The Kinship Model: Why Biodiverse Cities Matter

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1. The Limits of Positive Aesthetics

In some circles, the move by Speculative Realism (SR) to target reality as independent from human minds has not only turned heads, but has turned Phenomenology on its head. Of course, it sounds a little strange when SR advocates act like the mind-independence of objects is an entirely new value that challenges prior philosophical assumptions. Being realists, they are keen to distinguish nature's autonomy as free from the human mind, a view held by non-Idealists since Hume and Kant. The novelty of SR views centers on their critiquing phenomenology's tendency to frame knowledge as situated, perspectival, or intentional. While I am hardly an expert on SR, I remain unaware of any SR member who has proposed an implementable strategy in lieu of critiquing current philosophical methods. Either way, their concerns are legitimate.

I too consider mind-independence a necessary philosophical goal, yet I worry that SR's demand poses an additional challenge to environmental philosophers, especially those who employ anthropocentric premises to compel their readers to become active stakeholders in the planet's destiny. Even worse, I can imagine that viewing nature as mind-independent might even justify human inaction, out of respect for nature's independence.

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In this paper, I attempt to outline an alternative model that encourages human participation, while preserving nature's autonomy. I propose an environmental philosophy, which I call the kinship model, because it unites nature's diverse constituents in a manner that reflects greater scientific accuracy and therefore strives to accommodate nature's mind-independence, while inspiring its protection. Of course, many philosophers criticize science as being no less mind-dependent than human views of nature. On this view, all of knowledge (and all research into more accurate models) is debased as mind-dependent, a view that seems hopelessly untenable in the long run.

Those who view aesthetic judgments as thoroughly mind-dependent may consider it more accurate to view SR's stress on mind-independence as putting environmental aesthetics at risk, though not necessarily environmental philosophy. However, environmental philosophy is also at risk, since it evolved from environmental aesthetics (Hepburn 1966) and addresses human agency and action. SR's insistence on mind-independence also poses a challenge to environmental ethics, whose claims are grounded in human-centered values, and contests one of environmental aesthetics' central tenets, the idea of nature as a "cultural artifact." This notion was popularized in the 1990s by philosophers like Arnold Berleant who wrote, "We are beginning to realize that the natural world is no independent sphere but is itself a cultural artifact." (Berleant, 2004: 81)

On one hand, Berleant's remark ushered in the Anthropocene. On the other hand, I worry that viewing nature as a "cultural artifact" inadvertently credits human beings' thoughtless incursions as cultural contributions. Even if human beings have infiltrated every corner of our planet, nonhuman nature, however transformed, is not a cultural construct, but undergoes its own adaptations. One step toward mind-independence would be to treat culture (human artifacts) as a subset of nature, since homo-sapiens belong to nature, so from here on out, nature references include mankind. As science repeatedly demonstrates, nature is hardly indifferent to human beings, even though its activities are mind-independent. Consider migrant coyotes mating with refugee wolves and dogs to create super-predators known as coywolves (two-thirds coyote, one-quarter wolf and one-twelfth dog) that capably thrive amidst human environments where pure wolves would be shot (Velazquez-Manoff, 2014).

In contrast to Berleant's casting nature as a cultural artifact, Positive Aesthetics (PA) privileges wilderness as some aesthetic ideal exemplary of mind-independence. PA practitioner Allen Carlson contends that the "natural world is essentially aesthetically good", while Eugene Hargrove

claims that "nature is beautiful and has no negative aesthetic qualities" (Godlovitch, 2008: 272). According to Stan Godlovitch, Hargrove goes so far as to claim that ugliness in nature is "impossible". While the dearth of people inhabiting wilderness ensures SR's demand for mind-independence, philosophers typically deny the possibility that there remains somewhere untouched by human hands, let alone human minds.

In light of ugly beasts, stinky swamps, devouring sink holes, sublime vistas, and nature's potential for horrific destruction via hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires, lava spills, and droughts, PA's claims regarding nature's essential beauty are indefensible, and largely fantastical. In fact, nature's utter unpredictability probably explains why philosophers consider wilderness neither mind-dependent nor a "cultural artifact". I imagine people inhabiting environments believed to have been built to withstand nature's whims experiencing nature's unpredictability even more so. Were nature *essentially* positive, as PA adherents claim, human beings would not attempt to *tame* nature via agronomy, breeding/ domesticating animals, constructing dykes/ canals/ polders/ berms/ swales, pruning/ pollarding/ coppicing/ espalier, inventing GMOs/ pesticides/ herbicides, building greenhouses/ hothouses, etc. Nature is no doubt complex and operates along a vast invisible spectrum of entangled chemical reactions, energy forces, and biological motivations. Just as aesthetics admits that artworks' contents aren't necessarily perceptible, environmental aesthetics needs tools to ascertain nature's invisible contents.

I thus recommend aestheticians incorporate biodiversity into their views. Not only do scientists regularly measure biodiversity, which serves as a mind-independent yardstick of ecosystem functioning, but nearly 200 countries signed the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992. Of course, the variables human beings select to devise biodiversity models cannot escape mind-dependence, yet their success as models is constrained by mind-independent factors.

To develop my claim that the kinship model both preserves nature's mind-independence and enhances human beings' connection, I first review: 1) the pros and cons of a mind-independent environmental philosophy, 2) the implications for aspection, given its mind-dependent reliance on common sense, 3) the need for assessment tools that guide human action, 4) the reasons for grounding ethical action in kinship, and 5) recent research that suggests biodiverse cities exemplify the kinship model. Since human beings are part of nature, both are kindred participants in shared eco-systems. In light of human beings' tangled relationship with nature, I defend the kinship model, which eschews views grounded in human self-interest,

nature's essential goodness, or nature's inherent beauty. My primary goal here is to prevent nature's fans from incidentally becoming its hapless foes, whose sense of helplessness or esteem for nature's mind-independence justifies their standing idly by, as nature's opponents lament the erasure of man's historic role as the measure of all things. As for those whose high esteem for nature typically prevents them from acting on nature's behalf, I suggest that they reconsider such strictly preservationist stances.

2. Mind-Independence

According to Carlson and Berleant, "[L]inking the appreciation of nature to science suggests the possibility that positive aesthetic appreciation is nurtured by the scientific worldview, which increasingly interprets the natural world as having aesthetically positive properties such as order, balance, unity, and harmony" (Carlson and Berleant, 2004: 16). This point rather casts PA as mind-dependent, since order, balance, unity, and harmony are rather *mind-dependent* features. In contrast to some ideal of wilderness as completely isolated, or free from human influence, scientists increasingly notice that the co-existence of plants, animals, and even wildfires is environment-entwined. Exemplary of nature's capacity to react to its environment, Bettyann Kevles describes female gorillas sizing up their environment's potential harms before implementing a child-rearing program for their newborns. Peter Wohlleben characterizes trees as suckling their young or caring for the dead (Wohlleben, 2016) and Michael Pollan captures apples, tulips, marijuana, and potatoes co-evolving alongside humans, enabling each to unwittingly trade favors of interest, such as sweetness, beauty, intoxication, and sustenance (Pollan, 2001). He remarks that human beings offer marijuana mobility, while marijuana provides human beings altered states enabling forgetting. Finally, Glacier National Park's *Lodgepole Pines* require heat generated by wildfires to open cones containing seeds for future trees. Similarly, *Ponderosa Pines* germinate in mineral-rich seedbeds. Even if nonhuman-nature rarely depends on humans for its survival, nature remains inter-connected with its environment.

I imagine philosophers considering scientists' attributing such anthropomorphic traits to nature as exemplary of mind-dependence. But then again, one could say that all knowledge is mind-dependent since it is devised by and conceived for people's use. How SR intends to get around knowledge's mind-dependency remains to be seen, so I address this as it pertains to science. Although I have thus far mentioned mind-independence

about ten times, I've yet to explain its relevance for environmental philosophy, let alone environmental aesthetics. To do so, let's revisit PA. One may recall that I offered three reasons for rejecting PA. Namely, I showed the falsity of: nature's essential beauty, its inherent goodness, and scientific appeals to such "aesthetically-positive" properties as harmony, balance, order, and unity. Over the last four decades, complexity theory, nonlinear equations, and emergent systems arose to *order* chaos. Of course, some might argue that complexity theory exhibits *harmony*, nonlinear equations demonstrate *balance*, and emergent systems "self-organize" to display *unity*, but such notions tend to be rather aesthetic, not scientific.

Although scientists may discuss harmony, balance, order and unity, they are rarely the same concepts employed by environmental aestheticians, since scientists don't necessarily consider such properties perceptually available (visible) as aestheticians do. I thus don't see the scientist and environmental aesthetician agreeing on whether the slimy swamp exhibits balance and order. They may use the same terms, but they will give different reasons and/or point to different indications as evidence for their claims. Most likely, the aesthetician will have little or no access to what the scientist has identified, especially if the scientist's assessment required tools like microscopes, lab tests, or chemical analyses.

Scientists construct mathematical architectures to render otherwise invisible patterns, structures, and systems. Change the mathematical architecture's variables, and the new model either deviates from reality or reveals new patterns. Since the models must fit the systems under scrutiny, rather than satisfy scientists' preferences, scientists continuously rework mathematical architectures to fine-tune the model's capacity to convey the system. Scientists, who employ terms like order or balance, are not using them as aesthetic concepts, since they are not employing aesthetical judgments of taste, nor do they typically experience something as ordered, let alone make judgments based on perceived material evidence. There are far more considerations than meets the eye. By contrast, environmental philosophers explicitly employ perception to observe aesthetically positive properties. Aesthetically-positive properties are rampant in the environmental aesthetics literature, yet few question whether scientists and philosophers are employing these terms in the same manner. Fewer still fail to question the relevance of aesthetic properties for environmental philosophy.

As already noted, knowledge too is mind-dependent, as are aesthetics and ethics. The main difference between scientists and environmental philosophers is that scientists presume nature's autonomy, making them more like independent examiners who test for properties, rather than report

visible properties. This is not to suggest that science is not biased; evidence is not theory-laden; or that scientists' results are not tainted by false beliefs. Just as scientists employ biodiversity data to measure an ecosystem's health, environmental philosophers ought to consider using judgment-free evaluative properties, so that their tastes and preferences don't interfere with their evaluation of a site's conditions. For example, without testing a river's water or knowing which birds are indigenous, neither the water's clarity nor the sky's abundance of beautiful birds actually convey well-being. With environmental aesthetics, aesthetically-positive properties like order, harmony, balance and unity merely feign universality, yet each ecosystem has particular conditions that render such properties constitutive of environment. A site that is in balance under one condition might be out of balance elsewhere. For example, a wildfire in one forest could signal arson on the other side of the mountain. Employing purely visible standards leaves nature's fans helpless to know when and how to intervene.

For these reasons, I suggest environmental aesthetics forego its fascination with mind-dependent, aesthetically-positive properties. While people's love for nature is often inspired by their direct experience with nature and physical properties often trigger one's awareness of either the site's potential problems or its particular grandeur, aesthetic properties prove wholly insufficient for guiding ethical action. As discussed in sections 5 and 6 below, environmental aesthetics thus stands to employ mind-independent tools.

3. Aspection

Like most environmental aesthetic approaches, PA places its faith in the powers of observation, though its adherents specifically commend aspection, which they claim is cognitively richer, since it's particularly useful for ascertaining the most appropriate perceptual acts. According to philosopher Paul Ziff:

> [T]o contemplate a painting is to perform one act of aspection; to scan it is to perform another; to study, observe, survey, inspect, examine, scrutinize, etc., are still other acts of aspection. I survey a Tintoretto, while I scan an H. Bosch. Thus, I step back to look at the Tintoretto, up to look at the Bosch. Different actions are involved. Do you drink brandy in the way you drink beer? (Carlson, 2004: 62).

Although Ziff and Carlson both consider aspection an especially useful tool for assessing nature's status and deciding which actions should be undertaken to diminish nature's harm, I worry, however, that employing aspection risks to further nature's mind-dependence, since its boundaries require foreknowledge of a particular environment. Following Ziff's painting analogy, Carlson remarks that "[d]ifferent natural environments require different acts of aspection; and as in the case of what to appreciate, our knowledge of the environment in question indicates how to appreciate, that is, indicates the appropriate acts or acts of aspection." Absent appropriate acts of aspection, however, "[t]he result is the experience of a 'blooming, buzzing confusion', which in order to be appreciated must be tempered by common sense and scientific knowledge that we have discovered about the natural environment so experienced. Our knowledge of the nature of a particular environment yields the appropriate boundaries of appreciation the particular foci of aesthetic significance, and the relevant acts or acts of aspection" (Carlson, 2004: 72-73). To my lights, this move is circular, especially for a PA practitioner like Carlson who favors a more scientific approach that considers nature mind-independent.

4. Mind-Independent Assessment Tools

To grasp a system's disorder, scientists sometimes measure a system's entropy upticks, indicative of its increased disorder. Alternatively, lower entropies indicate more ordered systems. Scientists consider entropy to be generally increasing with time, so it seems paradoxical that environmental aestheticians would appraise order, which is distinct from Carlson's more scientific notion of "order appreciation". Order appreciation takes into consideration numerous invisible factors such as "the forces that bring natural configurations about, and we can be guided to the relevant features of nature by stories, [which come from] the sciences, including astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, genetics, meteorology, geology, and so on. These sciences and the natural histories they afford guide our attention to the relevant forces that account for the features of nature worthy of attention" (Carroll, 2008: 182). Order appreciation is thus part of Carlson's larger project for nature appreciation, which he calls the "natural environmental model", since he considers nature both an environment and natural (in contrast to Berleant). One obvious benefit of Carlson's notion of order appreciation, whose source of knowledge is science, is that it works for both aesthetic appreciation and environmental ethics.

Yuriko Saito notes that numerous critics of Carlson's views argue that science's anthropocentrism devalues it both in terms of its "practical application and conceptual orientation." As she clarifies, neither she nor Carlson proposes that "science will lead to an aesthetic appreciation," but that "our aesthetic appreciation of nature must be informed and adjusted by relevant scientific facts" (Saito, 2008: 156-157). To counter claims against science's anthropomorphism or views that science has already made a mess of the environment, she applies a "non-anthropocentric" appreciation of nature which urges that nature be understood on its own terms. Derived from Zen Buddhism, this methodology is free from "human categorization and conceptualization." "Rather than experiencing nature's aloofness or lack of rapprochement, with Zen enlightenment we 'enter into' or 'become one with' the object with our entire being" (Saito, 2008: 158). After referencing John Dewey's "sympathy through the imagination" as a way to appreciate art from the past or a foreign culture, she explores the Zen standpoint (Saito, 2008: 159).

Seeming a bit stuck as how to proceed next, Saito reconsiders how scientific information informs perception, and thus constrains mind-dependence. "In order to sympathetically listen to the story nature tells us, we must have some understanding of its origin, structure, function and the like" (Saito, 2008: 160). Scientific information focuses one's attention, enabling one to develop concepts and categories necessary for organizing one's observations. I next propose a complementary approach that I believe better embodies "a moral capacity for recognizing and respecting nature as having its own reality apart from our presence, with its own story to tell" (Saito, 2008: 163).

5. The Kinship Model: Maximizing Mind-Independence

To conserve mind-independence, I propose the kinship model, whereby we view all living creatures as actively engaging one another, since nature provides for and sustains human life, and vice versa. With the kinship model, inaction risks *immoral* consequences, even as it grants nature mind-independence, but it also prevents human beings from exerting control or assuming jurisdiction. For example, babies born to domesticated or zoo animals often require human intervention. To ignore a non-human mother's inadequacies is no less irresponsible than to refuse a human being's plea for help. Just as one acts to help a birthmother in such times of crisis, not acting to protect nature from human harm is wrong,

and ultimately detrimental to human life. Despite its similarity with Saito's Zen model, whereby one "enters into" or "becomes one with nature", the kinship model draws inspiration from Hepburn's 1996 essay that calls us to be one with nature. Hepburn writes, "[W]hen we speak of oneness with nature we may simply be meditating on the numerous common properties that we share with the nature we contemplate: we are ourselves in the scene and bodily continuous with it. Its life is our own life: we breathe its air; we are warmed, sustained by a common sun." He continues, "Here, oneness with nature *is* the aesthetic enjoyment of such chiming, resonating, reconciling, rhyming forms; much more than an intellectual recognition of them....Yet another way of being one with nature is to experience a sense of *equilibrium:* a sense of conflict with nature, of threat, even of causal engagement" (Hepburn, 2004: 133).

Of course, nature is no more mind-dependent than members of our kin (friends and immediate family), whose actions we can neither control nor pretend to understand as necessarily reasonable, just because they are close friends or family members. To what do we appeal to justify the demanding claim that human beings are committed to acting such that nature's injuries are minimized? This paper justifies such claims by appealing to relationships based on kinship which ensure mind-independence, while keeping human beings connected to their natural environment, and vice versa. One could even make the more radical claim that we owe more to nature, upon whose sustenance we depend, than to human beings with whom our daily lives don't intersect. Since human beings are part of nature, they too are kindred participants in shared eco-systems. In light of the kinship model, it's clear that views that frame wilderness as uniquely mind-independent and exemplary of ideal beauty problematically conceal mankind's connection to nature, and thus trivialize, if not ignore altogether, the constitutive nature of human beings' responsibility to non-human nature.

6. Biodiverse Cities as Exemplary of the Kinship Model

Since this paper proposes the kinship model as a practical, workable proposal, and not just a theoretical prospect, its efficacy must be assessed. Philosopher of biodiversity Sahotra Sarkar is particularly skeptical that biodiversity can serve as a useful scientific tool; yet biologists focused on ecosystem functioning, such as tree-biologist Michael Scherer-Lorenzen and zoologist Shahid Naeem, consider biodiversity indispensible, since they use it to quantify maximized productivity and resource exploitation, two

biological processes that tend to hinder invasive species. Ecology-oriented biologists consider biodiversity an independent variable, whose inputs are greater resource exploitation and productivity, in contrast to theories that view biodiversity as an input (dependent variable). Elsewhere, I've noted that biodiversity offers a bio-indicator of human cultural engagement, since biodiversity tends to be greater in locales where multiculturalism thrives (Spaid, 2015). Thus, routine biodiversity surveys provide useful information for ecology-centered biologists and aestheticians alike. Since each city's City Biodiversity Index (CBI) is routinely counted and reported, the CBI could easily serves as a bio-indicator of a city's ecological and aesthetic well-being.

Even though cities have far fewer native species than isolated rainforests or protected savannahs, they tend to have more natives than exotics. Cities tend to have more exotic plants (28% median) than exotic birds (3%) (Aronson, 2014). Moreover, biodiversity statistics offer city dwellers quantifiable factors that they can both own and take pride in, giving citizens good reasons to take whatever additional scientifically-advised measures are recommended to augment biodiversity. No doubt, species-positive actions go farther than mere "city beautification schemes", whose outcomes tend to be species-negative.

Until the millennium, urban planners commonly compartmentalize a city's diverse functions for leisure (parks, theaters and community centers), commuters (in/out arteries, public transit, and garages) and public works (waste processing, food production, and water treatment), rather than integrate them (Spaid, 2012:51). In the 1960s, only a handful of artists like Patricia Johanson or Alan Sonfist ever imagined cities serving as viable hosts for nature, let alone biodiverse environments capable of supporting urban forests, honeybees, and urban farms. Increasingly, urban communities that champion world languages, safeguard cultural rituals, and support ethnic foods encourage those attitudes that are most appropriate for inspiring inhabitants to value their environments and protect biodiversity. Cherishing kinship translates into respect for environment. It's thus particularly important that scientists collaborate with citizens to measure, evaluate, and publicize cities' biodiversity indices. Consider that the City of NYC Department of Parks and Recreation worked with 5000 volunteers to map 600,000 trees in all five boroughs (Silva, 2015).

Urban bee-keeping's unexpected success-rate in the early eighties first alerted scientists to cities' previously concealed biodiversity (Spaid, 2012:51). Biologists increasingly attribute the success of urban apiaries' pollinating opportunities to the way rural communities are increasingly blanketed with monoculture farms that require pesticides and herbicides to

reduce competition from insects and weeds. No doubt, human settlement has engendered species depletion over the centuries, but ignorance about the nature of cities has hastened species depletion in just 30 short years.

Fortunately, the past decade has witnessed a flurry of activity. In 2008, at COP 9 in Bonn, participants agreed to measure CBI, later renamed "The Singapore Index" a self-assessment tool enabling cities to "evaluate progress in reducing the rate of biodiversity loss in urban ecosystems" (27 September 2010). Using 25 indicators, CBI assesses 3 aspects: 1) a city's native biodiversity, 2) ecosystem services (water regulation, carbon storage, recreation, and education) provided by biodiversity, and 3) biodiversity governance and management. Since cities' biodiversity scores reflect region and age, how scores change post 2010 (the benchmark year) matters most. To capture, track and access all of this data, new fields like urban wildlife biology and urban ecology have sprung up to access cities' progress in improving biodiversity.

In 2011, another group of researchers encouraged the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) to document biodiversity in 114 cities (Nilon, 2014). In 2014, the London-based biology journal *Proceedings of the Royal Society B* "compiled the largest global dataset to date of two diverse taxa in cities: birds (54 cities) and plants (110 cities)" (Aronson, 2014). This data indicates that "although some exotic species are shared across many cities, urban biotas have not yet become taxonomically homogenized at the global scale and continue to reflect their regional bio-geographic species pool. Urban floras incorrectly clustered were primarily those in Australasia, which may be explained by the high proportion of exotic species from other regions in these cities, leading to more similar floras to these other regions." (Aronson, 2014)

This research affirms earlier suspicions that urban environments harbor CBIs superior to both rural environments, where pesticides (not queen bees) tend to reign supreme; and suburban ones, where manicured lawns replace habitat. Cities' lower levels of invasive species may be due to the fact that a greater species pool augments inter-species interactions, thus reducing invasive species' access (Aronson, 2014). The work of biologists Scherer-Lorenzen and Naeem totally supports this explanation, yet philosophers like Sarkar remain dubious. Either way, it's hopeful and helpful to recognize cities as biophilic oases. When it comes to hosting biodiversity, a city's greatest asset remains its botanical garden (plus a zoological garden if it has one), but if recent research is any indication, biodiversity thrives on roads heading out of town, in urban wastelands, and around rail tracks where habitat sprouts unabated (Von der Lippe and Kowarik, 2008; Aronson et al., 2014; De Smet et. al., 2015).

7. Conclusion

I began this paper by exploring the notion of nature as a cultural artifact, which is a prevalent view among environmental aestheticians. I noted that philosophy's burgeoning SR movement has put extra pressure on environmental philosophy to be more realistic, according nature mind-independence. While those who practice PA promote aspection as a promising tool, given its requiring varying perspectives, I consider it is no less mind-dependent than ordinary powers of observation accompanied (or even influenced by) by aesthetic judgments. Rather than merely critiquing environmental philosophy, I propose implementing the kinship model, which captures all of nature's constituents entangled in relationships. I view biodiversity as the best assessment tool for gauging nature's well-being and recommend that communities both take pride in and publicize their CBI. Only cities that measure and recognize the importance of CBI are prepared to benefit from and capitalize upon their thoughtful efforts to conserve species.

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ABSTRACT

Until Speculative Realism's arrival a few years back, few philosophers found it problematic to view nature as a cultural construct, circumscribed and dependent on human attitudes (Berleant, 1992: 53). While I share speculative realists' goal to strengthen philosophy's mind-independence (Immanuel Kant's goal as well), I worry that isolating nature as *beyond* human minds not only absolves human responsibility, but eradicates "kinship" relations, which capture non-human nature providing for and sustaining human beings, and vice versa.

To develop an environmental philosophy that affords mind-independence and offers evidence, unlike Positive Aesthetics, which idealizes wilderness, I discuss: 1) the pro/cons of nature's mind-independence, 2) the implications for aspection, 3) the need for assessment tools that guide human action, 4) the reasons for grounding ethical action in kinship, and 5) recent research that suggests biodiverse cities exemplify the kinship model. Inseparable from nature, human beings are kindred participants in shared eco-systems.

Key-words: biodiversity – Positive Aesthetics – wilderness – urban ecology – kinship

RESUME

Jusqu'à l'arrivée du Réalisme spéculatif il y a quelques années, peu de philosophes ont trouvé problématique de considérer la nature comme une construction culturelle dépendante des attitudes d'humaines (Berleant, 1992:53). Bien que je sois d'accord avec le but des réalistes spéculatifs pour fortifier l'indépendance d'esprit (c'est aussi le but pour Emmanuel Kant), je m'inquiète de l'isolation de la nature au-delà de l'esprit humain, qui pourrait effacer toute responsabilité humaine et éradiquer le rapport avec les êtres vivant proches qui encourage une relation avec la nature.

Développer une philosophie environnementale pour stimuler l'indépendance d'esprit, voilà ce que je vais décrire: 1) le pour et le contre de l'indépendance d'esprit, 2) les implications pour l'aspection, 3) la nécessité des outils qui guident l'action d'humaine, 4) les raisons pour des connaissances élémentaire de la nature, 5) les recherches récentes suggèrent que les villes biodiverses exemplifient un modèle d'affinités qui concerne la vie urbaine. Inséparable de la nature, les êtres humains sont des âmes sœurs qui partagent l'écosystème.

Mots-clés: biodiversité – esthétique positive – friche – écologie urbaine – affinités