what he calls the "neural identity theory." I am currently teaching a seminar on "Basic Description in the Arts" drawing upon the base laid down in Dewey, Pepper, Gendlin, my own efforts, and philosophical hermeneutics. It is my intention to show that it is incumbent upon a priori conceptual approaches claiming to say anything valid about qualitative phenomena to demonstrate that they have an anchorage in the qualitative event itself.

Along this same line, I want to mention a research proposal of mine and Joan Novosel-Beittel's called "Body-Mind changes Accompanying Sustained Immersion in Art Expression." I quote this proposal, now in its pilot phase, at length because its ground and methods are pertinent to all that I have said above.

Body-Mind Changes Accompanying
Sustained Immersion in Art Expression

Kenneth R. Beittel and Joan Novosel-Beittel

Background and Purpose

Philosophers, theorists, researchers, and educators have ascribed positive body-mind changes to sustained immersion in creative activity. Much of this literature suggests a cautious interpretation of these changes, seeing them as paralleling construction or reconstruction of the self-system (or "body-mind" as it will be called in this paper) which occurs, not in a clear cause-and-effect-way, but as increments of actualization accompanying the concrete and symbolic repetition of making organic artistic wholes.

From a research position, metaphysical and epistemological questions arise in confronting this body of theory and lore. Determinist positions, though powerful in precision and method, begin ineffectually far removed from the qualitative and existential world of those making art. Intuitionist positions begin at the core of the same qualitative and existential world but embrace a scope so vast and a methodology seemingly so ad hoc that "understanding" seems to be equally hard bought. Actually, both positions and their associated methods are taken to be legitimate and cognitively adequate world views. At their bases, however, they seem irreconcilable.

Art expression, seen as the progressive realization of organic unity without the imposition of a priori ends or constraints, remains, to a number of philosophers (e.g., Dewey, Collingwood, Langer, and more recently, Hausman), a paradigm case in which the clash between the determinist and intuitionist views comes to the fore. Moreover, various theorists tried to keep alive the inevitable tension between these views in a collaborative convergence on the problem of creation in art. Foremost among theorists supportive of this effort are Maslow, Gendlin, Hausman, and the later Pepper.

The research of one of the principal investigators has ranged both sides of this debate, from controlled experiments to ontological-phenomenological-hermeneutic descriptions and interpretations. As far as is known, however, no basic descriptive studies have been undertaken which invite these two views to co-exist collaboratively around the phenomenon of making art. As a paradigm case, where means and ends are not separable, where neither the progressive categories nor the ideal categories of formative organicism are allowed to hold sway, the making of art invites such a tensional "holistic" synthesis.

Parallel developments in "holistic medicine," in "humanistic psychology," in movements toward "body-mind integration," suggest the climate is ripe for such teamwork. Clearly, neither specifically "outside" nor "inside" views will completely suffice for this task.

Procedure

Ten "artists" will be screened by means of in-depth interviews and related clinical methods by a philosopher, a clinical psychologist, and a medical doctor before and after a ten-week immersion in regular art activity. The three specialists will work independently of each other. Their effort will be to produce holistic descriptions of the artists at these two points in time. All three specialists will be carefully selected for their willingness to undertake integrative descriptions from the vantage point of their own science and art.

In the interim period, these ten "artists" (this word is in quotation marks because, as will later be shown, it is not essential that participants

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have had prior artistic training) will work once weekly for ten consecutive weeks within an existing studio research facility (the "drawing lab"). Here they will experience a supportive but non-instructional climate, wherein their own artistic autonomy comes first. The principal investigators will repeat the general methods of their prior research (detailed in their own publications and those of prior research assistants) which, briefly, gain access to the artist's creating consciousness after the fact, by means of stimulated recall prompted from time-lapse photographs of each work's history as recorded unobtrusively from a front-surface mirror on a 45° angle over the artist's work table. These reflective interviews will take place each week before new work is begun and will trace the origin of the prior week's works. Interviews and all other comments by the artists will be recorded for later transcription. In addition, the researchers will make lab notes weekly and record phenomenological observations as they occur.

The logic of this "inside" view is such that the artist's world of making and being comes progressively to stand in the consciousness of artist and participant observers alike. Art works, process-records, reflective interviews, observations and lab notes fund together progressively so that a holistic view of the artist and his artistic serial develops.

At a later time, after the cessation of the artist's work in the drawing lab, the cumulative material, particularly the reflective interviews, will be analyzed by two documented intuitive methods. One of these is a "historical method" which focuses on the artist's third order concepts about making art (his concept of his concepts of making art) as these are ascertainable over the ten-week period in the drawing lab. Changes in these third-order concepts are taken to be a reflection of the artist's spiralling involvement in art making as these are seen along a time line. The second method, aptly termed a "structural-existential method" (or S-E method) by its originator, focuses on the occasions of existential change in the artist's consciousness by isolating antecedent conditions which clash with present conditions and lead to consequent ones transforming and transcending these.

Both of the above methods have elaborate philosophical and methodological justifications supporting them. Both attempt to resolve the split between qualitative and conceptual descriptions of on-going events.


In like manner, the "outside" specialists will have to resolve, from within their own disciplines, the split between qualitative and conceptual descriptions in the effort to produce an integrative and organic view of each artist at two different points in time. The "inside" view will trace the history of changes within the artistic serial itself.

The eventual task of synthesis will place the "outside" and "inside" views together and attempt a description of each artist's body-mind changes. Then, in the nature of "pooled cases" in medical research, a synthesis of these source across all ten artists will be attempted. At this level of description, more abstract categories will be drawn from the material under synthesis. The latter effort could fail without endangering the basic descriptive nature of the study as a whole, although it is felt that supportable abstract categories will emerge for theory building and for later testing for structural fit in new contexts.

The key to this effort at an internal and external view of artistic-phenomena is the requirement that the external experts report their findings in a manner which is integrative, addressed to an evaluation of the total physical, psychological and mental state of the participant before and after the "causative" event: immersion in sustained art expression. Most of what I have said in my paper proper at this Conference, however, is addressed toward the "internal" or qualitative side of the event. I wish to pursue "structure" and "method" within this qualitative focus in the paragraphs which follow.

First, I want to offer a kind of cycle-of-abstraction from the final draft of Novosel-Beittel's (1978) recent paper.

CYCLE OF ABSTRACTION FOR DESCRIBING AND INTERPRETING THE QUALITATIVE EVENT (Q)



I feel that this table should be mostly self-explanatory within the context of my paper. I would like, however, to offer an example in structure, not content, of the part of the table labelled "Reductions of the Surrogate." This is drawn from Novosel-Beittel (1978):

A Structural Example of How Description, Abstractions, and Interpretation Can Arise from Understanding of the Qualitative Event (Q) without Distorting Their Source in that Event

Level 1: The Event (Q)

Here: 20 sessions of art making in the Drawing Lab phenomenologically shared by the researchers.

Level 2: Dialogues with the artist stimulated by process photographs of his art making.

Level 3: 200 pages of type-scripts of the 20 dialogues

Level 4: 30 pages of type-scripts of 3 key sessions yielding most understanding of the artist's journey through the 20 sessions.

Level 5: 9 pages of typed "reductions" of dialogue content into paraphrase of that content in more abstract, descriptive language.

Level 6: Interpretations, relationships with surrounding contexts, second-level reductions, etc.

Level 7: Re-investment, or funding, through integration, synthesis, back to the quality of the original event (Q)

The above example is an actual one from one of the case studies in Novosel's thesis (1976). It is pertinent to this discussion because it shows how time, distance, and abstraction can occur in an orderly fashion when one is in touch with the qualitative event throughout. As Dewey puts it, the aspects abstracted out are a part of the pervasive quality and are guided by it. And this quality is part of a situation, a context, binding researcher and event together. Once the full meaning of this process of inquiry is grasped, we may experience an Einsteinian revolution within Art Education research.

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Je pense que je suis représentatif d'un grand nombre d'éducateurs en art "qui s'inquiètent mais ne peuvent pas..." qui ne semblent pas disposer de moyens propres de saisir le sens ou le courant de pensée d'un traité à cause d'une tendance déroutante à préciser le sens de la façon la plus exacte, à jouer avec les nuances infimes de signification presque à l'infini; au lieu d'étendre la discussion par des illustrations métaphoriques qui rejoignent beaucoup plus de voies de compréhension. Je trouve la communication de Beittel rattachée aux deux côtés de ce problème. Peut-être est-ce là qu'il devrait se situer, sur une sorte de terrain classique moyen entre les philosophes et les praticiens en éducation artistique. Mais je trouve que les idées sont trop importantes pour nous pour risquer que nos collègues n'accordent pas l'attention totale que les principes exigent et méritent.

La référence de Beittel à la suggestion de I.A. Richard, à savoir que nous devrions utiliser l'émotif et le poétique pour étudier l'émotif et le poétique me semble être une idée très simple bien que puissante et contraignante. L'acceptation d'un ensemble pluraliste de réponses approchées pour des situations et des besoins différents devient ici également impérative. Il est grand temps que nous développions et utilisions des systèmes variés pour les décrire aux autres et à nous-mêmes et pour en faire l'expérience au lieu d'essayer de découvrir le moyen parfait unique.

Je consens à accepter volontiers au moins un autre système de mon propre pragmatisme, tout en pièces rapportées, comme étant totalement approprié et apparemment essentiel à l'expérience d'un tout qualitatif. Mais alors laissez moi alors être pragmatique et demander comment ce système va fonctionner? En acceptant que le phénomène qualitatif puisse être identifié et expérimenté et que des moyens puissent être élaborés pour le décrire à la satisfaction ou au moins avec un certain degré de consensus des parties

impliquées. Et alors? C'est-à-dire, comment va-t-on appliquer le savoir qualitatif à l'acte qualitatif? Il semble que l'aspect important dans l'emphase de Beittel et Novosel-Beittel concerne le savoir personnel. Leur observateur devient moins un témoin-qui-ne-se-met-pas-de-l'avant et commence finalement à entrer dans le jeu de l'observé, de l'artiste. Pouvons-nous aussi ouvrir la définition de celui qui est observé pour figurer également l'étudiant ou l'artiste-étudiant apprenant?

En essayant de l'appliquer, pouvons-nous redéfinir le témoin pour signifier le professeur? Est-ce que le témoin-participant-observateur décrit dans la proposition est une redéfinition du rôle de professeur?

Selon la description, l'étude se déroule dans un climat d'encouragement, non instructionnel; et il a été déclaré que l'autonomie artistique est la préoccupation majeure. Mais, je penserais qu'une certaine forme d'apprentissage se produit au travers d'une direction subtile, qu'elle soit ou non auto-révélée. J'ai deux remarques à faire à cet égard.

Premièrement, le rappel par stimulation est utilisé dans cette étude comme une méthode pour faire reculer l'artiste dans les attitudes de la semaine précédente. C'est un grand laps de temps. Ces interruptions distrayantes n'affectent-elles pas le processus? L'artiste peut rapporter quelques unes de ces distractions avec lui dans son travail de création. Peut-être que l'immersion devrait être interprétée plus à la lettre afin d'éviter ce problème, en employant des sujets qui travaillent à leur tâche artistique chaque jour, toute la journée, dans une atmosphère de simili-retraite.

Le second point concerne les interviews réflexives qui sont menées avant le moment de commencer chaque nouveau travail hebdomadaire. Alors que l'on s'attend à ce que l'observateur participant en arrive à s'identifier progressivement à l'artiste, au propre développement de l'artiste lui-même en fonction de son travail, et avec le travail de l'artiste... je suis encore préoccupé par la façon dont les contrôles réduisent, retiennent ou équilibrent l'apport de l'observateur-participant. Cette personne à-la-fois-de-l'extérieur-et-de-l'intérieur partage l'espace à l'intérieur de la bulle phénoménologique mais ne doit pas être autorisée à devenir la vedette du spectacle.

Une telle personne a une formidable responsabilité en assistant et en se livrant à son étude sans influencer. Tout observateur (et dans ce cas, l'enquêteur-interprète-souffleur) peut faire jouer ses préférences simplement par le choix des choses remarquées, que ce soit par une disposition d'esprit à priori en effectuant un ajustement expérientiel après le fait en partant des data rassemblés précédemment sous la forme la plus stérile.

Ainsi, il semble qu'il y a ou devrait y avoir d'autres chercheurs dans cette étude qui puissent superviser le déroulement des rapports informant/informé et qui puissent, nous l'espérons, saisir la tendance possible de l'observateur participant à devenir trop agissant dans la relation triadique. L'artiste peut commencer à rechercher dans cette situation d'études des signes et des indications chez son "partenaire" à la manière attentive de l'enfant qui a décidé que la manière sage de fonctionner est de faire ce que le maître dit et ce que le maître fait. La situation peut nécessiter un quatrième personnage pour contrôler le troisième, celui qui fonctionne en dedans du contexte de production de l'oeuvre. Est-il possible d'apporter quelques contre-mesures, appliquées très soigneusement pour pallier cette situation, la redresser vers une position d'équilibre? Comment dans une situation phénoménologique comme celle-ci peut-on empêcher les observateurs-participants d'enseigner par inadvertance et les sujets d'apprendre de ces derniers?

Peut-être que toutes les contraintes devraient être assouplies et l'étude moins préoccupée de savoir comment un individu développe ses formes d'art et davantage soucieux de ce qu'il choisit de sélectionner parmi ses intérêts, son expérience, son intuition... et l'environnement courant (y compris la personne qui peut bien lui avoir enseigné une chose ou deux) pour créer l'art. Un enseignant devrait être aussi important pour nous, étant des éducateurs en art, que celui qui apprend.

Je pense que la recherche de Beittel et ses remarques, qui représentent ici sa pensée sur son travail, sont extrêmement importantes pour notre domaine. Son argument paraît nous inciter, sinon à retrouver, au moins à redécouvrir la qualité des choses comme un moyen de nous comprendre nous-mêmes. Comme le dit

Susanne Langer, les adjectifs que nous utilisons aujourd'hui avaient originellement un rapport avec l'accent des sentiments et les qualités des sens.

Ainsi que les hommes de notre passé le plus lointain le firent naturellement, nous avons besoin d'apprendre à nouveau à converser et discourir sur les qualités des choses. Et nous avons besoin de mettre à jour des moyens pour identifier la nature de l'acte de production d'une oeuvre de façon à avoir quelque chose de qualitatif sur quoi parler.

Three-Cornered Ping-Pong Anyone? (1)

The song of the sirens,
The song of songs,
And the song of a bell in the empty sky.

Artist,
Witness, and
Aborning work.

Artist-witness,
Artist-work,
Witness-work.

As co-agency,
Co-sharing, and
Co-creating...

Singing the sounds of a ping-pong bell in the
Still, empty sky.

The preceding thoughts and phrases are my spin-off impressions gathered from Dr. Beittel's parting words in his article in a 1974 Art Education journal on "Formative Hermeneutics in the Arting Processes of an Other." They should "ring a bell" with anyone familiar with the term "Arting" and Beittel's thinking that led to its use.

My first contact with Dr. Beittel, albeit from the secure and impersonal refuge of the back row of a small auditorium, was in the very early 60's at Wayne State University in Detroit. He and Dr. Robert Burkhart confounded me and a few of my colleagues (first year college teachers) by speaking a strange language between themselves. It was certainly an Encounter of the Third Kind for us, for the statistical discourse that came so easily to their lips gave the appearance of a wonderful Steinberg

caricature. They spoke to us in algebra or calculus, or some such foreign language. And we had to play mental catch-up throughout the morning. It was thoroughly impressive; but I'm afraid it was not very meaningful. Perhaps I feel safer with words than numbers, and signs; but I am relieved that Beittel has turned to the medium and the philosophy of exchange that deals with complete thoughts rather than the shorthand of symbols. I think we often overload the circuitry when we make empirical signs stand for too much. We risk the loss of power of meaning. Or we risk an explosive diversion from the central idea into a frenzied search for understandable alternatives. Or we simply experience a numbing and total breakdown in communication. It means we are no longer talking together, and that we have somehow limited healthy exchanges between people who have ideas and those who have questions.

Some ideas are best distilled or graphically represented, or hyphenated as Buckminster Fuller would have us do. And one should expect in a meeting of great minds such as this that discussion would be conducted on a higher plan of discourse than usual. But how high the plane? Who will interpret what we say? And I do not refer to the translation from English to French, or French to English -- but rather to the sense, non-sense, commonsense matter referred to yesterday. I think we ought to roll up our sleeves and speak as plainly as possible while still maintaining meaning in what we say. We tread on dangerous ground when phrases are coined or archaic terms are plucked from the dig. I am expressing my personal concern that the exciting and important ideas that researchers in the field put together travel precariously along the edges of my understanding. For me, and perhaps for others, they are in danger of falling off the shelf (or through the Looking Glass) into the nether world reserved for articles and books that are put aside for another time, when I say I'll need more time to concentrate. This is my dusty graveyard of earnest intentions unfulfilled. Maybe I reveal my own ignorance or a kind of mental laziness in this respect. But I think I represent a rather large number of art educators "who care but can't.." who can't seem to get a proper handle on the meaning or the trend of thought of a treatise because of the diverting tendency to define more closely to play with the infinite nuances of meaning almost to infinity; rather than to expand the discussion into metaphorical illustrations that bridge many more avenues of understanding. I find Beittel's paper reflective of both sides of this issue. Perhaps that is where it should be, a kind of classic middle ground between the philosophers and the practitioners in art education. But I feel the ideas are too important for us to risk that our colleagues will not pay the strict attention the principles require and deserve. Now I have expressed my fears. Beyond style, let me attempt to comment on content as I think I understand some

of the concepts.

My own background has been somewhat typical of most who have been public school art teachers; college art professors of theory, methods, and studio courses; supervisors of student teachers; and practicing artist-craftsmen. Which means that I have spent some of my years showing, telling, guiding, and criticizing students involved in a variety of art experiences... and have called it "teaching." And I have experienced the development of ideas and intention into completed art works. Jewelry is my field, and the lengthy processes my abilities and temperament have selected for me have provided less spontaneous and more deliberate ways of proceeding towards translation of concepts to things. I've turned the wax into silver and the silver into objects... and have called the wonderful phenomenon "creating art." This is my background for the response still to come. I do not intend to be so presumptuous as to suggest courses of inquiry in an area which Beittel has developed for many years. But I want to place some emphases at certain points as they have occurred to me as a teacher-educator-supervisor-artist... and student.

My first approach toward trying to understand Beittel's finely tuned set of arguments was wholly atomistic. Pull the threads apart to see what they're made of. Not a very practical approach. An unraveled weaving remains fiber but ceases then to be fabric.

My second tack, probably closer to the heart of the matter, was the holistic or universalist approach. Get a feeling for the overall experience. Do not try to analyze, but try to experience the wholeness of the presentation. Read it and sit back to savor the sum of one's impressions of the sum of the parts.

And so I have become convinced-- or converted. I have confidence that one can describe the qualitative. Beittel's reference to I. A. Richard's suggestion that we should use the emotive and poetic to study the emotive and poetic seems to me to be a very simple yet powerful and compelling idea. The acceptance of a pluralistic set of near-answers to differing situations and needs also becomes an imperative here. Assuming that most people find these "apples and oranges" -- the emotive and the cognitive -- as different from one another most of the time, perhaps it is high time that we develop and use different systems for describing them to others and to ourselves, and for experiencing them, rather than trying to find the perfect single means. So many of us act as if we are the ones blessed with the Golden Fleece. And that it is the next individual, poor soul, who by our tightly held argument cannot possibly be right, and must have earned nothing more precious than a simple tube of yellow carpet warp. It is refreshing to become convinced that many of us may be correct

in our own arguments, if we are also willing to accept that at least one other system co-exists to explain experience. May we all dance on the tines of our own philosophical systems, then, as symbolized by Pepper's fork of life.(2)

Beittel makes a strong case for the exclusive character of the qualitative, and I have lived in the shadows of the cognitive-summative axis too long. I'm humbly willing to accept at least one other system from my own patchwork pragmatism as being fully appropriate and apparently essential to the experiencing of the qualitative whole.

But then let me be pragmatic and ask, how is this system to be applied? Accepting that the qualitative phenomenon can be identified and experienced, and that some means can be devised to describe it to the satisfaction of, or at least with some degree of communal agreement among, the parties involved...What then? That is, how does one apply qualitative "knowing" to the qualitative act, and still come out representing all factors in the equation: teacher, student, learning, and works? In attempting to apply it, may we redefine witness to mean teacher? Is the witness--the participant-observer described in Beittel's and Novosel-Beittel's proposal-- a redefinition of the teacher role? It seems that much of the emphasis in the proposal is upon personal knowing. Their observer becomes less an unobtrusive witness and eventually begins to interact with the observed, the artist. Can we also open the definition of the one observed to also represent the student? Or artist-student-learner? I think we should, if we can, expand the implications and the questions beyond what has been presented here for the purposes of speculation on future applications of these ideas.

The interactions take place through a series of evaluative sessions (formative) which begin to guide the artist or student towards self-realization. I wonder how this very personal system of witnessing-sharing-disclosure-interpretation-disclosure-understanding can be developed beyond the one-to-one frame (or two-to-one or one-to-one-to-one, if we should include dialogues with the artist's work). Can this intimacy ever be achieved on the wholesale scale of the school classroom? Not within the time frame, institutional structure, number of individuals, nor even the character of the youngsters, in art classes with which I'm familiar. Introspection, even on the college level, is a difficult thing to encourage or nurture towards a positive dialogue between artist and witness. Will this procedure ever become a practical mode for all art experiencing? Or is this study an end unto itself, in which movement towards the understanding of the nature of creativity is quite enough. Perhaps we will have to wait for another day to find methods of application to the classroom-studios in which we teach.

According to the description of the research proposal, the study takes place in a supportive, non-instructional climate; and it has been stated that artistic autonomy is paramount. But I should think that some form of learning takes place through subtle guidance, whether self-revealed or not. I have two points to make in this regard. I assume that they have been covered or anticipated, and that they do not represent weaknesses in the design. But they certainly demonstrate the character of phenomenological research in all of its complexity and the essential requirement to attempt to cover every detail that could possibly become contextually significant.

First, stimulated recall is used in this study as a method to pull the artist back into the attitudes of a week ago. This is a long period of time. It is probably a necessary interval, based on individual time schedules, and the need for time to process the preceding week's records of the observations of artist development. But I see a wrenching back and forth from the reality of other life activities throughout the week, to the once-a-week nurtured immersion of the subject into the artistic act. Are the distracting interruptions apt to effect the process? The artist may bring some of these distractions with him to the arting process. And it seems that there may have to be some lengthy and extensive warm-up periods before the "other" life is shucked off in favor of the artist-problem at hand. Perhaps "immersion" should be interpreted more literally to avoid this problem by using subjects who work at their arting tasks every day, all day, in a retreat-like atmosphere.

The second point relates to the reflective interviews which are conducted preceding the time that each week's new work is begun. While it is expected that the participant-observer comes progressively to identify with the artist, with the artist's development of himself towards his work, and with the artist's work... I am still concerned about how the checks restrict, restrain, or balance the input of the participant-observer. This is spite of assurances, such as appear in Beittel's article in the Art Education Journal: "An Alternate Path for Inquiry Into Art;" (3) that there is no intent to instruct or influence persons, and that there is no conscious desire to instruct; that it is the freest and most neutral environment possible. My question remains about the participant-observer capacity or role that I would characterize as that of the inside-outsider. He is the individual who shares space inside the phenomenological bubble, but who must not be allowed to become the star of the show. Such a person has a tremendous responsibility to support and study without influencing...thus bringing true psychological respect for the artist's autonomy to the situation. This, of course, has been one of Beittel's stated conditions. But any observer (and, in this case, interviewer-interpreter-prompter)

can exercise a bias simply by the selection of things noticed, whether it be an a priori set of mind or by practicing experiential tuning after the fact from data collected earlier in the most sterile form.

So it seems that there are (or should be) other researchers in this study who can monitor the on-going process of brief-debrief and who can, we hope, catch the possible tendency of the observer-participant to become overactive in the triadic relationship. But even then, isn't the harm apt to have been done with no way to undo it after the fact? Depending upon the perceived role of the observer (and perhaps his ascribed status, too, under the circumstances) the artist may begin to look for clues or cues from his "partner" in this study in the hopeful way a child does who has decided the safe way to operate is to do as teacher says and teacher does. And the child develops an exquisite sensitivity to learning what the teacher wants him to do and what he thinks is "good" -- often without the teacher being aware that these signals are being picked up and acted upon in successive situations. Coming back to the project proposal, then, the situation may require a fourth party to monitor the third party, the one who is operating inside the arting context. The expressed intent is, of course, to keep him "honest." But, short of breaking the door down and ending the session then and there, the problem cannot be rectified -- if detected! -- until the beginning of the next episode. And this also presumes, as I said earlier, that the "harm" in the form of inappropriate pressures is something that can even be undone. Is it possible to bring some very carefully administered counter-pressures to bear on the situation, swinging it towards equilibrium? Or, more properly, can it be moved back to the autonomous control of the artist -- his control of himself and his work? If this is not possible, then the situation may flutter out of control, and what results may be fortuitous teaching. How, in phenomenological research such as this, do we keep observer-participants from inadvertently teaching, and subjects from learning from them, in spite of our best laid plans?

Perhaps all the constraints should be relaxed, and the study be less concerned with how an individual develops his art forms, and more on what he chooses to pick out of his interests, experience, intuition...and current environment (including a person who can possibly teach him a thing or two) to create art. This broadened viewpoint, which accepts Wagner's declaration of yesterday that there can be no phenomenological description unless the observer inserts himself into the art situation, admittedly makes the study situation more complex. But it does account for an important variable in most of our lives: our teacher (the observer teacher), or what in our lives teaches us... or what phenomena we learn from. The teacher should be equally as

important to us, being art educators, as the learner. In the abstract, I cannot see them both as anything but absolutes in the equation of experiential growth.

I think that Beittel's work, and his remarks here that represent his thinking about this work, are immensely important to our field. His arguments seem to urge us, if not to go back, to at least rediscover the quality of things as a means for understanding ourselves. As Langer (4) points out, the adjectives we use today originally referred to feeling tones and sense-qualities. Somehow we have lost touch with the subjective value of experience and today we put a premium on what are publicly comparable features of objects, classifying and representing to the extent that quality becomes diminished or lost in what we speak of daily. We also treat our feelings as objects, rather than affective states of being. So it is work such as this that can lead us back to those root metaphors, those conceptual antecedents we left grounded in feeling that represented our rich beginnings. We need to learn again, as people of our more primitive past did so naturally -- to be able to converse and discourse again about the qualities of things. And we need to devise ways to identify the nature of the act of making art in order to have something qualitative to talk about. Dr. Beittel's approach points to our noble way. I think it is one of the most significant directions for art education to take today.

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- (2) From K. Beittel's reference to Stephen Pepper's, Concept and Quality, 1966; in Beittel's book, Alternatives for Art Education Research: Inquiry Into the Making of Art. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown and Co., 1973, pp. 130-131.
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RESPONSE TO KENNETH R. BEITTEL'S
"QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITATIVE"
Robert Parker

Les précédentes orientations de la recherche en éducation artistique qui ont essayé de rendre compte des aspects particuliers de l'activité intentionnelle de l'homme pourraient être tenues pour des descriptions conceptuelles; c'est-à-dire, pour des méthodologies qui sont behavioristes, basées sur des opérations et vérifiables par tout le monde. Une approche plus récente, comme Beittel l'a soulignée, peut être dépeinte comme une description qualitative. Parce que le qualitatif est le principe sous-jacent qui gouverne l'activité intentionnelle de l'homme; et peut-être, d'après Beittel, parce qu'à la fois poétique et expressive dans un système descriptif, elle a la chance de décrire adéquatement le courant de la conscience artistique à l'intérieur de l'évènement expressif.

Pour décrire adéquatement le qualitatif, Beittel essaye de rapprocher les vues du monde organico-contextualiste de Stephen Pepper du modèle structuro-existential d'interprétation et d'analyse du courant de la conscience artistique.

Le contextualisme et l'"organicisme" contiennent tous les deux des critères pertinents à la relation interne de l'évènement expressif. La question peut alors être posée à savoir comment ces critères peuvent être adéquatement réunis dans le modèle structuro-existential. Les critères incorporés dans une vue organico-contextualiste, impliquent, par définition, un renvoi à une mesure ou des mesures qui constituent le critère lui-même. Donc, l'utilisation d'une vue organico-contextualiste possède comme exigence des critères qui pourraient offrir une précision de l'analyse esthétique de l'évènement expressif.

La précision de l'analyse esthétique apparaît être d'une importance aussi grande dans l'utilisation du modèle structuro-existential pour également décrire qualitativement l'évènement à apprécier. Les critères qui sont contenus dans le contextualisme et l'"organicisme" peuvent agir à priori

par la vertu de leur fonction, encourageant par ce moyen l'émergence d'une structure qui fonctionnerait à priori dans les futures rencontres avec l'oeuvre d'art. Cette réponse suggère que la description qualitative de l'évènement d'appréciation ou expressif pourrait opérer à plusieurs niveaux; ceux qui se rapportent aux médiations de surface pour identifier une structure émergente et ceux qui ont trait aux médiations au-delà de la surface pour présenter une structure pleinement définie.

In his paper "Qualitative Description of the Qualitative," Professor Beittel's intention is to further explicate the assumptions which provided the basis for his book Alternatives for Art Education Research, 1973. He identified these assumptions as,

...to study the making of art one must move as closely as possible to the creating stream of consciousness;

and to do so, "...a special participant observer role is essential to his closeness (1973, p.vii)." It is to the first assumption that Professor Beittel primarily directs his remarks today. He asks, If we are to describe the quality which characterizes the artistic stream of consciousness within purposive activity, then how can this description be cognitively adequate?

The alternatives which Beittel defines in his book are not those which can be described as conceptual, that is, the behavioristic, operationally based, and publicly verifiable methods which typed art education research in past; rather his orientation is with the qualitative. And these alternatives or modes, as he suggests, include both the presentational, which are closest to the artist's stream of consciousness, and the historical, which connects this stream of consciousness with the observations of the participant observer. Thus the focus which he employs does not separate the knower and known, does not treat the subject and object as extreme points on a continuum, but rather unites the two in an onward movement towards integration to the "...non-subject world on qualitative being (Beittel, 1978, p.6)." In defining these alternatives, Beittel hopes to point out some of the "...features of this less known landscape for art education research (1973, p.131)".

The underlying principle of these alternatives, and which he acknowledges Pepper and Dewey, is the belief that the qualitative is the regulating principle which governs man's purposive activity. It is, according to Dewey, the "...background, the point of departure...of all thinking (p. 116)."

The pervasive quality which colors our experiencing, unifies and guides our activity, and ultimately unifies our cognition is Beittel's basis for inquiry into the making of art.

This orientation is a result of what Beittel calls "metaphysical pluralism," which he states is a "...rendering into a world view what is appropriate thereto (1978, p.5)." What is appropriate to the expressive event in all of its "qualitativeness" then is a means to adequately describe the pervasive quality of the event in such a manner that the description becomes qualitative in itself. But this is not to suggest that he does so at the expense of conceptual description, his use of the "structural-existential" model attempts to conjoin these two ways of describing. The structural-existential model is not a restrictive, and either/or choice which has pervaded art education research in the past, rather it is Beittel's belief that because the purposive activity of man is qualitative as well as conceptual then any a priori conceptual approach ought to demonstrate an anchorage "...in the qualitative event itself (1978, p.19)." It is through the synthesis of the qualitative and conceptual that the expansion, as Pepper suggests, of our knowledge occurs, a comprehensive unification of knowledge about man's purposive activity.

To return to the question which Beittel asks concerning the cognitive adequacy of qualitative description, he suggests that we are faced with inadequate criteria to judge the descriptive language of the expressive event. He does so to dispell the appeals which have so often marked the pronouncements of artists as well as scholars when they speak about the making of art. From Pepper's World Hypotheses, 1942, Beittel outlines two weak criteria which could characterize the intentionalist stance on the one hand, and the intuitionist stance on the other. Both these positions have little empirical justification. Animism and mysticism are not justifiable grounds for qualitative description of the qualitative for, as is in the case of animism, its appeal rests upon the infallible authority of artist or scholar; and mysticism appeals to the indubitability of "... immediate insight into the meaning of all things (Beittel, 1968, p.9)"

The criteria which appears to be cognitively adequate for Beittel at this time is a type of "progressive organicism." The progressive organicism criteria seems to be consistent with the existential "being forward in the world" description of the artistic stream of consciousness within the expressive event, and it seems consistent with his structural-existential model as an interpretive analytic, and it appears to function adequately within a contextualistic aesthetic as well. However organicism does contain

criteria, and the hypotheses of organicism could be considered unrestrictive in scope, but it does demand corroborative evidence for its use to be justifiable. Organicism demands the integration of the artist, spectator, and critic in the expressive event, and the recognition that fragments or elements of the event really belong. The notion of belonging, according to Pepper (1942) is,

when we have come to understand or achieve the whole of which the fragment was a part, we will recognize that the fragment was all along an integral part of that whole, and that the apparent separateness of the part was merely due to our failure to perceive it in relation to the other parts of the whole (p. 74).

Then the onus is upon the spectator as well as the artist to accomplish this integration. The spectator then acts as a facilitator, guiding the movement towards integration. Thus the use of "progressive organicism" as a cognitively adequate descriptive model requires the accuracy of aesthetic analysis as to the depth of the experiential integration of the qualities of the expressive act.

To control this situation then, Beittel requires the expressive event to occur in a limited context setting. To qualitatively describe the root metaphor of making art unencumbered by the structures of the situation which art educators have sought description in the past: the classroom; Beittel turns to the private sector: the laboratory. There he hopes to discover the underlying structure of the expressive act. He does so by means of a participant observer relationship. The participant observer acts not as a passive spectator but rather a "nurturant friend," an individual of trust who becomes in Deweyian terms, part of the process of re-creation, who searches for descriptive language of the qualitative, a language which is both poetic and expressive to describe a poetic and expressive event. It is not the multiplicity of observation of a single fact but the observed convergence of many different facts toward one result: that of the description of an emergent structure of the individual's purposive activity. Beittel admits to no structure, no will to structure, no a priori structure, rather it is the emergent structure of the "being forward in the world." What he is suggesting then, is that the artistic stream of consciousness is continually undergoing transformation, the various fragments of the event are continually in flux, moving onward, but still regulated by the emergent structure itself. It is the constant movement of the artistic stream of consciousness towards integration.

The question could now be posed. If the emergent structure does

exist through the exegetic interpretation on the part of the participant observer, then what is the status of this emergent structure? It appears that some sort of structure has been achieved, does this then influence future structuring? The problem as I see it, is whether the artistic stream of consciousness as qualitatively described through the structural-existential model may be analyzed in respect to surface mediations to identify an emergent structure as well as the analysis of the deep structure of the expressive event to discover a structure fully developed. I am suggesting that perhaps the artistic stream of consciousness may operate on more than one level. If this be the case, then an emergent structure could be defined by the participant observer, however, a deeper structure would be a possibility. Simply put, the question centers upon the notion of whether structures are formational, once the emergent structure has been defined, does it then become a "structure"?

In summary, Beittel's concern at this time is to build a theory of learning in art, or as he suggests, "...meaning in art (1973, p. 13)." He focuses upon the theoretical knowledge of particularized givens in a unique expressive situation. More precisely, the nucleus of Beittel's research is the investigation of the expressive event, and his orientation is meant to encompass the appreciative event as well.

The possibility of applying Beittel's orientation to the appreciative event is particularly interesting to me, since I was trained as an art historian as well as an art educator. As an art historian I was trained to consider both the intrinsic as well as the extrinsic characteristics of a work of art. Intrinsic considerations would deal with the inherent qualities of a work of art, whereas extrinsic considerations would focus upon the conditions and influences surrounding its creation.

However, I am reminded of a task I was assigned to complete very early in my graduate studies. I was asked to write about a painting by Matisse. I wrote the first paper explaining in rather detailed terms the formal qualities presented by the work. My instructor was not satisfied. Nor was he satisfied upon the completion of the next two papers which further clarified these formal properties. Finally, I wrote a paper dealing with the pervasive quality of Matisse's work, this paper was acceptable to my instructor. The importance of this account is the fact that my instructor demanded that I confront the work beyond the surface mediations which were readily perceptible, to search for a deeper meaning significant to me as an observer.

Upon reflection at this time, I realize that integration, a oneness,

perhaps even an aesthetic experience could characterize my attending to the work by Matisse. And it was done so with little prior knowledge of Matisse. It might be suggested that this is what Wagner means when he speaks of phenomenological description as beginning with the self, and what Beittel means when he speaks of integration.

But again I must refer to the point which I made earlier concerning structures and emergent structures. Upon reflection, I would suggest that some sort of structure emerged, however, it was structure that has been used in attending to works of art since my confrontation with the work by Matisse. This model might be described as a structure fully defined.

In his search for the root metaphor of art Beittel suggests that the parallel between making art and developing a self system are "...the basic phenomena of our field and practice (1973, p. vii)." This position has gained a certain amount of credence within art education research during the last decade. Art educators, art historians, critics, and philosophers alike have written extensively on the connection between art and life and its application to the practice of art education. It might be proposed that Beittel is continuing this direction, however his orientation moves closer to the event and what actually occurs when an individual is confronted with an image.

Perhaps the notion that Gene Youngblood presents in Expanded Cinema, 1970, when he refers to man and the image he creates or is confronted with is appropriate here. Youngblood believes that we are entering an era of "...image exchange between man and man (p. 49)." He states,

The truth is this: that with the possibility of each man on earth being born a physical success there is no archetypal Man whom one can use in the culturally elitist manner and each man becomes the subject of his own study. The historical preoccupation with finding the one idea that is Man will give way to the idea that earth is, and then to the idea of other earths (p.49).

Perhaps man's studying himself, relative to himself, uninhibited by the notion of archetypal man, is what Beittel meant by an Einsteinian focus in art education research.

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J. VICTORIA

What we would like to do this morning is to have Dr. Wagner, Dr. Aoki and Dr. Beittel make a few remarks in response to their respondents and then we will allow our nine distinguished presenters to debate among themselves for a few moments. Then after the coffee break we will entertain questions to all the presenters from the audience. So, if Dr. Wagner is ready.

H. WAGNER

I have only one remark to make which has to do with the insightful presentation of Marilyn Zurmuehlen. She started with beautiful examples taken from Holt's book with the children who try to come to terms with a challenge. The recorder of this observation spoke of children collecting data. I would object to this language. Marilyn explained to me that it was in purposes not for the children but for his readers because they think in terms of data collecting. But children do not collect data. They are involved in the adventure of exploring their world. They are collecting experiences, if you want to say it. Even "collecting" is too much, because it is not their intention. They just do it. What is so beautiful about young children is the spontaneity of the thing and the playfulness of everything. Children, I think, at the beginning have only one purposive activity in mind and that is eating. And then, even there, they experiment if you figure all you can do with your pie instead of just eat it. I would say that we speak here of experiencing which a behaviourist would call "random" or "random movements". But it is not random. It is random only at the beginning, because you will find that, as we have found so beautiful in this report, the children suddenly focus on something. "Here is a particular string" or "Here I put down my finger and when I do it, now it has an effect, but if I put down my finger on this string it has an effect". This experimentation becomes direct. And so the child decides how to explore this experience. So the randomness is only a start.

So I just wanted to make these remarks here. I have nothing else to say about the excellent presentations of my friends and colleagues.

J. VICTORIA

Thank you, Dr. Wagner. Dr. Aoki?

T. AOKI

The few remarks that I would like to make at this point in time stem from my reaction to the words said by particularly, Doug Boughton.

Now Louise responded to my address and I have made arrangements that I visit Quebec city sometime so that we carry on a dialogue out there, en français et en anglais, mais je ne comprends pas français. So I have to limit myself today to the response of Doug Boughton.

The thing that stimulated my thought with respect to Doug's presentation is the sort of ideas that he has entertained or is entertaining with respect to the relationship between art education as such and curriculum. And the diagrams that we saw yesterday have led me to think further about some of the curriculum issues that we need to attend to ourselves. And in this connection I'd like to try to embrace remarks made by others. So if you would give me just ten minutes?

I am recalling now what Dr. Wagner said in his talk when he was referring to provinces of meaning to life-worlds, if you like, or James' sub-universes. He said that each such realm, while it is attended to, is real after its own fashion. Speaking philosophically each has its own ontology. Likewise it has its characteristic style of expression and cognition - its own epistemology and in a sense, it has its own logic. Now that's a mouthful! It's not that I'm going to question this at all. There is the whole notion of what is contained in a province of meaning or of life-world. And so when we start unpacking the life-world, say the classroom or curriculum or the suggested life-worlds in a curriculum, then we have to start looking at some of those things that Dr. Wagner mentioned.

Now suspending that just one moment, Ken Beittel introduced me to a very interesting notion "arting", and I would like to put the notion of arting in this sort of context. There is a person in there and that person is the artist. So artist, arting, art work. So we have there kind of a man, activity and the product of this activity all together. And if you will recall the sort of triangular thing that I had displayed yesterday on the transparency, I was thinking in terms of the person called the teacher, the person called the student and some objects in the environment to which they attend, which I referred to as something displayed. Okay, if you're looking at one portion of that, a person called "the student" arting in class, working in order to produce a work of art. Now right there if we start packing a little bit of what might be going on there, I am thinking now in terms of some curriculum issues, and I'm kind of worried about how to

deal with this whole emphasis on "back to the basics". Because "back to the basics" typically, at least on the West Coast, is thought of in terms of "back to the skills". The skills of writing, reading and arithmetic - these are the major things that the people, the populace think of. So, if in the case of art education, this activity called arting, it is a mode as Ken expressed that term, a mode of arting, the mode of doing called arting. And does that make sense. Put that beside another mode, the mode of being called arting. Now I am going to suggest something like this: that the skills curriculum tends to emphasize doing to the point that we start to entertain a particular kind of ontology, a particular kind of being, and that notion of being is coupled with the technical know-how type of approach to whatever tends to lead to what I term a recipe curriculum, a curriculum in which the kids are learning recipes, technical knowledge. Now, the being, the sense of being which goes along with that kind of thing is not necessarily a human being; it is a very thingafied sort of being. And I am just wondering how we can couple this notion of the skills with the being which refers to human being. So I am sort of thinking of something like this: that the being of a thing is a being result and can be fully explained in the terms of its antecedents. The being of a thing is nothing but its belonging to the material cosmos. The fact that a thing is nothing but a result means that the thing is necessitated; for determinism covers a world of things. Now man's being is also a result, also necessitated, also a part of cosmos. But he cannot be totally result, totally necessitated, for otherwise nothing would be. So we are saying that being human is quite different from just being or being a thing. See it is in this connection that I ponder about this sort of notion: to gain technical mastery in art, in music or whatever, there is a suggestion that we have to have technical mastery in order to get to the loftier things such as the meaning of composition, the meaning of painting and so on. The question I raise is: is this a kind of sequential sort of thing? Do we teach kids to do things, to learn how to handle a brush, to paint, to sculpt, etc. At what point do we make that a meaningful sort of activity? I am afraid that whereas the teacher may know that "the kids who need to have these skills so that..." from the kids' perspective, as they are engaged in learning how to do things, the interest and the purpose that the kids have, the motivation that the kids have may not match those of the teacher. I think it is a big curriculum question. The reading people who are concerned about reading skills are beginning to address themselves to the question of, "Okay, skills in the context of what kind of being? - skills in the context of what kind of being?" And I am just wondering how you people in art education are dealing with this because I think, really, we in the area of curriculum can learn much from you people in the

relationship between skills and being. So I'd like to just pose that, and I'd call that a kind of response plus to the discussion yesterday.

J. VICTORIA

Thank you.

K. BEITTEL

Just as I was thinking of packing up, Ted has unpacked some things and I didn't intend to comment, but just in passing, I would like to comment on the last point that Ted raised, because I think it is a great watershed of opinion and a division within art education itself. And I don't think there are any answers to it.

Just in passing, I would like to say that I find two kinds of viewpoints there. Within a tradition or what I'll call a community, that is where the people are in communion about the things, within a living tradition where continuity is assumed in more than one's ego displacement on the map. Then I think that techniques are never techniques. I think if technological discourse, what C. W. Morris calls technological discourse, that is where the language is prescriptive and information, then we never have art. Studying with a Japanese master one never learns just prescriptions and information; that is experience I would like to point out, which is tradition. In that mode of learning, one is always learning more than is being demonstrated. One is always learning a life that is using the techniques, and that would be one way I would think of that. Given the lack of those, and I was brought to this observation the other day when I was talking with a young man working on his doctorate, who is working in museum education. He was having trouble reading Collingwood and he didn't know why. And I began to think about it with him, and it occurred to me that given expressionistic philosophy of art the pictures in the museum have no relevance. I mean they're just so many things no better than anything else if they do not match the propulsion, if you please, and the interest and purpose coming from me - me as a person alive. And who cares about Rembrandt! I remember one day in the early days of the Black liberation movement, somebody said "Who cares about Bach and Beethoven! Our music is what counts." Expressionistically and life-world wise, that is true. To someone who is interested in preserving and continuing the culture, that is not true. So again philosophies of art clash at that point, and that makes much sense to me as well. I think both of those views co-exist, and they are hard to integrate. And those are my simple-minded observations. I sense them integrated where technique is no longer technique and where technique is only technique I would say "A pox on the technique". That's only in passing, and I find that it is a very exciting

issue to me. So much so that I was so confused personally when my Japanese master came to Penn State at his own interest and expense in 1976 when I was teaching an advanced course in making porcelain on the potter's wheel. He came and joined a community which was oriented in one way, which I called "the wilderness community". He came and brought what I called "the village", and I called my funny essay "East and West of the Swamp Fires" East of the swamp fires there was a village with its continuity, its organization, its communal life and the tradition. In the wilderness it's a no-man's land which has promise and everybody is searching for his own homestead, if you please. The two do not co-exist very well, and I experienced some reversal in the same teaching format and that brought me to contemplate them a bit. That's only in passing.

The other comments I wanted to make were to the two excellent responses to my paper yesterday. These are very brief comments - not so much in any disagreement but to further elucidate some of the positions that I would expand upon, to clarify perhaps some of the terms, and I will do it very briefly. The word "participant-observer" as used in our study is not the right word. It is a word that makes some sense in educational research and other contexts. Douglas yesterday had a cartoon, he was answering the question "What is a non-participant-observer?" And he drew a something where a man had a hood over his head and two eye holes or something. It was certainly not a person, whatever it was. It was something observing, but we didn't know quite what to call or identify it as. Those of us who worked together in this context would be more apt to call it a "co-sharing" or a "co-journeing." These are very poetic terms, but they seem to fit better than participant-observation. I borrowed from Jung in curriculum language extraining construction which I call the "formative hermeneutic mode." Luthe's method, Luthe said he saw that as somewhat like Rogerian counselling, that is where one participates in the creating of man. He is in a sense a co-creator. That sounds very presumptuous. But if one is an influence, one should acknowledge the type of influence. On the other side, one is never not an influence. One is never not an influence; that is a very hard concept really to grasp. But when I counter intervene, when I try to do nothing to direct the person, that is a very strong influence, believe me. That is an influence which says, "You must act. You must make". It has prescriptions in it, if you please, because it is a value position. There is always a frame to everything that is done - to go back to Heidegger's statement, "Nothing is not ground". If you try to get rid of all presuppositions you cannot get rid of that one, the fact that being has a ground and you have language there to speak. And language speaks from that ground and from no other. So what I have done is to have erected conventions if you please

in my earlier book I called them "bounded contexts." Every context is bounded or else you have problems: your study never advances and never ends. I have a very brilliant young man now as my research assistant who has this problem, and I would like to expatiate on it briefly because it relates to the theme of this conference. When you start to admit the life-world, what is the end to the admission of the life-world? There is no end. You could become Boswellian and go on with Samuel Johnson. Or you could become what I call here in my notes (I thought it was an interesting phrase) you can become what I call "a dumb shit sufferer" like Carlos Castaneda. You will undergo the reverse-hero role. Everything is dumped on your head, you do everything wrong, and you come out wiser somehow and you understand the great man you are trying to learn something from. You understand what he is trying to mediate, not him. But whether or not one becomes Boswell or Castaneda or whether one works, for example, like a sensitive therapist. A sensitive therapist sees perhaps a client one hour a week and may be not even that often. He will not usually go home with the patient, not very often. The life of the patient is all laid bare by the language between two people. There is no limit to what is laid bare neither in depth nor height nor common place. That context is useful to him. I have suggested to my student that he may never finish his study because the immersion in life-worlds has no ending. The person he is studying may die, but that won't even solve the problem because history remains an open book, the text always being interpreted. So framing and making a convention and making a bounded context is an aid to perception. Perhaps it's a kind of super-bracketing, if you please, which does not rule out, what is not within the brackets but makes what is not within the brackets come within the brackets, so that it can be seen. For example, it does not seem to me useful to get the life history of my artist a priori. Now some might proceed with such knowledge. I prefer to know what is it, in the life history, that is pertinent to the making art. You see I really don't care if he was born a Protestant in Afghanistan or something unless somehow that informs his making art and it's alive and it's present. Now if it is in his past, it is always potentially around in his present. At that point I am quite content if it can be shared and brought in the context to admit anything and everything.

The other point was, I think, very well indicated in the closing remarks of Professor Wagner and his first presentation. It had to do with the insertion of himself into the events.

H. WAGNER

What was it? Can you repeat it? (laughter)

K. BEITTEL

I think you said that what is needed was the insertion of the self into the events one is studying.

H. WAGNER

Oh, yeah.

K. BEITTEL

And as soon as we say that (and I quite agree with that statement) there is no observer and object; there is only observer-object, if you please, or whatever word you want to use there. They are bound into one. And all phenomenology at that point is hermeneutic; it is interpretive. Whether you bracket, whether you are following Husserl or not. Once he admits his life-world in all of its meanings and openness he participates in them. Once the insertion is there, his meaning is involved in that context. Then I would argue that it's hermeneutic phenomenology. That's a small point. My small points continue. I'd better stop making them.

J. VICTORIA

That is alright.

H. WAGNER

I am just beginning to realize, to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, that the Americans and the Canadians are separated by the same language. (laughter) In any case I haven't gotten my instructions straight at all. I'd like to address myself to the papers of the two other main speakers of this conference.

Let me start with Ken and let me start with the remarks he made in his present statements. He picked up this expression "the participant-observer", and he pointed out, if I translate this into my own language, that the participant-observer as the sociologists perceive him is a temporarily schizophrenic personality who wants to be involved and wants to be detached at the same time. And he pointed out that this is a not quite comfortable arrangement. I agree fully. And I come back, to the thoughts of a very sensitive sociologist Kurt Wolf who spoke not of participant-observers but who spoke of a person who forgets that he is a sociologist when he goes into a community among people and surrenders to the situation, immerses himself there and sees and tries to make sense of what happens around him without being concerned with how he could exploit that later as a sociologist. When he has extricated himself from the

situation or when they have kicked him out as the matter may be, then he may sit down in retrospect and ask himself "And now what did I catch?" So one speaks of surrender to the situation and to the people and then afterwards to look at the catch, if any.

Now I will speak about some points, basically one point in Ken's paper itself. He starts with the very interesting conception of what I believe is his wife's insightful theory of organicistic cosmology. "A world which is coming to form, a being expresses itself in this ungoing forming world." I am reminded of a wonderful little trick in the decorative art of the Hopis where there is a pattern and there is a little gap at some point. And that means it is not finished, it goes on. And I can understand this very well but I think we should keep in mind that it is risky and provides, let's say, a metaphysical connotation we do not want or may not want to say that being expresses itself. I would say or I would prefer to say, "being is" period. Or "beings", if one could use the Heideggerian form of language which we have not accepted yet. But I would say I express what I experience of or about being. So that is one point I wanted to make. Another is the idea that how being comes to form. What is this coming to form? Well this is understandable to me when I speak of the growth of a plant for instance; being comes to form. But man of course also comes to form in this sense because he grows, and he grows in his experiences as well as biologically. However, man is in an existential sense a part of this process very different from the plant which is in the process. He is more. As artist he is growing, and I would say, he makes growth, if we can say that. I like the story of Michelangelo who is to have said that a sculpted figure was there and that he only chipped away the excess of material. Now the crucial point is he chipped it away. The Pieta did not grow out of the stone like a child out of her or his mother. It was not in the stone, it was in Michelangelo's mind. In his desire, his will, he put it into the stone before he carved it out, and it is only therefore that it was there.

K. BEITTEL

And vice versa.

H. WAGNER

What is the vice versa? (laughter)

K. BEITTEL

That is the other part of the dialogue.

H. WAGNER

That the stone made Michelangelo?

K. BEITTEL

You'd better believe it, baby!

H. WAGNER

Alright, I accept it, let's say with reservations. Now I say that the Pieta is created. He created it. Still another point. In this response to this organistic existential interpretation of things, I feel the need to restore. (We may not be here in agreement. We may have to hear it with the difficulties of a compressed presentation of points which at the time they are presented, it is impolite to say "And what do you mean?" "Could you elaborate on this," and so I elaborate here and this may not be a criticism here at all. Possibly it is not.) I would like to restore the students of Ken to their feeling, and I would support them in their feeling, that they think that they have learned more about themselves than about what they are supposed to learn. Now, Ken thinks this is possibly over stated, well that is not desirable. We come here into a psychologism we don't want. Well I don't want the psychologism either, but I think that a non-ecological phenomenology misses out on some core issue. I am reminded of a twenty-year private battle between Schutz and Woolrich who wrote these beautiful studies of field theory. Gestalt psychological theory, and Schutz who insisted that you cannot have a complete theory and understanding of consciousness without having an understanding of the "I" in the center of it. So I think that that would be what we are after. Now, I have also difficulties with understanding what he really meant when he said "It is as bad to psychologize the self and another". Now I don't know what this another is. Is it I, and something that is "non-I" which is "non-I" in general, being in general, existent in general, or is another being in some way like me, another I. Think that it is a crucial difference. When I speak of dialogue, I speak basically of an exchange between one I and another I, but I may also speak of a dialogue which is between two conscious aspects of myself. Namely I speak to me, I and me. Me, that I, I was yesterday or the day before, and so I think we have to restore at least in my feeling or to make clear that we don't go off at the deep end here into the romantic or metaphysical speculations here without really noticing it. We have to make clear that when we speak of consciousness of experience of being, then that is always in relation to the subject, that means it is always in relation to a conscious being and I. Well these were more, I hope, comments than criticism.

Now, I have the feeling that I should stop here, I have something to say about Ted Aoki's paper. I don't know whether you want to postpone that for a different part of the discussion; maybe Ken would want to say something to what I have said here.

K. BEITTEL

Only briefly, so that others can get into the discussion too. Just a passing point. I think that this would require more dialogue between Professor Wagner and me, and I don't want to extend that endlessly, but I'll make just a passing point or two.

In my facetious comment, I did actually mean that the stone carves me as much as I carve the stone. In my dialogue I do restrict meanings to more what Buber meant by it. He would say, "You cannot have a dialogue between I and me". Now, he would say that, and we can differ on those positions. You can have dialogue between I and thou. Thou is the other. Levinas, the French philosopher, says too, "I is the same, the other is infinite. My cup overflows with the infinity of the other". This is the kind of language he uses. Back here at home, I am the same until otherness changes me. I think that the artist feels that very strongly and I think that the other thing is perhaps metaphysical, perhaps metaphorical. As I said, I actually mean it literally when I say; "The stone carves me and the pot makes me. I make me but the pot makes me." It decides things for me, as I decide things for it. And the dialogue then between us is about that form which is emerging. In dialogue partners there is not just the two I's involved, the two I's are involved about something. The persons are immaterial to the something which transcends them. Although they comprehend each other through their persons and histories. But this is about something else. That is not too unlike the whole problem of phenomenology to me. I see something similar in that. The other phrase I would use, I have borrowed from Karl Hausman whose treatise on novelty and creation puts it this way "Creation is a teleological process but it is a discontinuously developmental teleological process." Now by that he means certain specific things: there are gaps and brakes and unpredictabilities as there are in any true dialogue. The development makes no sense a priori; if it does, you have technical work of art. And at least to Collingwood and others that is not a work of art. Means and ends do not coalesce unless their history has a difference between them. If so, that is something a machine can make. I quite agree a man makes art, but art also makes the man. That's the dialogical principle I would hold to. Otherwise we are reduced to a technological theory and that is the very problem I think that Ted alluded to. So if it is discontinuously developmental, it allows the organicism to exist but it is true, it is not quite like the

acorn and the oaktree. The metaphors are difficult here. What is something that starts as an oaktree. Wittgenstein is closer to that. And it ends up as a sailboat. That sounds very ridiculous but it is as logical as I can make this process in a way. That is a very strange type of logic, but it has to do, I think, with the generative in general, generative speech, poetry. Again Heidegger's comment, man dwells poetically, that is the ground. And then he also dwells in other ways, I quite agree. But that is the ground to dwelling. That is metaphysical, and I suppose then it is a matter of one's metaphysics. I would agree with that.

H. WAGNER

I would like to just make a short comment. I think we will come to an agreement, here. In a metaphorical sense I agree fully that you can say that the material makes the artist. But this influence is not carried by the intention of the stone. The stone influences me directly only in instances like if it falls on my head. Otherwise the stone influences me because I visualize it as a medium and by visualizing it and seeing it as a medium, I immediately also submit to the characteristics of the stone. What will that stone allow me to do? I am not free to do anything. Materials have their inner possibilities and restrictions and in seeing them, the material influences me. So in this sense I can agree.

K. BEITTEL

I think we still need to go further with it.

H. WAGNER

Alright, So I would love to discuss this further.

But I would like to talk to the paper of Professor Aoki. He said at one point that the researcher orients himself on a situational interpretation. That is right in the center of my own work and my own interests. And he mentioned two features which have to be kept in mind. First, people giving personal meaning to each situation, and second, they interpret the same event differently. Now all this is very correct. I see that he added a good point, which he did not number, namely communication between man-and-world and man-and-man. Now I will address myself mainly to this point that, as a sociologist, is the crucial of the three. When I speak of communicating between man and world, communication has a different meaning than when I speak of communication between man and man. The latter is, in my sense, genuinely intersubjective. The other means, possibly again in a kind of self-dialogue form, I making clear to me, I explain to me, I interpret for my benefit

my experiences of the world, or, if you want to be a bit more precise, my experiences in this world, and I focus on a certain aspect. I am focussing on my audience or on this roundtable and I know there are other things in my world which are not here. Here and now, this segment of this world is the field of my experience. Now if I speak of intersubjective communication, I will speak here with the assumption that the communication takes place. That means that the persons who speak to one another understand what they each mean, get what the other intends to communicate. Now when I take the first two statements about the personal meaning of the situation and the different interpretation of the situation by each person involved, and of course communication between people is a vital human situation, then I will have to explain now the possibility of how these two with their different interpretations and meanings understand each other. That, in other words, let's say the question is "How is understanding possible?" Now for simplicity I shall speak here only of communication by language. Although other means of communications or language with different media would demand their own particular approach and interpretation again. Now language is the medium of communication par excellence. Language has two aspects for my understanding and for our purposes. Language is our greatest trouble to understand our experiences of the world and parts of the world, because it chops up these experiences in single bits and puts general labels on these bits which in themselves are the crudest ontological distortion of our experiences. Now, it is of interest to see an example of Ken's paper at some points how the exponents of hermeneutics for instance or Heidegger, modify the modes of expression of our language to bring it one step closer to experience. I say only one step, namely from the hypothesized thing-world we come more to a process world. Things come not in slabs; things stream in our experience. To see this fluidity, this continuity, this becoming and being, in this sense, and if we can express a little bit of this in language we have achieved a lot. Well now, the other aspect of language, language is our salvation. Our salvation from the utter subjective chaos which the world would be by its mere reduction, rather what the world would be if we had to depend on nothing but the subjective experiences of people. But language, by the mere reduction of unending variations of experiences and the inexhaustible possibilities for their combination and interpretation and what have you, the reduction from this unmanageable manifoldedness of experience to a limited number of abstracted categories to naked terms with dictionary meanings. And these naked terms all are typifications of experiences throwing out all that is particular to individual experiences and to maintain the naked and poor little chore, let's say, of a general meaning. When I say painting, I make audible a word which I could in the same poor sense define

with other words and then I have a so-called linguistically objective meaning of the term "painting". When I say "painting" I experience in my mind what has been deposited and retained and combined of my past experiences of the paintings which I have seen in my long life and these were very many and some have impressed me deeply. And I combined this again with the jumble of traces of my emotional reactions to these paintings at the time what I thought flickers on and comes back, and I combine this again with the remnants of my later interpretations of them. All of this is there. And all this in James' terms is in the fringes of this one word for me, namely the word painting. All this is there, and all this I can say only I spell it out here for our purposes. Now these fringes are completely unique. I would bet you any amount of dollars, Canadian or American, that nobody has seen the bulk of the paintings which I have seen in original, having been fortunate to grow up in the city which has one of the most famous art collections in the world. Nobody has had my art experiences. But you know what I mean when I say painting. You know that not merely because you remember the name definitions of picture in the dictionary. Maybe you have made up this definition by your own efforts in a course on the arts when you have been asked to define a picture. Define the term picture. Now yet you understand what I mean also and mainly because the word evokes in the stream of the fringes of your mind the sedimentations of your experiences of paintings. What I offer to you in this stripped down and poor word mediates between my experiences and your experiences. Now they are not the same, but they are experiences existentially. They are comparable, and this is what we mean when we say we understand each other. So I think, for this reason, it would be useful to continue what Professor Aoki has brought out in this respect by some consideration of the ways of communication with the help of the typifications of every day life, the words we use in order to communicate with one another and to understand one another, the typifications of every day life which Schutz has explored in his methodological studies much better than anybody else could possibly present it here.

T. AOKI

I appreciated very much Dr. Wagner's comments with respect to the sort of looseness in which I used the term communication. He pointed out for me the distinct difference between the communicative relationship between man and thing in his world and between man and man, and that in dealing with the situational interpretive that I do well to contain myself to the intersubjective, that is to say that communication typically through language between man and man. I will certainly clarify that point in my paper when I revise it. Now with respect to the significance of language, I guess this is the kind of thing we started to banter with yesterday when I sort of unknowingly

commented that "Man-in-his-world" is a very clumsy sort of way to try to pull out, to typify, that which is within our conscientiousness and flowing by. And as I suggested that perhaps the German language might be a much better language to use in order to come to grips with things of this sort, and on that point, too, the historical origin and nature of German language being more metaphysically oriented, that sort of contention is something that was sort of alien to me until yesterday. But in connection with the different aspects of language, I think this is the sort of thing that I referred to yesterday when I made reference to Aldous Huxley when he said that "We must try to get at things directly rather than through concepts which are typically labelled things. And the labelling process itself has a tendency to distort that world and I guess Dr. Wagner's comment just a moment ago is to remind us that that very process is a distorting process and that we are to be aware of that kind of thing. The communication as the major interest of activity in situational interpretive studies, I think, is a sort of area that many linguistic analysts seem to be moving into. If we could unpack what they are doing, I think that we would there begin to see that to some, linguistic analysts are approaching their task from almost like the outside. But from what I can understand the more phenomenologically oriented linguistic analysts are approaching their task quite differently. And I think that when we hear about these people, the ethnographers, the linguistic analysts and soon we better take a good look at how they are approaching their task, because just by their terms alone we don't know what stance they are taking. I appreciate very much Dr. Wagner's comments. I've learned much, thanks.

M. ZURMUEHLEN

I just wanted to respond briefly to a theme that seems to me to have reoccurred among the speakers this morning. That is the issue that might be put as skills versus living-in-the-world-of-art in the classroom. And I want to suggest the possibility that we could conceive of being-in-the-world-of-skills. It seems, to my way of thinking, it is a rather false dichotomy to oppose skills versus making in art. That we could have, for me, a sense of being-within-skills as we could have a sense of being within what I would take to mean interpretive activities. I would like to give what I consider an example of that with which many of you might be familiar and that is Studs Terkel's book Working. If you don't know it, I commend it as an example of what I am trying to talk about here and that is that he has interviewed quite a few people in many different kinds of occupations. If you read that book in its totality, I think that what comes through is a point which seems to me is also very real, and that is that the world-of-every-day-life

and the world-of-art are not such discrete categories. There is quite a deal of slippage, as Doug was talking about in his paper, that occurs between those worlds. For instance I will not be able to quote them verbatim but some of you who have read it may recognize a steelworker from Gary, Indiana who talked about how he would like to make his mark, and that sometimes he and his friends in the process of making the sheets of steel that would go into buildings would deliberately put something on them that was a kind of irregularity that would be a statement. And he spoke in terms of taking his son to see that building and saying I want to be able to show that as my mark on the world. Some people write books; some people paint paintings that's my mark. And I think that there is that sense of identification that people have through the process of skills. And in that book there is even a more specific example and that is of a carpenter from Goshen, Indiana who happened also to be a poet; so maybe he put this a little more poetically. But the activity that he described was an activity in which he talked about the process of hitting with the hammer or mallet the nail, and how that experience itself became a very meaningful and satisfying experience to him. And I wish I did have a quotation but he used words like "hitting it true" and "hitting it right" and it builds up until you get some feeling for that experience. I am sorry I don't have the words that he used here but I want to suggest that I think there is a possibility for resolving this problem that was first posed to us as a curriculum problem in terms of our ways of viewing reality. That is that I am suggesting that we can have a being-within-skills and if we manage as educators to achieve that being-within-skills, then that's not perhaps the problem because there is no longer that dichotomy.

D. MCKAY

Now this is in response to Dr. Aoki's question "In technical mastery, is there a sequence?" and I think of this as a kind of development of a three-phase situation with the youngster, beginner, novice being dependent, dependent on himself, on the world about him, on his own sense of where he needs to go. And in terms of the three phases, one of the first is a development of technical skills, I see this as "Yes". My answer is simply "Yes". I think there needs to be a development, and a sequential kind of development, of skill. In many cases in the craft world and many of the areas where you are using machines and such, one kind of skill is dependent upon the next. You can't skip, in order to maintain safety and such and involvement of that sort. Then there is also the transformation from the teacher's perception of what is good for the student (because teacher knows best out of experience in the past, kinds of situations of that sort) to eventually what the student knows best based on his own interest and his perceptions of what he

needs, and so there should be some kind of flow. The third one being a growth of self confidence on the part of the student from some sort of high dependence, in the beginning, on the teacher to set up the situation and to provide explanation about the tools and such, and the processes and then eventually the kind of independence a self confidence growing in that case as one masters what is happening, and also gets a sense of how much one is capable of doing, and so this is also on the kind of continuum which tends toward a kind of growth. And all of this is aiming toward a point, some magical point, along through these three sets of continuum that is the point of release and at that kind of stage, whatever it is or whenever it occurs if it does, then the student is released from his dependence upon someone else, has his own sense of, I know where I have to go from here, I know what I want, I am able to do it and I have the vocabulary and skills vocabulary to do it. And from that point forward, I think he is in the creative realm of making art. Before that he is a toddler who is learning how to walk and so this is how I see the set-up in terms of that skill arrangement and technical mastering.

D. BOUGHTON

I'd like to make a comment in reference to what Ted was suggesting this morning and again congruent with all of these comments about coming into the world of being and the relationship of skill development to this. If you can recall the example that I used yesterday of the little boy with the aircraft, I thought that was an excellent example of this kind of problem that Ted referred to. The little boy was concerned with the being of the aircraft and his relationship to that object in the world. And he was saying something about that relationship or trying to. The teacher on the other hand was concerned that he should learn about how to make shadows and how to use color and that he should look and see the plane as it really was as far as she was concerned; there was no linkage at all between her perception of what he was supposed to be doing and what he thought he was trying to do. Now, had the teacher had some kind of grounding in phenomenological methodology and approached that student from the view point of trying to understand what meaning he was attributing to the act he was engaged in, then there could have been a linkage, a very meaningful linkage, and skills and meaning and being could have come together. And my point yesterday was that if there was some kind of reconceptualization of the process of art education, from a phenomenological view point we would have a revolutionary change in the nature of art education.

Now I want to take another step back from that. I just had a very interesting discussion with a member from the audience that should have been asked publicly I think. She was asking me

about another way of perceiving that kind of example that I was using and suggesting that perhaps my understanding of the meaning that was attributed by the little boy to the plane had grown out of some kind of masculine affinity. It's the kind of thing that little boys do, and the teacher was unable to have that same kind of understanding and that perhaps this was a kind of castration complex that the teacher had. But that example, that way of looking at this particular situation, I see as coming from the empirical analytic mode where the situation is being explained from a position of causes of action that caused the two to do what they were doing, whereas my point was that we could look at that situation from a phenomenological perspective which is trying to explain the reasons why each of them did as they did. And there is a difference there between causes and reasons. Thank you.

D. BURTON

I just want to make a few comments, kind of knit-picking on a certain area that was being talked about and that was the, I guess, categories that these different things would fall into: Man-to-man relationships or person-to-person relationships I should say, person-thing relationships. We tend to think of art, making art, creating art as a person-thing relationship and we really can't in quite the same way as a regular thing that already exists. There's a lot of chicken-egg paradoxes involved in art, particularly at the forming end of it. Once a work of art is already made we can approach it more or less like any other thing in the world. It's an object which can be treated more or less like it. But at that stage before it's made, when the artist walks into a studio, that's really a different category of thing and the relationship that the artist has there is much more complex. What I mean to say is that the art-object, the work of art, literally does not exist in its meaning, in its physical form, in its incipient stage before it is created. There is literally nothing there and the artist in some way brings meanings into existence. It's almost like bringing something out of the void. It's raw phenomenon brought into existence, and don't ask me where it comes from. I don't really know. I do think this has a tremendous bearing on what we do in the classroom then, because our relationship with the child, with the art student, is predicated on a lot of assumptions that the meaning already exists perhaps in the sense of values that the child is supposed to be doing or drawing with values and colour and so on. We need to drop back into what is happening with the child, not so much what he intended to do. A very curious thing is that most children, and even I think adults, in the art-making situation do not realize they're supposed to be making art, and if you tell them that, they feel a lot more confident. They feel what they are

supposed to be doing is shading or colouring or something of this nature - manipulating, making. They think they are supposed to be making, and they really don't grasp that there is this other dimension of creation. That they have an aspect of forming, bringing into existence meanings. This really is only conveyed in a personal or interpersonal or intersubjective way. We can tell them, "Yes, you are supposed to be making art", but the significance of it all comes through our feeling for them. Again, coming back to this paradox of art that it does not exist before it's created, I feel when the artist walks into his studio or finds himself in a classroom that, where do we start? There's no meaning there to start with; there's no really phenomenon there to start with in the most elementary sense. If there's no phenomenon, we really cannot get the whole process going. We get tracked into a reductive question of first principles. I think the way that the process starts is almost in terms of a conditional proof. The child or artist just says to himself, "Well, I'm going to make some art now." And he really doesn't know what he is going to make in terms of what kind of object. It is just the raw intention of making art. And from this, a few phenomena can begin to emerge, and this process can build up speed from that.

R. PARKER

Just one point in terms of what Professor Wagner has said which was expanded on by Ken. I think the crucial aspect of the Michelangelo statement was the fact that Michelangelo had the belief system that the form was in the stone. And to me that relationship that existed between Michelangelo and the form, or that the stone I should say, was being in the way that Professor Wagner stated - in the fullest sense of the word, in the qualitative sense of the word. I think the qualification has to be made, at least in my mind, between what estheticians talk about purposive activity and purposeful activity. There is the artistic intention to reveal form or uncover form in terms of Michelangelo's sense, and then there is the artistic intention in terms of purposeful to create a Pieta. And I think there is a great deal of distinction between the two ways of approaching Michelangelo's intention. I think this could move into the idea that Marilyn talked about in terms of being-within-skills. There is purposive activity in terms of skill, expertise, and there is purposeful activity. And I believe it would be beneficial for us to look at that distinction in terms of hammering, let's say, to complete some sort of form, and then there is hammering to hit the mark true. It's entirely different. The difference comes in terms of humdrum hammering and hammering. It seems to me if we are going to be talking about skills and being-within-skills, that we are talking about hammering not hammering to drive a nail.

J. VICTORIA

Perhaps at this time if you would like to address questions.

AUDIENCE

I have a question. I am not teacher; I am not engaged in art. But having this expertise available makes me want to pose this question. I felt that in all the different talks, one came to the point where the question arises: "Where does it come from, this initial drive of creation?" The drive among educators of the 20th century to break the boundaries of limited or restricted education. To make my question clear, I want to give a small illustration. About two weeks ago, I attended a musical recording where an artist, apparently known, said to another person, who was also recording, "Open your mouth and the music will come out." And this lady then proceeded and did a really professional recording. I have been walking for two weeks now with this one line. How did she achieve getting this other human being to overcome frequency of response being flat or sharp with one single sentence, "Open your mouth and the music will come out." And I think the same thing is happening here today, which you were asking, where people are asking. "Well, if language is restricted, if language does not allow us to express the basic emotion feelings and desires, what other forms of communication can we utilize to obtain that goal, creation?" Whether Michelangelo had the stone to initiate that desire or was it the other way around, I think if we really want to solve this criterion, perhaps you should not avoid that question, but just pose it. "Where does it come from?" That's my question.

K. BEITTEL

It comes from life.

M. ZURMUEHLEN

I'll make one response to that. I think that you gave us the answer in the illustration that you gave. It came from finding the possibility for doing that within another person, and I think that the words you gave us were only a code for the communication that really went on between the person who achieved that and the person who made that possible. And I think it was possible for that person to communicate that to the singer because of the entire life experience that person had had. I would say that the words are only a small key that you can express to us now out of that communication. It seems to me that we learn in art or in any other way, not so much by specific demonstration, as by the demonstration of the possibilities for doing that from another person. That what we show people is not how to draw a

a specific thing, or if we attempt that, I consider that a fallacy or not how to interpret a particular picture of painting, but that there is a possibility of doing all those things and we only show that possibility as we manifest it in our lives.

K. BEITTEL

Can I say one word, too? I would assume that "it", whatever it is, did not come from the person who said, "Open your mouth and music will come out". That process was already underway in the person before those words were spoken. That might have been the intermediary which brought it to be in that instance. I'd go way back when I facetiously said, "That comes from life," that comes from being in its basic terms. Langer would say, for example, it is the nature of being human to symbolically transform one's experience into expression. And that's one disagreement I probably would have with David. There are no hierarchies in art. There are hierarchies in skills. There is a big distinction there. In that sense, the child who somehow symbolizes following symbolically, before speech is on the same level as Michelangelo. And you may disagree with me, but I feel that, at base, that is a true statement. That is the point that Dewey would also take; it comes from being alive as opposed to being dead, both in a metaphorical and actual sense. The wonder of the thing, you have shown though, is the wonder of art education when it works. (laughter) And that is a very good thing to come back to, I think.

D. BURTON

The point I was trying to make is that art, in many cases, while it is a forming process, it occurs in the artist. It is not caused externally by the art educator, and in that sense the art educator can help the artist only by not throwing obstacles in his way. I don't know how many art teachers I've seen, when a kid sets into trouble with his art or doesn't know what to do, they'll say "Be expressive. Be original." Well, that is a tremendous burden. (laughter)

K. BEITTEL

"Be gifted."

D. BURTON

Yeah. In the sense, that's a whole set of presuppositions about what expression is. It is a lot easier to go right to it or rather attend to the creative act at hand and say, "Okay, I want you to make some art. We are going to create some art. This is what we have to keep in mind." At that point it becomes

a mechanical or a means problem. "Well, I would probably have to be expressive in order to do this thing, but that perhaps that object needs to be in mind, not necessarily what the statue will look like when I get through." But that object of consciousness, that intention to create art and the making of art conceptually then follows its creation.

AUDIENCE

I would like you to make clear to me the perspective of researches on phenomena which appears in arting. To what extent does the research deserve the name phenomenological research. What is not really clear to me is when can we say that we have respected what Husserl put forth as phenomenology which is reduction. For instance, in that example we have been offered in research on the phenomenon of arting, that bracketing has been used, was the bracketing necessary, and what has been bracketed? I don't know if my question is clear, I am not fluent enough in English to catch all the subtleties of the presentations, but it seems to me I have jumped over the bracketing aspect of phenomenology. I see the validity and the interest and that complete change in focussing in the intensity of the value of a research undertaken with the phenomenological approach. I would like to be sure that in undertaking my work, that I will bracket what has to be bracketed and that there is something to bracket. (laughter)

H. WAGNER

It is difficult, as you may know, from your field to answer in a few words about a question of technique, but I would do my best by saying the following: when Husserl said, "I have to set the world into brackets", then he said "I do not deny that there is a world. I do however not wish to make any statements about its reality; ontology in other words, is not my concern. That means not that I for other purposes can unbracket what I have bracketed and can make it a subject of another investigation. But now I don't want to." So that is number one. Number two, Husserl said, "Phenomenology has to be without presupposition." Now this a very contested thing. I can point out two presuppositions that Husserl made, never stated, but without which we cannot understand what he has done. Namely he presupposed that the conscious being, he speaks about, is an adult and rational. That is a presupposition of his whole work. But what he means is when I turn back into my own experiences, toward my own experiences, when I reflect on what has happened I will suppress as far as I can and as well as I can manage, all that I have learned about the mind about memory and about the subject I am thinking. Bracket the supposition as far as you can manage and as well as you can manage, and you can say how do these things look to me when I don't come up to looking at them with my

ready-made explanations and interpretations which I have all stored up in my mind and that's how we work normally. So therefore bracketing is always an effort to control oneself, to control oneself from, let's say, jumping to conclusions and from putting the results before the perception of things.

K. BEITTEL

Can I say something here? A very simple statement. It starts with "on the other hand". (laughter) And maybe I should stop here. (laughter) I think I will stop here. (laughter)

AUDIENCE

I would just like to say as an art educator, how very stimulated personally I have been by the material, but I would also like to say that as an art therapist how astonished I've been, as well as stimulated because it seems to me that something that has concerned me for some years which has been what seemed to me as a separation of goals in the areas of art education and my particular area seems perhaps not to be such a separation after all. I do have certain problems with where we are at the moment. And I may say I am not acquainted with phenomenology except a little through the work of R. D. Laing. And some of the problems relate I think to what Professor Wagner was saying a little in relation to the rational and irrational and I wonder how in terms of art what actually deals with the irrational in terms of the kind of structures and suppositions that we're using. A couple of things come to my mind. One of them, a couple of you must forgive me if you have heard before, is a story told by Jung at the time he was perhaps at the peak of his status when he had referred to him a patient from, I think a French psychologist who had failed with her in therapy, and this patient who was a woman, I think, in middle age who suffered from chronic insomnia and hypertension. She came to see Jung and he was confronted by this very tense woman, and the interview somewhat seemed to meander. It was a confrontation by the two individuals, but towards the end of the time, Jung feeling very depressed as he reports it said nothing really was happening. There was no interaction really taking place. At the moment a tune came into his head which he remembered from his boyhood which his mother used to sing. It was all about sailing. His house was by Lake Zurich and he looked out at the boats and he started talking in desperation with the patient about his own interest in sailing and talking about how one catches the wind in the sails, and so on, and how one takes advantage of it. Eventually feeling very ashamed of the whole interview, he sent the patient back and did no more about it. And I think that a year later he bumped into the referring psychiatrist who said, "I am very angry with you. You sent me no report on that interview with the patient I

referred and all she told me was that you talked about sailing and nothing happened. But whatever you did, it seemed to do the trick" (laughter) And what Jung reported about it was "You see, if a little tune comes into your head, follow it". (laughter) What I think I am really asking is a question of the status of the kind of information we may acquire in a given situation. How in fact we see it. How one deals with the irrational and then perhaps a further and supplementary question which comes back to my original comment, which is that it would seem to me that what distinguishes the literature of art therapy which is a very small literature, is that it is mostly oriented towards case histories and the particular and out of which generalization are very difficult whereas art education literature is mainly characterized by inspirational generalizations out of which the particular is very difficult to formulate. I wonder whether the implication of a conference like this is one that is looking towards particularization as a research mode really in terms of particularly the art experience and indeed what general inferences one can see coming from such particularization. And perhaps just one final comment, I am sorry to go on so long. I was interested in listening just again this morning to Professor Aoki in discussing the curriculum and wondering to what extent one can consider in a sense the inner curriculum or to what extent one is attending to the, call it, the hidden curriculum, but in fact what perhaps the art therapist might regard as the inner curriculum of the situation. I am afraid I have wrapped up the questions rather. (laughter)

AUDIENCE

I have a specific question to Marilyn referring to what Dr. Wagner was talking about this morning, about the limitations of the spoken language to express the fluidity of experience. I wonder in terms of applying this concept to one of your master's students or doctoral students, would you entertain a movie, a series of photographs, a video tape as a means of communication in research in description for its own sake?

M. ZURMUEHLEN

Well, I would certainly entertain all of those events or items that you have mentioned as means of communication. I am not certain whether you meant by that as a thesis or a dissertation.

AUDIENCE

Right, right.

Yes. Now I can say "yes" to that, and the reason it took me a few seconds there to think about it, it would be comparable I think to saying "Would I entertain words as a means of communication in a thesis or a dissertation?" and I would have to say "yes" the same way. Do you understand what I am trying to convey? That it makes a great deal of difference how those things are used whether they represent communication or whether they represent someone's process toward achieving a communication. And that gets us to the nature, I suppose, of how the academic world conceives of a thesis or dissertation, and they do, "we" I should say, conceive of it as a person's going through a process that does allow them to come to terms with their own grounding of knowledge to that point. But more than that, in the hope that it will also be able to communicate in some form, something of the funding of knowledge that they achieved at that moment to other people. So, I would want to make the same reservation about those forms of communications that I would make about language, that they would probably in academic life have to be subjected to the judgemental evaluation and guidance, however we want to put those things, of the faculty in the same way that words would be.

K. BEITTEL

Could I make a comment? Is it possible to make one more comment on the same issue? Since these Ph.D. theses for example, and M.A. theses exist within a tradition in academic communities, I'd preface my statement that way and also since I would make a distinction between a work of art and a work of knowledge, and a work of knowledge which is also a work of art, I am not excluding the possibility that they could come together. I would say that a film would not be a thesis. No. I would categorically say "No". In of itself it could be a work of art. It would, to me, not be a work of knowledge in the sense that at least the tradition of theses entertain. Now if that be a limit it's one which can expand as any limits can expand under legitimate attacks or even attacks, legitimate or not. Who cares? Irrational, perhaps. If they make their way into academia more power to them. I have always felt that the M.F.A. student should have to write nothing in a defense of his exhibition, for example. It's a mixing of categories. If he is getting a Master of Fine Arts, if he wants that other thing and his faculty want in addition some statement, that statement cannot be required to be scholarly in terms of supporting the art, at least. It's up and above. Art supports itself. And so does knowledge in my opinion. I am taking a strong stand, because I've faced this stand my whole career. Lowenfeld, for

example, thought one could get a doctorate by painting a mural. I thought it bastardized both murals and doctorates. I am a purist in that tradition in a way. I think they're mixing categories that can co-exist but are not the same.

M. ZURMUEHLEN

Maybe I should add one thing, as you talk. It strikes me that perhaps when you gave that example of Lowenfeld and the mural that I may have left a mistaken impression. I will tell you the kind of model that came to my mind as a specific example when you talked about that and I think that you addressed the question to me because of the examples I gave of master theses.

AUDIENCE

Yes.

M. ZURMUEHLEN

What came to my mind as you were talking was, for instance, the kind of things that Bateson and Margaret Mead did with the pictorial representation through photographs of various concepts that they felt they perceived and derived from their perceptions in their studies. That is the sort of thing I had in mind. There are some words in there but beyond the importance of the words there was some organization of the photographs by sociological concepts. There was not simply aesthetic organization. Now, I think there were aesthetics that entered into the organization as well, but there was a conceptual level of dealing with sociological concepts, if I can be redundant there, that I think separated it from the kind of portfolio that MFA people in photography put together. They made use of photographs and they used them I think in a different way, and it's in that light that I gave you the answer, I did. I think that I need to clarify that.

D. BURTON

Could I add one comment to that? That issue has come up before in the sense of perhaps a recorded medium, video tape in particular, would be more appropriate to our day and age when we see so much information displayed, would in fact a form of reading a dissertation on video tape be appropriate? Well, it wouldn't, because, as like you say, a work of knowledge, as a work of scholarship it has to be there more or less in print so you can go back and look at these things and say, "Wait a minute. Let me look at that again". This is not possible with the video tape. The stream of consciousness keeps flowing on and you really can't jump back and forth or you don't want to. In reading you can change your speed, slow down, speed up which

seems to me to be necessary as a physical element in theses.

AUDIENCE

I might just say one word, because that to me is a misuse to the video medium.

D. BURTON

Yeah.

AUDIENCE

That's not what I meant at all. What I was referring to was Dr. Wagner's suggestion, and I agree with, that words often distort experience. And I was just asking if we didn't have, as visual people, mediums of communication which would not distort as much the experience we were trying to study. I don't think that reading a theses on video is all what video is for. It's just a misuse of video.

D. BURTON

It's not what theses are for either.

AUDIENCE

I had the opportunity during the coffee break to give to Professor Aoki my interpretation of bracketing and reduction system, and I have been quite relieved and satisfied, and I feel safe that I can deal with Dr. Wagner's explanations. But now, I am anxious to know what you mean by "On the other hand." (laughter)

K. BEITTEL

I'll reflect an image I got as I heard Dr. Wagner give his answer. There is a philosopher at Penn State who has referred to me as a street corner phenomenologist. I got the image of walking down the street with brackets in my pockets Matt Dillon-like and a phenomenon attacks me. (laughter) And I whip out my brackets. (laughter)

T. AOKI

I would like to pose a question rather than try to answer. I speak as a general curriculum person concerned about the place of art education in the school program. And the concern that I have is, why a course like arts which deals with the fundamental

core of what it means to be human should be considered a frill in so many areas. And the question that I am asking also at the same time is "Are art people themselves helping the populace in placing art into a frill position?" I would like to see it as a basic core. Any reaction? Ken? Are you elitists?

K. BEITTEL

No. I think we contribute to its demise if you want my opinion. I think we contributed very well to the demise of art in the curriculum by defenses and apologetics and by not really attacking, not in the terms which the battle had been pitched. I think those of us who teach are committed to arting-being and bringing those together and learning and hope to do something at this particular level that we work, no matter however small it may be. I have no grand schemes for the world of art; I think that's partly our problem. We may talk generally about the particular. But the particular is what gets made and experienced, and it includes the general. I do think that is a nice flip. Just as through these phenomenological studies, whatever they may be, however we define them after this conference, you do learn something in general. You cannot separate the two. You study a good case of drawing, for example, a good instance of drawing, you learn something about "drawing" in quotes. You undergo making as a student, a teacher, as a human. You understand something about creating, making, "making art" as Dave called it, in general. That's no answer, but I think we've missed the, how to put it, we've missed the live part of it. That is the core. That is the being of art education and its troubles and its issues. Those are indeed the politics of art education. But that's a very simple-minded answer. As Dave said, "I know I am making art when I am making art."

T. AOKI

Yes, I am glad you have mentioned the politics of art education. Because curriculum is a political thing, as well as other things and too often we think of curriculum as apolitical, as if it were not concerned with politics. And maybe another conference is due.

M. ZURMUEHLEN

Could I make one quick comment about that curriculum notion. I wanted to respond to it when you first brought it up. As I perceive the problem with the so-called back-to-the-basics movement in curriculum, I don't see it as a problem of the arts only. It seems to me that the problem is a general curriculum problem and that people that I know who are in literature or in

reading if you want to be specific are very concerned to think that somehow reading is conceived of as only a skill, that they don't perceive that they are teaching only a skill when they are teaching reading, that that is not separated from the content, that people are best motivated to learn through meaning. I think that they feel that they have a great deal of evidence for that and I could go on and give examples through math and science but I won't keep making that point. But it seems to me that as art educators we've taken the wrong political stance, if you will, in becoming defensive about our own area. That it seems to me the best defense of this is made in terms of the educational values throughout the curriculum. It seems to me that the back-to-basics approach, of course that is a very key phrase, it has different meanings for different people, but as a code phrase stands for a mechanistic approach that is threatening equally to all areas of the curriculum.

J. VICTORIA

Thank you, Marilyn. I believe the time has come when we must draw to a formal close. Usually someone who moderates is supposed to give a synthesis of what has taken place. (laughter) I have my own synthesis and my own life-world of this event and I am sure you all have the same. And in closing then, I would just really like to express my heartfelt appreciation to all these fine people who have come together and have interacted with us, both in quotes "the audience" and "the participants" because we are all participants in one form or another and just allow me to say thank you, everyone.

CONFERENCE PROGRAM / PROGRAMME DE LA CONFERENCE

THURSDAY 6 APRIL, 7:00 - 10:00 p.m.
JEUDI 6 AVRIL, 19h00 - 22h00

Helmut R. Wagner, "Phenomenology In Art"

Marilyn Zurmuehlen, Respondent / Répondante

David Burton, Respondent / Répondant

FRIDAY 7 APRIL, 9:30 - NOON
VENDREDI 7 AVRIL, 9h30 - 12h00

Ted T. Aoki, "Toward Curriculum Research In a New Key"

Louise Bourbeau-Poirier, Respondent / Répondante

Douglas Boughton, Respondent / Répondant

FRIDAY 7 APRIL, 2:00 - 4:30 p.m.
VENDREDI 7 AVRIL, 14h00 - 16h30

Kenneth R. Beittel, "Qualitative Description of the Qualitative"

David L. McKay, Respondent / Répondant

Robert Parker, Respondent / Répondant

SATURDAY 8 APRIL, 9:30 - NOON
SAMEDI 8 AVRIL, 9h30 - 12h00

SPEAKERS' ROUNDTABLE AND DISCUSSION
TABLE RONDE ET DISCUSSION

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

TED T. AOKI

Professor and Coordinator of the Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction at The University of British Columbia. He has had extensive experience as a teacher and assistant principal in the Alberta Public Schools. He has been the head of a number of curriculum development and evaluation projects at both the provincial and federal levels and has served as consultant to numerous other projects. Professor Aoki has conducted research and published widely on the topics of curriculum theory, program development and evaluation in the areas of Social Studies curriculum and instruction. In July 1978, he will assume the duties of Professor and Chairman of the Department of Secondary Education at The University of Alberta.

KENNETH R. BEITTEL

Professor of Art Education, Department of Art and Music Education, Pennsylvania State University. He teaches courses in art education and ceramics and has directed numerous doctoral dissertations in art education. His pottery has been exhibited throughout the United States and in Arita, Japan. Professor Beittel has been the recipient of the Art Educator of the Year Award and the Manual Barkan Award. He has served as Senior Editor of Studies In Art Education and as Editor of Eastern Arts Research Bulletin. He has had three research grants from the U.S. Office of Education. The foci of these investigations were conditions that affect drawing strategies and a case methodology for the study of drawing. An interdisciplinary study of creativity was funded by the National Science Foundation. Professor Beittel has published extensively in art education and has written two books: Mind and Context in the Art of Drawing, and Alternatives for Research in Art Education.

DOUGLAS G. BOUGHTON

Assistant Professor of Education, University of Lethbridge. He has responsibility for the art education program leading to the B.Ed. degree. His art teaching experience includes both elementary and secondary teaching in Australia and Canada. Professor Boughton has a doctorate from The University of Alberta. He has served as an external evaluator for several curriculum projects

in Alberta and has been associated with teacher education programs for native Indian peoples. He has presented papers at provincial teachers associations, the Canadian Society for Education in Art, National Art Education Association and at the Wollongong Institute of Education in Australia. Presently, Professor Boughton serves as an Executive Member of the Editorial Board and as Editor of the journal of the Canadian Society for Education through Art.

LOUISE BOURBEAU-POIRIER

Coordinator of Art Education at l'Ecole des Arts visuels, Université Laval, Quebec City and Director of the undergraduate program with art teaching major. She is completing her doctorate at The Ohio State University, and her dissertation is entitled "Art Attitude Investigation at the Junior High School Level in the Quebec Area". Her articles have been published in *Vision*, the journal of the Quebec Art Teachers Association, and *Atelier*, the journal of *le Musée d'art contemporain* in Montreal. In 1966, she won the Province of Quebec Sculpture Award.

DAVID BURTON

Assistant Professor, Department of Art Education, Virginia Commonwealth University. He has had art teaching experience in the public schools as well as in higher education. His doctorate was earned at Pennsylvania State University and his research interests are in the domains of interaction analysis and phenomenology. Professor Burton has delivered numerous papers at the professional meetings of the National Art Education Association and other education conferences. His published papers on the topics of phenomenology and aesthetics have appeared in *Studies in Art Education* and *Art Education*, the journals of the National Art Education Association.

DAVID L. MCKAY

Associate Professor of Art, Department of Art, Northern Illinois University. He has served as Director of Graduate Programs in Art, Chairman of Art Education and as Director of Student Teaching in Art at Northern Illinois University. His teaching responsibilities include courses in art education and jewelry. Professor McKay's doctorate is from Wayne State University, and his writings have focused on curricular and instructional issues and appear in state and national art education publications. He has presented numerous papers and workshops at the conferences of the National Art

Education Association and other professional conferences at the state and national levels.

ROBERT PARKER

Assistant Professor Faculty of Fine Arts, Concordia University. He teaches courses in art education and art history, and his previous art teaching experiences include both elementary and secondary teaching in Iowa and art education at Frostburg State College in Maryland. He received his doctorate at The University of Iowa, and he has conducted a historical study of the development of aesthetic education. Professor Parker's recent research is on aesthetics and children's responses to works of art.

HELMUT R. WAGNER

Research Professor at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. He studied under Carl Meyer and Alfred Schutz. In 1970 he published the volume *Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations*, a part of the Sociology Series of The University of Chicago Press. Professor Wagner has also published articles on phenomenological sociology. His recent articles on the Bergsonian period of Alfred Schutz, intersubjectivity and transcendental problems or sociological conception, and the influence of German phenomenology on American sociology appear in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Review of Social Theory* and *Annals of Phenomenological Sociology*.

MARILYN ZURMUEHLEN

Coordinator of Art Education at The University of Iowa. She teaches art education and ceramics and is in charge of the doctoral, master's and undergraduate programs. She was Coordinator of Art Education at The University of Missouri, and has taught at The Pennsylvania State University and at the junior high school level. Her articles have been published in *Studies in Art Education* and other art education journals, and she has made numerous presentations at the Research Seminars of the National Art Education Association and state art education meetings. She has studied ceramics at Haystack Mountain School of Crafts and in Japan where she visited elementary and secondary schools. Her doctorate is from The Pennsylvania State University and her research has been on aesthetic response and classroom interaction analysis.

PARTICIPANTS A LA CONFERENCE

TED T. AOKI

Professeur et coordonnateur du *Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction* à *The University of British Columbia*. Il possède une vaste expérience comme enseignant et directeur adjoint dans les écoles publiques de l'Alberta. Il a assuré la direction de nombreux projets d'élaboration et d'évaluation de programmes d'études, tant au niveau provincial que fédéral, et a agi comme conseiller pour nombre d'autres projets. Le Professeur Aoki a dirigé des recherches et publié quantité d'ouvrages sur des sujets tels que l'aspect théorique des programmes d'études, l'élaboration et l'évaluation de programmes d'études et d'enseignement des sciences sociales. En juillet 1978, il cumulera les fonctions de professeur et de directeur au *Department of Secondary Education* à *The University of Alberta*.

KENNETH R. BEITTEL

Professeur en éducation artistique au *Department of Art and Music Education* à *The Pennsylvania State University*. Il donne des cours en éducation artistique et en céramique, et a dirigé de nombreuses thèses de doctorat en éducation artistique. Ses travaux de poterie ont été exposés partout aux Etats-Unis et à Arita au Japon. Le Professeur Beittel a été récipiendaire des prix *Art Educator of the Year* et *Manual Barkan*. Il a été le premier éditeur des *Studies In Art Education* et l'éditeur des *Eastern Arts Research Bulletin*. Il a reçu trois bourses de recherche de l'*Office of Education* des Etats-Unis. L'objet de ces recherches étaient les conditions influant sur les façons de dessiner et une méthode d'étude type du dessin. La *National Science Foundation* a fourni les fonds nécessaires à une étude interdisciplinaire sur la créativité. Le Professeur Beittel a publié beaucoup de textes sur l'enseignement des arts et il a écrit deux ouvrages qui s'intitulent *Mind and Context in the Art of Drawing* et *Alternatives for Research in Art Education*.

DOUGLAS G. BOUGHTON

Professeur adjoint en pédagogie à *The University of Lethbridge*. Il est responsable du programme d'études en éducation artistique qui mène au baccalauréat en pédagogie. Son expérience dans l'enseignement des arts englobe à la fois les niveaux élémentaire et secondaire en Australie et au Canada.

Le Professeur Boughton possède un doctorat de *The University of Alberta*. Il a fait l'évaluation externe de plusieurs projets de curriculum en Alberta et a apporté sa collaboration à la planification de programmes d'enseignement des maîtres pour les autochtones. Il a donné des conférences devant des associations provinciales d'enseignants, la *Canadian Society for Education through Art*, la *National Art Education Association* et au *Wollongong Institute of Education* d'Australie. A l'heure actuelle, le Professeur Boughton est éditeur du journal de la *Canadian Society for Education through Art*.

LOUISE BOURBEAU-POIRIER

Coordonnatrice en pédagogie en arts à l'Ecole des Arts visuels de l'Université Laval à Québec et Directrice du programme de baccalauréat avec majeure en enseignement des arts. Elle termine actuellement son doctorat à *The Ohio State University* et sa thèse s'intitule "*Art Attitude Investigation at the Junior High School Level in the Quebec Area*." Ses articles ont paru dans *Vision*, le journal de l'Association des professeurs d'arts plastiques du Québec, et dans *Atelier*, le journal du Musée d'art contemporain (Montréal). En 1966, elle a remporté le Grand Prix de la Sculpture de la Province de Québec.

DAVID BURTON

Professeur adjoint au *Department of Art Education* du *Commonwealth University of Virginia*. Il acquit son expérience en enseignement des arts dans les écoles publiques de même qu'à des niveaux supérieurs. Il a obtenu son doctorat de *The Pennsylvania State University* et ses domaines de recherche sont l'analyse des interactions et la phénoménologie. Le Professeur Burton a fait plusieurs conférences lors des assemblées professionnelles de la *National Art Education Association* et à d'autres conférences sur l'enseignement. Les documents qu'il a publiés sur la phénoménologie et l'esthétique ont parus dans *Studies in Art Education* et *Art Education*, journaux de la *National Art Education Association*.

DAVID L. MCKAY

Professeur adjoint au *Department of Art* du *Northern Illinois University*. Il a agi comme directeur des programmes d'études supérieures, président de la Faculté *Art Education* et du *Student Teaching in Art* du *Northern Illinois University*. Ses cours portent, entre autres, sur l'enseignement des arts et la joaillerie. Le Professeur McKay a obtenu son doctorat

du *Wayne State University* et ses écrits ont surtout porté sur les problèmes relatifs à la conception de programmes d'études et d'enseignement. Il a fait plusieurs exposés et présenté de nombreux travaux pratiques lors des conférences de la *National Art Education Association* et d'autres conférences professionnelles.

ROBERT PARKER

Professeur adjoint à la Faculté des Beaux-Arts de l'Université Concordia. Il donne des cours en enseignement des arts et en histoire de l'art et son expérience comme professeur d'art a été acquise aux niveaux élémentaire et secondaire en Iowa et en enseignement des arts, au *Frostburg State College* au Maryland. Il a reçu son doctorat à *The University of Iowa* et mené une étude historique sur l'élaboration de l'enseignement de l'esthétique. Les derniers travaux du Professeur Parker portent sur l'esthétique et sur les réactions des enfants face à l'art.

HELMUT R. WAGNER

Professeur de recherche aux *Hobart and William Smith Colleges*. Il a fait ses études sous la direction de Carl Meyer et d'Alfred Schutz. En 1970, il a publié un livre intitulé *Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations* (*University of Chicago Press*), qui fait partie d'une série d'ouvrages en sociologie. Le Professeur Wagner a également publié des articles sur la socio-phénoménologie. Ses articles récents sur la phase bergsonnienne d'Alfred Schutz, l'intersubjectivité et les problèmes de la transcendance ou la conception sociologique et l'influence de la phénoménologie allemande sur la sociologie américaine apparaissent dans *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Review of Social Theory* et *Annals of Phenomenological Sociology*.

MARILYN ZURMUEHLEN

Coordonnatrice en enseignement de l'art à *The University of Iowa*. Elle enseigne l'éducation artistique et la céramique et est responsable des programmes d'études du doctorat, de la maîtrise et du baccalauréat. Elle a été coordonnatrice en pédagogie des arts à *The University of Missouri* et a enseigné à *The Pennsylvania State University* et au niveau secondaire. Ses articles ont été publiés dans une revue intitulée *Studies in Art Education* et dans d'autres revues en enseignement de l'art; elle a également fait plusieurs exposés aux *Research Seminars* de la *National Art Education Association*. Elle a étudié la céramique au *Haystack Mountain School of Crafts* et au Japon où elle a visité les écoles

élémentaires et secondaires. Elle a obtenu son doctorat de *The Pennsylvania State University* et ses recherches ont porté sur l'analyse des réactions esthétiques et des interactions au niveau des classes scolaires.